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Abstract 
Recently, online social networking sites have exploded in popularity. Numerous sites 
are dedicated to finding and maintaining contacts and to locating and sharing different 
types of content. Online social networks represent a new kind of information network 
that differs significantly from existing networks like the Web. For example, in the 
Web, hyperlinks between content form a graph that is used to organize, navigate, and 
rank information. The properties of the Web graph have been studied extensively, 
and have lead to useful algorithms such as PageRank. In contrast, few links exist 
between content in online social networks and instead, the links exist between content 
and users, and between users themselves. However, little is known in the research 
community about the properties of online social network graphs at scale, the factors 
that shape their structure, or the ways they can be leveraged in information systems. 
In this thesis, we use novel measurement techniques to study online social net-
works at scale, and use the resulting insights to design innovative new information 
systems. First, we examine the structure and growth patterns of online social net-
works, focusing on how users are connecting to one another. We conduct the first 
large-scale measurement study of multiple online social networks at scale, capturing 
information about over 50 million users and 400 million links. Our analysis identifies 
a common structure across multiple networks, characterizes the underlying processes 
that are shaping the network structure, and exposes the rich community structure. 
Second, we leverage our understanding of the properties of online social networks 
to design new information systems. Specifically, we build two distinct applications 
that leverage different properties of online social networks. We present and evaluate 
Ostra, a novel system for preventing unwanted communication that leverages the 
difficulty in establishing and maintaining relationships in social networks. We also 
present, deploy, and evaluate PeerSpective, a system for enhancing Web search using 
the natural community structure in social networks. Each of these systems has been 
evaluated on data from real online social networks or in a deployment with real 
users. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Since its creation, the Internet has spawned many information sharing networks, 
the most well-known of which is the World Wide Web. Recently, a new class of 
information networks called "online social networks" have exploded in popularity 
and now rival the traditional Web in terms of usage [112]. Social networking sites 
such as MySpace (over 246 million users)1, Facebook (over 124 million users), Orkut 
(over 67 million users), and Linkedln (over 9 million "professionals") are examples of 
wildly popular networks used to find and organize contacts. Other social networks 
such as Flickr, YouTube, and Google Video, are used to share multimedia content, 
and others such as LiveJournal and BlogSpot are used to share blogs. 
Unlike the traditional Web, which is largely organized by content, online social 
networks embody users as first-class entities. Users join a network, publish their own 
content, and create links to other users in the network called "friends". This basic 
user-to-user link structure facilitates online interaction by providing a mechanism for 
organizing both real-world and virtual contacts, for finding other users with simi-
lar interests, and for locating content and knowledge that has been contributed or 
1The number of users refers to the number of identities as of November 2008 as published by 
each social networking site. 
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endorsed by "friends". 
The extreme popularity and rapid growth of these online social networks repre-
sents a unique opportunity to study, understand, and leverage their properties. Not 
only can an in-depth understanding of online social network structure and growth aid 
in designing and evaluating current systems, it can lead to better designs of future 
online social network based systems and to a deeper understanding of the impact of 
online social networks on the Internet. Online social networks also offer many useful 
properties that can be leveraged to enhance information systems, such as enhance-
ments to controlling information propagation, new directions for information search 
and retrieval, and new ways of reasoning about trust. 
Thus, the goals of this thesis are two-fold, aiming to both understand the prop-
erties of online social networks and leverage those properties in information systems. 
We describe each of these in more detail below. 
Our first goal is to understand the structure of online social networks, focusing on 
the social network graph that connects users. To this end, we conduct the first large-
scale measurement study of online social networks, capturing information about users 
in multiple networks at scale. By examining more than one network, we can determine 
which structural features are unique to one network, and which are common across all 
networks. While the operators themselves obviously have complete data about their 
social networks, this data is not generally available to researchers due to competitive 
and privacy concerns. Thus, we chose to collect the data ourselves by querying the 
3 
public interface provided. Our collected data (which we have made available to the 
research community in anonymized form) represents the first large-scale data set 
available to researchers for many of these systems. 
Our second goal is to apply our understanding of the properties of online social 
networks to build applications that leverage the information contained in social net-
works in innovative ways. In this thesis, we present two applications that address 
important challenges for information systems. The first challenge we address is the 
problem of unwanted communication, such as unsolicited marketing, propaganda, or 
spam. We demonstrate how to leverage the effort required to create and maintain 
social relationships in a social network to effectively block users from sending such 
communication without impeding legitimate communication. The second challenge 
we address is the problem of finding Web pages that are either new, not publicly vis-
ible, or of interest to only a small set of users. Due to the rapid growth of the Web, 
such pages are often not included in traditional Web search engines; we demonstrate 
how to leverage the shared interest between users in a social network to find such 
pages. 
At a high level, this thesis is divided into four distinct parts: (a) discussions 
of background, related work, and data collection methodology; (b) detailed studies 
on the structure and growth of online social networks; (c) an examination of the 
communities in online social networks; and (d) the presentation of two new systems 
that leverage properties of online social networks. In the next few subsections, we 
describe each part in detail. 
4 
1.1 Background, related work, and methodology 
This thesis begins with a brief history of online social networks, a discussion of re-
search related to this thesis, and a description of our data collection methodology. In 
Chapter 2, we provide background on online social networks and motivate this thesis. 
We describe the rapid rise in popularity of these networks and catalog the various 
mechanisms that today's online social networks provide for information sharing. In 
Chapter 3 we detail related work from computer science, sociology, graph theory, and 
theoretical physics. We describe previous approaches to studying the structure of so-
cial networks, the various data sets that have been collected so far, and applications 
that been built on top of social networks. 
In Chapter 4 we describe the data sets we have collected for study. We obtained 
data from six different online social networks covering over 50 million users connected 
together by over 400 million links. We describe the procedures used to collect these 
data sets and discuss ways in which our collection methodology limits our analysis. 
We also describe which of the data sets we have made publicly available and provide 
instructions for accessing them. 
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1.2 Network structure and growth 
To begin our analysis, we first focus on the graph formed by users in online social 
networks. In Chapter 5, we present an analysis of the structure of four popular online 
social networks: Flickr, YouTube, LiveJournal, and Orkut. Ours is the first study to 
examine multiple online social networks at scale; in contrast, previous studies have 
generally relied on proprietary data obtained from the operators of a single large 
network. Data gathered from multiple sites enables our analysis to identify common 
structural properties of online social networks. 
This analysis allows us to validate the power-law, small-world and scale-free prop-
erties previously observed in offline social networks, as well as to provide new insights 
into the properties of the social network graphs. We observe a high degree of reci-
procity in directed user links, leading to a strong correlation between user indegree 
and outdegree. This differs from content graphs such as the graph formed by Web 
hyperlinks, where the popular pages (authorities) and the pages with many references 
(hubs) are distinct [74]. Our analysis also shows that online social networks contain a 
large, strongly connected core of high-degree nodes, surrounded by many small clus-
ters of low-degree nodes. This suggests that high-degree nodes in the core are critical 
for connectivity and information flow in these networks. 
We observe an intriguing similarity between the structure of multiple networks, 
despite different mechanisms, policies, and conventions for creating links. This sug-
gests that links are created in a similar manner across all of the networks. Thus, in 
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Chapter 6, we use empirical data to understand the growth processes that lead to the 
observed network structure. Our analysis of large-scale growth data shows that new 
links are created and received by users in direct proportion to their current number 
of links, and that users tend to quickly respond to incoming links by creating a link 
in the reverse direction. Additionally, our analysis reveals a strong proximity bias 
when users select other users to link to: users tend to connect to nearby users in the 
network much more often than would be expected from previously proposed growth 
models. 
Our work on studying network growth is an important first step towards un-
derstanding the processes that shape the structure of online social networks. Our 
work enables the creation of synthetic networks that reflect both global and local 
characteristics of online social networks. Moreover, our collected data may lead to 
more accurate structural and growth models, which are useful for network analysis 
and planning. Such models can be used in the design of search algorithms (e.g., by 
pre-identifying users that are likely to be hubs), in data mining (e.g., by identifying 
candidate users to monitor), and in system evaluation (e.g., by allowing networks to 
be simulated over a wide range of sizes). 
7 
1.3 Communities in online social networks 
Next, in Chapter 7, we focus on how users form communities in online social net-
works.2. Communities are interesting for a variety of reasons. For example, users in 
a community tend to interact frequently, often share interests, and trust each other 
to some extent. Therefore, communities are useful, for instance, for guiding infor-
mation dissemination and acquisition, in recommending or introducing people who 
would likely benefit from direct interaction, and in expressing access control policies. 
Many algorithms for automatically detecting communities in social networks have 
been proposed [14,31,58,99,118,131,153,160]. However, these algorithms have never 
been tested over real online social networks at scale. 
We use detailed data from an online social network to study the effectiveness of 
existing approaches for detecting communities. We collect detailed data about the 
members of a university in the Facebook social network [49] and analyze the structure 
of communities in our data. We find that users are often members of multiple over-
lapping communities. We then examine whether these multiple communities can be 
automatically detected. Most existing algorithms have only been evaluated on non-
social networks, and we find that they do not perform well in detecting the multiple 
overlapping communities that exist in current social networks. 
We propose and evaluate a new algorithm that can infer memberships of multiple, 
2
 A community is a subset of the users in a social network that is more tightly interconnected 
than the overall network [119]. 
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potentially overlapping communities, when given information about a small subset 
of the community members. The algorithm uses the ratio between the number of 
links within a community and number of links between the community and the rest 
of the network. We demonstrate that the algorithm works well in practice: even if 
community membership information is only known for as few as 20% of the users, the 
remaining members of the community can be determined with high accuracy. 
1.4 Ostra: Leveraging relationships 
Finally, we present systems that leverage social networks to solve open systems chal-
lenges. In Chapter 8, we present a system that exploits the the difficulty in es-
tablishing and maintaining relationships in social networks to address the problem 
of unwanted communication. Internet-based communication systems such as email, 
instant messaging (IM), voice-over-IP (VoIP), online social networks, and content-
sharing sites allow communication at near zero marginal cost to users. Any user 
with an inexpensive Internet connection has the potential to reach millions of users. 
This property has democratized content publication: anyone can publish content, 
and anyone interested in the content can obtain it. Unfortunately, the same property 
can be abused for the purpose of unsolicited marketing, propaganda, or disruption of 
legitimate communication. 
We describe a method that exploits existing relationships among users in an on-
line social network to impose a cost on the senders of unwanted communication. Our 
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system, Ostra, (i) relies on existing social networks to connect senders and receivers 
via chains of pairwise relationships; (ii) uses a pairwise, link-based credit scheme that 
imposes a cost on senders of unwanted communication without requiring sender au-
thentication or global identities; and (iii) relies on feedback from receivers to classify 
unwanted communication. Ostra ensures that unwanted communication strains the 
sender's relationships, even if the sender has no direct relationship with the ultimate 
recipient of the communication. A user who continues to send unwanted communica-
tion will eventually lose the ability to communicate. An evaluation of Ostra on traces 
from an online social network demonstrate that it can effectively block unwanted 
communication. 
1.5 Peerspective: Leveraging shared interest 
In Chapter 9, we demonstrate how to leverage communities in online social networks 
to help users find interesting content. Users increasingly share content, recommen-
dations, opinions, and ratings using online social networks. However, the growing 
number of users and the increasing variety and volume of shared information on 
these sites aggravates two fundamental problems in information sharing: privacy and 
relevance. Since users are often sharing personal information, privacy and access 
control is critical. Additionally, since the volume of shared content is growing at an 
enormous rate, finding relevant information is becoming increasingly difficult. We 
argue that communities are an important concept that can offer a solution to this 
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growing dilemma. 
Most online social networks today allow only very coarse-grained content sharing 
policies: users typically have the options of sharing content with (subsets of) their 
direct friends or with everyone. Communities can provide a natural middle ground, 
allowing convenient sharing among groups of users who do not necessarily know each 
other but who are close together in the social network. Also, communities often 
represent sets of users with common interests, a fact that can be naturally leveraged 
by systems to provide information that is relevant at a local, rather than global, 
scope. 
Using empirical data from an online social network and from a system deployment, 
we demonstrate the potential for using communities in online social networks. We 
have built and deployed PeerSpective, a system that leverages communities in a so-
cial network in order to aid Web search. PeerSpective automatically indexes browsed 
pages and transparently inserts relevant pages viewed by friends into Web search re-
sults. The results are aggregated over the community and presented alongside the 
normal search results. Using data from a PeerSpective deployment, we demonstrate 
that communities represent groups of users with shared interests, and that PeerSpec-
tive provides a measurable improvement to Web search. 
Finally, Chapter 10 presents concluding remarks, discusses the implications of our 
work, and describes future research directions. 
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Chapter 2 
Background 
In this chapter, we first give an overview of online social networks, describing their 
characteristics, the reasons behind the growth in their popularity, and the range of 
user interactions they allow. Then, we describe applications of online social net-
works, motivating why understanding their structure and properties is a necessary 
step to building future applications. Finally, we provide background on metrics for 
the analysis for complex graphs. 
2.1 What are online social networks? 
We begin by denning online social networks, providing a brief history of their growth 
in popularity, and detail the mechanisms that today's online social networks provide 
for users to connect and share content. 
2.1.1 Definition and purpose 
For the purposes of this thesis, we define an online social network to be a system 
where (a) users are first class entities with a semi-public profile, (b) users can create 
explicit links to other users or content items, and (c) users can navigate the social 
network by browsing the links and profiles of other users. This definition is consistent 
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with that used in previous studies [38]. 
Online social networks serve a number of purposes, but three primary roles stand 
out as common across all sites. First, online social networks are used to maintain 
and strengthen existing social ties, or make new social connections. The sites allow 
users to "articulate and make visible their social networks", thereby "communicating 
with people who are already a part of their extended social network" [38]. Second, 
online social networks are used by each member to upload her own content. Note 
that the content shared often varies from site to site, and sometimes is only the user's 
profile itself. Third, online social networks are used to find new, interesting content 
by filtering, recommending, and organizing the content uploaded by users. 
2.1.2 A brief history 
We now give a brief history of online social networks. The site Classmates.com [30] is 
regarded as the first web site that allowed users to connect to other users. It began in 
1995 as a site for users to reconnect with previous classmates and currently it has over 
40 million registered users. However, Classmates.com did not allow users to create 
links to other users; rather, it allowed users to link to each other only via schools 
they had attended. In 1997, the site SixDegrees.com [145] was created, which was the 
first social networking site that allowed users to create links directly to other users. 
As such, SixDegrees.com is the first site that meets the definition of an online social 
network from above. 
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Online social networks began to grow in popularity as more users became con-
nected to the Internet. In the early 2000s, a number of general-purpose sites for 
finding friends were established, the most notable of which is Friendster. Friendster 
was focused on allowing friends-of-friends to meet, beginning as a rival to the online 
dating site Match.com. Other, similar sites created in the same timeframe include 
CyWorld [34], Ryze [140], and Linkedln [95]. 
In 2003, MySpace [111] was created as an alternative to Friendster and the others. 
MySpace allowed users to heavily customize the appearance of their profile, which 
proved very popular with users, causing MySpace to quickly become the largest online 
social network. As of this writing, MySpace has 247 million user accounts, over twice 
as many as the second most popular network, Facebook. For a more complete history 
and analysis of the evolution of online social networks, we refer the reader to the 
numerous papers by boyd [35,36,38,39]. 
With the rise in popularity of online social networks, many other types of sites 
began to include social networking features. Examples include multimedia content 
sharing sites (Flickr [52], YouTube [167], and Zoornr [174]), blogging sites (Live-
Journal [97] and BlogSpot [20]), professional networking sites (Linkedln [95] and 
Ryze [140]), and news aggregation sites (Digg [41], Reddit [132], and del.icio.us [40]). 
All of these sites have different goals but employ the common strategy of exploiting 
the social network to improve their sites. The list above is not meant to be exhaus-
tive, as new sites are being created regularly. For a more complete and up-to-date list 
14 
of the notable online social networking sites, we refer the reader to Wikipedia [96]. 
The sociological aspects behind the rapid growth and adoption of social networking 
sites are also the subject of much scholarship. One of the primary reasons that has 
been noted for popularity of social networking sites is their user-centric nature. The 
content that is shared on social networking sites is often information about the users 
themselves, such as their status, photos, and so forth. For more details, we refer the 
reader to the work by boyd [37]. 
2.1.3 Mechanisms and policies 
We now give a brief overview of the mechanisms and policies that most online social 
networks provide. 
Users 
Full participation in online social networks requires users to register a (pseudo) iden-
tity1 with the network, though some sites do allow browsing public data without 
explicit sign-on. Users may volunteer information about themselves (e.g., their birth-
day, place of residence, interests, etc.), all of which constitutes the user's profile. 
The social network itself is composed of links between users. Some sites allow 
users to link to any other user (without consent from the link recipient), while other 
^ n the rest of this thesis, we use the terra "user" to denote a single unique identity in a social 
network. Clearly, a single human may create multiple identities, and may even create links between 
their own identities. We consider each of these identities as separate users. 
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sites follow a two-phase procedure that only allows a link to be established when both 
parties agree. Certain sites, such as Flickr, have social networks with directed links 
(meaning a link from A to B does not imply the presence of a reverse link), whereas 
others, such as Orkut, have social networks with undirected links. 
Users link to other users for numerous reasons. The target of a link may be a 
real-world acquaintance, a business contact, a virtual acquaintance, someone who 
shares the same interests, someone who uploads interesting content, and so on. In 
fact, some users even consider the acquisition of many links to be a goal in itself [36]. 
When compared to links in the Web, links in online social networks combine the 
functionality of both hyperlinks and bookmarks. 
A user's links, along with her profile, are usually visible to those who visit the 
user's account. Thus, users are able to navigate the social network by following user-
to-user links, browsing the profile information and any contributed content of visited 
users as they go. Certain sites, including Linkedln, only allow browsing of profiles 
within the user's own neighborhood (i.e., a user can only view other users that are 
within two hops), while other sites, such as Flickr, allow users to view any other user 
in the system. 
Groups 
Most sites also enable users to create special interest groups, which are akin to 
Usenet [127] newsgroups. Users can post messages to groups (visible to all group 
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members) and even upload shared content to the group. Certain groups are moder-
ated, and admission to the group is controlled by a single group maintainer, while 
other groups are open for any member to join. All sites today require explicit group 
declaration by users; users must manually create groups, appoint administrators (if 
necessary), and declare which groups they are a member of. Certain sites (such as 
Facebook) create a few pre-populated groups based on the domain of users' email 
addresses, but the majority of groups do not fall into this category. 
The primary use of groups in today's networks is to either express access control 
policies or to provide a forum for shared content. Examples of the former include sites 
like Facebook, which, by default, allows only users located in the same geographic 
location or organization to view each other's profiles. Examples of the latter are more 
common, including Flickr's shared photo groups and Orkut's communities feature. 
Content 
Once an identity is created, users of content-sharing sites can upload content onto 
their account. Many such sites enable users to mark content as public (visible to 
anyone) or private (visible only to their immediate "friends"), and to tag content with 
labels. Many sites, such as YouTube, allow users to upload an unlimited amount of 
content, while other sites, such as Flickr, require that users either pay a subscription 
fee or be subject to an upload limit. All of the content uploaded by a given user is 
listed in the user's profile, allowing other users to browse through the social network 
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to discover new content. Typically, the content is automatically indexed, and, if 
publicly available, made accessible via a textual search. An example is Flickr's photo 
search, which allows users to locate photos by searching based on tags and comments. 
Once on the site, users can submit their uploaded content into groups that they 
are a member of. The privacy settings often allow for the content to be accessible only 
by group members. Moreover, the sites generally allow users to browse the content 
uploaded to groups they are members of. 
Users are also often allowed to create favorite lists, which link to a user's favorite 
content uploaded by other users. These favorite lists are also generally publicly ac-
cessible from the user's profile page. Similarly, most sites allow users to comment on 
pieces of content, much like a Usenet posting, and the comments appear alongside 
the piece of content itself. 
Finally, many sites contain most popular content lists, which contain the most 
popular content items (in terms of the number of views, comments, or ratings) that 
have been recently uploaded. Users can browse these lists to find new content to 
view. A notable example is YouTube's top-100 lists, where popularity is based on the 
number of views, comments, or favorite-markings a video has recently received. 
2.1.4 A new form of information exchange 
To underscore how online social networks represent different information distribution 
systems relative to systems like the Web, we focus briefly in this section on how con-
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tent is spread in today's networks. Most of the sites we study are designed for sharing 
content: Flickr, YouTube, and LiveJournal are used for publishing, organizing, locat-
ing, and distributing photos, videos, and blogs, respectively. 
To investigate the role played by the underlying user network in organizing and 
locating content, we conducted a simple measurement of how users browse the Flickr 
system. We analyzed the HTTP requests going to the fl ickr.com domain from an 
HTTP trace taken at the border routers of Technical University of Munich between 
August 17th, 2006 and October 11th, 2006. We found 22,215 photo views from at least 
1,056 distinct users. For each of these views, we examined the browser's clickstream 
to determine what action led the user to a given photo. 
We found that 17,897 of these views (80.6%) resulted from following links in the 
Flickr user graph or from following links between photos within a user's collection. 
In other words, 80.6% of the time, the social network of Flickr users was used in 
browsing content. We count these views as being influenced by the social network. 
Of the remaining, 1,418 (6.3%) views involved Flickr search facilities. Finally, only 
2,900 (13.1%) views followed a link from an external source, such as links from an 
external Web site or links received via email. Neither of the latter sets of views 
(19.4%) involved the social network. 
Thus, our experiment demonstrates that the social network in Flickr plays an 
important role in locating content: four out of five photos were located by traversing 
the social network links. 
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2.2 Why study online social networks? 
Online social networking is still very much in its infancy, yet it already forms the basis 
for some enormously popular applications. As this paradigm matures, we expect 
more sophisticated applications to naturally emerge. It is not inconceivable that 
social networking systems will eventually become de-facto portals for both personal 
and commercial online interactions. Below, we outline a few of the many potential 
applications that could benefit from understanding the structure of and information 
flow in these networks. Additionally, we speculate on how the data collected in this 
thesis could be relevant to researchers in other disciplines. 
2.2.1 Trust 
Adjacent users in a social network tend to trust each other more than random pairs 
of users in the network. A number of research systems have already been proposed 
to exploit this trust. Trust relationships are being used in the PGP web of trust [172] 
to eliminate the need for a trusted certificate authority. SybilGuard [169] and Sybil-
Limit [168] uses the social network to mitigate Sybil [44] attacks in distributed sys-
tems, exploiting the fact that real people tend to have a diverse set of social relations. 
R E [57] determines the social network distance between the sender and the receiver 
of an email to aid SPAM detection. We believe that a deeper understanding of the 
underlying topology is an essential first step in the design and analysis of robust trust 
and reputation metrics for these systems. 
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2.2.2 Shared interest 
Adjacent users in a social network also tend to share common interests. Users browse 
neighboring regions of their social network because they are likely to find content 
that is of interest to them. Systems such as Yahoo My Web [165], Google Co-op [60], 
and PeerSpective [104] use social networks to rank Internet search results relative to 
the interests of a user's social network. Using the content viewed and search results 
clicked on by members of a social network, these systems to rank the results of the 
members' future searches more accurately. 
Clearly, understanding the structure of online social networks, as well as the pro-
cesses that shape them, is important for these applications. For example, efficient 
algorithms are needed for inferring the actual degree of shared interest between two 
users, or the reliability of a user (as perceived by other users). It is also important 
to understand the robustness of such networks to deliberate attempts of manipu-
lation. These topics are beyond the scope of this thesis; however, a fundamental 
understanding of online social network structure is likely to be a necessary first step. 
2.2.3 Content exchange 
The phenomenal popularity of social networking sites like YouTube, Flickr, and MyS-
pace represents a shift in how content is published, located, and distributed on the 
Internet. Understanding how content diffuses through these networks and becomes 
popular over time is not only of academic interest, but is increasingly important in 
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commercial advertising, in political campaigning, and ultimately to society. In fact, 
a number of research efforts [42, 43, 66, 72,137,158] have proposed viral marketing 
campaigns to leverage the word-of-mouth effect. In 2007 alone, $1.2 billion was spent 
on advertisement in online social networks worldwide, and this is expected to triple 
by 2011 [147]. Understanding how information flows among users of online com-
munities is an important step toward the design and analysis of future information 
dissemination systems. 
Understanding how information flows in online social networks can also aid design-
ers of current social networking systems. If, for example, one can predict the relative 
popularity of newly introduced objects, caching and pre-fetching schemes can be cre-
ated to reduce the latency and bandwidth required by the site. Since many of the 
currently popular sites rely primarily on advertising for revenue, reducing distribution 
costs for multimedia content is clearly a pressing issue. 
Understanding how content flows through social networks also has the potential 
to improve search algorithms. By examining the content that users view or mark 
as a favorite, sites may be able to suggest other content that may be of interest 
to the user. Many have noted [10] that the age of the Internet has enabled much 
greater diversity in preferences and tastes; using online social networks appears to be 
a natural approach to further discover and refine tastes. 
Finally, understanding how content is exchanged in online social networks can 
help guide the designers of future systems. Social networks have already proven to be 
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useful in a number of different contexts, and we are seeing new sites popping using 
social networks to predict music preferences, find potential job applications, and share 
content. By understanding the user structure and the properties of information flow, 
designers of future systems have a empirical basis for designing and provisioning their 
systems. 
2.2.4 Other disciplines 
As mentioned before, our work has relevance beyond computer systems. To sociolo-
gists, online social networks offer an unprecedented amount of data. These systems 
represent the complete evolution of a large, contained online social network, with the 
accompanying timeline of every event that occurred within them. Sociologists can 
examine this data to validate existing theories of communication, as well as to look 
for new forms of communication. 
To political scientists and marketing specialists, studying how information flows 
through social networks may help improve techniques such as targeted advertising and 
viral marketing. Political candidates have already realized the importance of blogs 
in recent elections [133]. Similarly, marketing specialists are already experimenting 
with paid viral marketing [125] to better promote products and companies. Clearly, 
a better understanding of how content is currently being exchanged in these systems 
holds the potential to improve these approaches. 
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2.3 How do we analyze complex networks? 
We now discuss the various ways of analyzing and characterizing the shape of large 
networks, and conclude with a discussion of the various classes of graphs that have 
been observed in the real world. 
2.3.1 Preliminaries 
We assume that we have a network which can be viewed as a graph G = (V, E). In 
the context of an online social network, for example, the vertices represent users and 
the edges represent relationships among users. The links in the graph can either be 
directed, meaning each link is sourced at one node and terminated at another node, or 
undirected, meaning each link is between two nodes without a source and destination. 
Consistent with previous work, we define a node i's degree, denoted by di, to be 
the number of links the node has to other nodes. For directed networks, we distin-
guish between indegree (the number of incoming links) and outdegree (the number of 
outgoing links). Also for directed networks, we consider the level of symmetry in the 
network to be the fraction of links that have a corresponding reverse link. 
2.3.2 Radius and diameter 
We now discuss the radius and diameter of a graph, which represents how far away 
nodes are from each other in the network. First, the eccentricity of a node v is the 
maximal shortest path distance between v and any other node. The radius of a graph 
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is then the minimum eccentricity across all vertices, and the diameter is the maximum 
eccentricity across all vertices. Thus, the radius represents the maximal distance from 
the most "central" node in the graph to all other nodes, and the diameter represents 
the maximal distance from the least "central" node in the graph to all other nodes. 
Due to the computational complexity associated with determining the actual ra-
dius and diameter, the radius and diameter of a graph is often estimated by calculating 
the eccentricity of a large random sample of nodes in the network. In such cases, the 
diameter should be viewed as a lower bound of the true diameter, and the radius as 
an upper bound of the true radius. 
2.3.3 Degree distribution 
The degree distribution of a graph is a function P(k) which describes the fraction 
of the network's nodes which have degree k. The degree distribution describes how 
the links in the graph are distributed among the nodes. For example, the degree 
distribution of a graph with randomly placed edges among n nodes follows a binomial 
distribution of 
p(fe) = ("^ i y( i -pr - i - f c (2.i) 
where p represents the probability that any two nodes are connected. Most real-world 
networks have been shown to deviate from random graphs, and instead, have a bias 
whereby a few high-degree nodes hold a large fraction of the links. 
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2.3.4 Joint degree distribution 
In addition to the degree distribution P(k), we also focus on the joint degree distri-
bution (JDD) represented as J(k,m). The function J(k,m) represents what fraction 
of the links in the graph are between nodes of degree k and degree m. In the case of 
a directed network, J(k, m) represents the fraction of links that are from a node with 
outdegree k and to a node with indegree m. Thus, the JDD represents how often 
nodes of different degrees connect to each other. This property is also referred to as 
the 2K-distribution [101] or the mixing patterns [116]. 
The JDD provides many insights into the structural properties of networks. For 
example, networks where high-degree nodes tend to connect to other high-degree 
nodes are more likely to be subject to epidemics, as a single infected high-degree 
node will quickly infect other high-degree nodes. On the other hand, networks where 
high-degree nodes tend to connect to low-degree nodes show the opposite behavior; 
a single infected high-degree node will not spread an epidemic very fast. 
The JDD can be approximated by the degree correlation function knn, which is a 
mapping between outdegree and the average indegree of all nodes connected to nodes 
of that outdegree. Clearly, an increasing knn indicates a tendency of higher-degree 
nodes to connect to other high-degree nodes; a decreasing knn represents the opposite 
trend. 
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2.3.5 Scale-free behavior 
The scale-free metric s(G) [91] of a graph is a value calculated directly from the joint 
degree distribution of a graph. The scale-free metric ranges between 0 and 1, and 
measures the extent to which the graph has a hub-like core. To define the s(G), we 
first define s'(G) as 
s'(G) = Y^ dA (2-2) 
Then, we define the scale-free metric s(G) as 
s(G) = ?P- (2.3) 
"max 
where s'max represents the maximum value of s' over all graphs with the same degree 
distribution of G. A high scale-free metric means that high-degree nodes tend to 
connect to other high-degree nodes, while a low scale-free metric means that high-
degree nodes tend to connect to low-degree nodes. 
2.3.6 Assortat ivity 
The scale-free metric is related to the assortativity coefficient r, which is a measure 
of the likelihood for nodes to connect to other nodes with similar degrees. The 
assortativity is defined as the Pearson correlation coefficient between the degrees of 
all pairs of nodes connected by an edge. Thus, the assortativity coefficient ranges 
between -1 and 1; a high assortativity coefficient means that nodes tend to connect to 
nodes of similar degree, while a negative coefficient means that nodes likely connect 
to nodes with very different degree from their own. 
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2.3.7 Clustering coefficient 
The clustering coefficient of a node i, denoted by c(i), is defined as the number of 
directed links that exist between the node's neighbors, divided by the number of 
possible directed links that could exist between the node's neighbors. Thus, if a node 
i's neighbors have n directed links between them, then the clustering coefficient of i 
is defined as 
7X 
The clustering coefficient of a graph is the average clustering coefficient of all its 
nodes, and we denote it as C(G), or 
C(G) = Eve^{v) (2.5) 
Thus, the clustering coefficient of a graph ranges between 0 and 1, with higher values 
representing a higher degree of "cliquishness" between the nodes. In particular, a 
graph with clustering coefficient of 0 contains no "triangles" of connected nodes, 
whereas a graph with clustering coefficient of 1 is a perfect clique. 
2.3.8 Betweenness centrality 
The betweenness centrality B of an edge, originally proposed by Girvan and New-
man [119], is defined as the number of shortest paths between all pairs of vertices 
in the graph that cross the edge. If a pair of vertices have multiple shortest paths 
between them, then each path is assigned a weight such that the sum over all paths 
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is one. Thus, betweenness centrality for an edge e can be expressed as 
where cr(u,v) represents the number of shortest paths between u and v, and ae(u,v) 
represents the number of shortest paths between u and v that include e. The be-
tweenness centrality of an edge can be viewed as a metric for the importance of an 
edge in a graph, as edges with a higher betweenness centrality fall on more shortest 
paths, and are therefore more important for the structure of the graph. 
2.3.9 Modularity 
When examining communities in networks, one often requires an objective metric to 
evaluate how "good" a particular division of the network into communities is. One 
such metric is the the modularity measure proposed by Newman [118]. Consider a 
community structure of k communities. Let e be a symmetric k x A; matrix, whose 
element e^ is the fraction of edges in the network that connect vertices in community 
i to community j by considering all the edges in the original network. Also, we define 
ai = ^2j eij b e the fraction of edges that touch vertices in community i. Then, the 
trace of the matrix Tr e = ^ en gives the fraction of edges in the network within 
the same community. Hence, modularity is defined as 
Q = J > « - a ? H T r e - | | e 2 | | (2-7) 
i 
where ||y|| indicates the sum of elements of matrix y. Modularity is then a measure 
of the fraction of intra-community edges minus the expected value of the same quan-
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tity in a network with the same community divisions, but with edges placed without 
regard for communities. Modularity therefore ranges from -1 to 1, with 0 representing 
no more community structure than would be expected in a random graph, and signif-
icantly positive values representing the presence of community structure. In practice, 
a modularity over 0.3 or higher is observed in real-world networks with significant 
community structure [118]. 
2.3.10 Connected components 
Finally, we discuss the notion of connected components in graphs. For an undirected 
graph, a connected component as a subset of the nodes such that there is a path in 
the network between all pairs of nodes in the set. For a directed graph, we distin-
guish between a strongly connected component and a weakly connected component. A 
strongly connected component (SCC) is defined as a set of nodes such that there is 
a path in the network between all pairs of nodes in the set. In contrast, a weakly 
connected component (WCC) is defined as a set of nodes such that there is a path 
in the network between all pairs of nodes in set if the all links in the network were 
viewed as undirected. 
Studies of real-world networks, such as the Web and the Internet topology, has 
shown that there often exists a single, dominating SCC which is orders of magnitude 
larger than all other SCCs [23]. In this thesis, we refer to this dominating component 
as the dominant SCC . 
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2.3.11 Classes of studied networks 
Now, we detail classes of complex networks that have been observed in the real world. 
For more detail on these networks, we refer the reader to the survey by Newman [117]. 
Random networks have been heavily studied, starting with the seminal paper by 
Erdos and Reyni [48]. These graphs are usually constructed by randomly adding 
links to a static set of nodes. Researchers have shown that random graphs tend to 
exhibit very short average path lengths between any two nodes [78]. More recent 
work on random graphs has provided mechanisms to construct graphs with specified 
degree distributions [108] and characterized the size of the large strongly connected 
component [109]. 
Power-law networks are networks where the probability that a node has degree 
k is proportional to k~a, for large k and a > 1. Thus, the degree distribution of 
a power-law network follows an exponential decay. The parameter a is called the 
power-law coefficient. Researchers have shown many real-world networks are power-
law networks, including Internet topologies [51], the Web [15,83], social networks [4], 
neural networks [22], and power grids [128]. 
Scale-free networks are a class of power-law networks where the high-degree nodes 
tend to be connected to other high-degree nodes. Scale-free graphs are discussed in 
detail by Li et al. [91], and are defined as networks with a significant scale-free metric 
a(G). 
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Small-world networks have a small diameter and exhibit a high clustering coef-
ficient. Studies have shown that the Web [7,23], scientific collaboration [115], film 
actors [9], and general social networks [4] have small-world properties. Kleinberg [76] 
proposed a model to explain the small-world phenomenon in social networks, and 
also examined navigability in these networks [75]. The online social networks ex-
amined in this thesis demonstrate small-world properties much like their real-world 
counterparts. 
2.3.12 Preferential attachment 
Preferential attachment [15], also known as cumulative advantage [170] or the rich 
get richer phenomenon, is a property of link formation in a graph. In short, prefer-
ential attachment says that the likelihood of a node being attached to a new link is 
in proportion to the node's degree. Preferential attachment in a given network can 
be characterized as linear, if the probability of a node receiving a link is in linear 
proportion to the node's degree, or sub-linear, if the probability of a node receiving 
a link is, for example, in proportion to the log of the node's degree. Under cer-
tain circumstances, preferential attachment has been shown to result in power-law 
networks [15]. 
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Chapter 3 
Related Work 
In this chapter, we describe prior work related to the topics presented in this thesis. 
As this thesis covers a number of different topics, the related work has been grouped 
into sections detailing (a) work that examines the static structural properties of com-
plex networks, (b) work that examines how complex networks evolve, (c) work that 
identifies and uses communities in online social networks, (d) work that tries to solve 
the problem of unwanted communication, and (e) work that tries to personalize web 
search. 
3.1 Complex network structure 
We begin by examining work that characterizes the structure of static snapshots 
of large scale networks. In following chapters, we examine the static snapshots of 
multiple online social networks. In order to ground our analysis, we compare our 
results to those from other large-scale complex networks such as the Web and the 
Internet. Thus, we describe related work that studies these networks after describing 
work that studies social networks. 
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3.1.1 Social networks 
Sociologists have studied many of the properties of offline social networks, and we only 
briefly describe a few of the relevant findings. For a more complete overview of offline 
social networks and associated analysis techniques, we refer the reader to the book 
by Wasserman [157]. Milgram [102] showed that the average path length between 
two Americans was six hops, demonstrating that social networks can be classified 
as small-world. Pool and Kochen [129] provided an analysis of how the small-world 
property of social networks affects contacts and influence. The influential paper by 
Granovetter [63] argued that a social network can be partitioned into 'strong' and 
'weak' ties, and that the strong ties are tightly clustered, while the weak ties represent 
longer-distance relationships. We were able to verify that online social networks have 
similar properties, with short path lengths and strong clusters connected by long-
distance links. 
As online social networks gained popularity, researchers have begun to investigate 
their properties. Adamic et al. [4] studied an early online social network at Stanford 
University, and found that the network has small-world characteristics as well as a 
significant clustering coefficient. Liben-Nowell et al. [94] found a strong correlation 
between friendship and the geographic location of users by using data from Live-
Journal. Kumar et al. [82] examined two online social networks from Yahoo! and 
found that both possessed a dominant SCC. Girvan and Newman observed that users 
in online social networks tend to form tightly knit groups [58], evidenced by a high 
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clustering coefficient. We were able to verify all of these properties on multiple sites 
and on a much larger scale in our study. 
In more recent work, Ahn et al. [6] analyzed complete data from the large South 
Korean social networking site Cyworld [34], along with data from small sample crawls 
of MySpace and Orkut. The authors obtained data directly from CyWorld operators, 
and the volume of available data allows the authors to conduct an in-depth study of 
that site using some of the same metrics that we use in this thesis. The comparison 
with different networks, on the other hand, is limited by the small crawled data 
samples of MySpace and Orkut. Our study is largely complementary: the data 
available to us for any one site is less detailed, but we are able to compare large 
crawled data sets from multiple sites. 
Finally, researchers have also examined how the activity network, or the pattern of 
interactions between users, compares with the social network. In particular, Wilson 
et al. [163] studied the activity network of samples of the Facebook network and found 
that, in contrast to the social network, the activity network is much more sparse and 
has a significantly lower maximal degree. Chun et al. [29] found similar properties 
for the interaction network in CyWorld. In our work, we focus only on the social 
network, but our approach and methods could be naturally applied to the activity 
network as well. 
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3.1.2 Other information networks 
A long thread of research examines the structure of information networks like the 
graph of Web pages and the Internet's routing topology. A prominent study of Web 
structure [23] showed that the Web has a "bow-tie" shape, consisting of a dominant 
SCC, and groups of nodes that can either reach the SCC or can be reached from the 
SCC. We show that the social networks share a similar dominant SCC, but that this 
component is relatively much larger than that of the Web. Faloutsos et al. [51] found 
that the degree distribution of the Internet's routing topology follows a power-law, 
and Siganos et al. [144] demonstrated that the high-level structure of the Internet 
resembles a "jellyfish". 
Kleinberg [77] showed that high-degree nodes can be observed in the Web that 
function either as hubs (pages containing useful references on a subject) or authorities 
(pages containing relevant information on a subject). Kleinberg also presented an 
algorithm [74], which, when given a graph of Web pages, can infer pages function 
as hubs and as authorities. The well-known PageRank algorithm [122] uses the Web 
structure to determine pages that are considered reputable. Our results indicate 
that in online social networks, the high degree of link symmetry may prevent such 
algorithms from working, since the hubs are automatically also the authorities. 
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3.2 Complex network growth 
In addition to the study of the static structure of various information networks, re-
searchers have also examined the evolution of networks, looking at the processes by 
which links are formed and removed. Consistent with previous work, we refer to these 
processes as growth models. In our work, we collect detailed data on the growth of 
online social networks. Thus, in this section, we describe related work on various 
growth models, and detail the extent to which they have been validated on real data. 
3.2.1 Growth models 
Growth models for complex networks can be partitioned into structural models (i.e., 
models that only take into account the structure of the network to predict link forma-
tion or removal) and explanatory models (i.e., models that consider external factors, 
such as human factors in online social networks, to predict links). We describe each 
of these types of models below. 
Structural growth models 
Researchers sought to explain the intriguing similarity in the high-level structural 
properties across networks of very different scales and types by hypothesizing that 
the networks are the result of a few common structural growth processes at work. 
Many models of these processes have been proposed and analyzed to explain the 
structure of complex networks. 
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The well-known Barabasi-Albert (BA) model [15], based on preferential attach-
ment, has been shown to result in networks with power-law degree distributions. 
In the BA model, new links are attached to nodes using a probability distribution 
weighted by node degree, resulting in linear preferential attachment. Many extensions 
to the BA model have been proposed (e.g., to add a tunable level of clustering [67]). 
We are able to verify that the growth of online social networks follows linear prefer-
ential attachment, but not in the way that the BA model proposes. 
Another class of models that produce power-law networks are based on local rules, 
such as the random walk model [142,154], where nodes select new neighbors by taking 
random walks; the common neighbors model [114], where nodes select new neighbors 
by picking nodes with whom they share many friends in common; and the finite 
memory model [79], where nodes eventually become inactive and stop receiving any 
new links. All of these models exhibit preferential attachment (since high-degree 
nodes end up being selected more often), but with higher levels of local clustering 
than the BA model [154]. We demonstrate that, while these models are more accurate 
at predicting the destination of new links in our data than the BA model, the overall 
accuracy of these models remains very low. For a more detailed treatment all of these 
models and others, we refer the reader to a paper by Mitzenmacher [106]. 
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Explanatory growth models 
Some recent studies, particularly on online social networks, have proposed explana-
tory models of the network growth. Unlike structural growth models, which try to 
model growth solely as a function of the network structure, explanatory models seek to 
account for the underlying sociological factors that cause the links to be established. 
For example, an explanatory growth model for Flickr, a photo-sharing social network, 
could be based on an understanding of how users behave when sharing pictures. 
Examples of work on explanatory growth models include Kumar [82], who divided 
users into ones who are active and passive, and presented a model describing their 
behavior in an online social network. Jin et al. [70] presented a model of social net-
works based on known human interactions. Backstrom et al. [12] looked at snapshots 
of group membership in Live Journal, and presented a model for the growth of user 
groups over time based on understandings of peer pressure. Finally, Chang et al. [27] 
proposed a model for the growth in connectivity of the Internet topology, modeling 
the decision processes of the administrators of autonomous systems. 
Compared to structural growth models, explanatory models are more detailed, 
but they also tend to be specific to the network being investigated. For example, the 
reasons why autonomous systems connect to each other in the Internet topology are 
very different from the reasons why users in Flickr connect to each other. By being 
agnostic to these factors, structural growth models are inherently less accurate. But, 
they are far more general, and can be compared across different types of networks. 
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In this thesis, we focus only on structural growth models. 
Validation of growth models 
It is important to note here that both structural and explanatory growth models are, 
by and large, intuitive models that can explain the observed structural properties of 
the networks. But, they have not been significantly validated using empirical data. 
Mitzenmacher [107] poses this as one of the biggest challenges facing the future of 
power-law research. One of the contributions of this thesis lies in collecting data that 
can be used to determine how well these processes predict what actually occurs in 
different real-world networks at scale. 
3.2.2 Observations of network growth 
With the growth in popularity of online social networks, a few studies have examined 
the properties of the networks over time. We briefly describe these studies below. 
A few studies have looked at how links are formed in social networks. Kossinets 
and Watts [80] used an inferred social network from an email trace to show that 
new links in the network are more likely to be established between nodes close to 
each other. Nowell et al. [93] investigated co-authorship networks in physics to test 
how well different graph proximity metrics can predict future collaborations. New-
man [114] and Jeong et al. [69] examined the properties of scientific collaboration 
networks and found evidence of preferential attachment. Peltomaki and Alava [126] 
examined a scientific collaboration network and a movie-actor network and found 
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evidence of sub-linear preferential attachment. 
Our work shares similar goals and methodology as the above studies. However, the 
data sets we use are orders of magnitude larger than the ones used before. Moreover, 
our data allows us to analyze network growth over a large number of samples. We 
analyze daily snapshots of Flickr and YouTube networks, and weekly snapshots of the 
Internet topology. For Wikipedia, we have sufficient data to create a snapshot of the 
network at the precise second a new link is established. Since the growth models rely 
solely on the current network structure to predict new link formation, having frequent 
snapshots of the network is crucial to validating the models with high accuracy. 
Researchers have also studied the high-level properties of graph evolution, looking 
for evolution trends at the global level. For instance, Leskovec et al. [87] examined 
the evolution of a number of real-world graphs, including collaboration networks and 
recommendation networks. They found that the graphs tend to densify, and that 
the average path length tends to shrink (instead of growing in proportion to the 
number of nodes). Additionally, Kumar et al. [81] observed the early evolution of the 
blogosphere, and found that it is rapidly increasing in both scale and connectedness. 
This line of work is largely complementary to our work, as we focus on the local link 
formation phenomena which might lead to these global observations. 
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3.3 Detecting communities 
We now turn our attention to the detection of communities in online social networks. 
A community is a subset of the users in a social network that is more tightly in-
terconnected than the overall network [119]. Thus, all of the work described in this 
section tries to detect densely connected components of graphs. At a high level, the 
approaches can be divided into global approaches, which assume knowledge of the 
entire graph, or local approaches, which only assume detailed knowledge of a region 
of the network. After briefly describing how communities were detected classically in 
sociology, we describe the global and local approaches. Then, we describe empirical 
studies of social networks that have looked for the presence of communities. 
3.3.1 Classical community detection 
Classical community detection in sociology took the approach of partitioning the ver-
tices in a social network into different communities while minimizing the number of 
edges between communities. Within this approach, there are two main algorithms: 
spectral bisection [130] and the Kernighan-Lin algorithm [73]. Both algorithms par-
tition the graph into the best two communities possible, and then further subdivide 
those two until reaching the user-specified number of communities. However, both 
algorithms require the user to specify the sizes of the two communities initially, as 
well as the final number of communities desired. 
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3.3.2 Global community detection 
One of the first community detection algorithms that did not assume pre-existing 
knowledge of the community structure was proposed by Girvan and Newman [119]. In 
short, their algorithm works by calculating the "most important" link in the network, 
and then removing it. The algorithm then repeats this step until the social network 
graph becomes partitioned, at which point the various partitions are considered as 
communities. Continuing to run the algorithm over the various partitions will produce 
even finer communities, until all of the links are removed from the network. 
From the above description, it is clear that the selection of the most important 
link is integral to the functioning of the algorithm. A good metric of importance can 
quickly partition the graph into its various communities, while a bad metric can simply 
disconnect nodes one-by-one and produce degenerate partitions. Girvan and Newman 
suggested using the metric of betweenness centrality. The intuition behind Girvan and 
Newman's algorithm is simple: if we assume that the social network is divided into 
densely connected communities, the betweenness centrality metric looks for links that 
bridge communities. Since communities are, by definition, more dense than the graph 
as a whole, these bridging links will naturally have a higher betweenness centrality. 
Once they are removed from the graph, the underlying community structure emerges. 
Newman [118] later proposed a faster, alternate approach, based on the greedy 
optimization of modularity. The algorithm starts with each vertex in a separate 
community, and merges pairs of communities, choosing at each stage the pair that 
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would yield the highest increase or smallest decrease in modularity. Clauset et al. [32] 
proposed a faster variant of this algorithm by further optimizing the operations with 
the use of more efficient data structures. These improvements in speed are important, 
as the running time of the original algorithm prohibited it from being used on graphs 
with more than a few thousand links. 
Tyler et al. [153] presented a variant of the algorithm of Girvan and Newman, 
which improved the speed of the algorithm at the cost of accuracy. Instead of calcu-
lating the total betweenness centrality score by considering all paths starting at every 
vertex in the graph, Tyler et al. suggest that the betweenness centrality be calculated 
by summing over only a subset of the vertices, thereby obtaining a partial between-
ness centrality score for all edges. The algorithm is run multiple times, yielding 
multiple community partitionings and are then aggregated into a single community 
partitioning using the technique proposed by Wilkinson et al. [161]. 
Radicchi et al. [131] proposed another algorithm based the approach of Girvan 
and Newman. It uses a local approximation to select the edges to be removed, which 
can be calculated quickly and, hence, runs faster. For each edge, it approximates the 
betweenness centrality by the number of loops of length three (i.e., triangles) that 
include the edge. Inter-community edges are unlikely to belong to many triangles, 
because they require another edge between the communities to complete the loop. 
Other approaches have looked at finding multiple, overlapping community struc-
tures from a global perspective. This is in contrast to the previously discussed ap-
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preaches, which were only concerned with finding the best way to partition the nodes 
into single, non-overlapping set of communities. The overlapping approaches include 
work by Palla et al. [123], which used ^-cliques to find overlapping communities at 
different scales. Baumes et al. [16,17] proposed a similar approach for finding over-
lapping communities by first looking for dense collections of nodes in the graph. Du 
et al. [46] presented an algorithm to detect communities in large-scale social networks 
by considering the overlapping nature of communities. Finally, Li et al. [92] proposed 
a separate approach for overlapping community detection based on triangle formation 
and clustering based on text similarity. 
3.3.3 Local community detection 
One potential downside of the global approaches to community detection is that the 
structure of the entire graph must be known; this is often prohibitively expensive 
(as many real-world graphs are extremely large) or hard to obtain (for example, the 
graph of Web pages). As an alternative, a number of researchers have looked at 
local approaches to detecting communities, which use only local knowledge to build 
a community around a set of source nodes. In contrast with the global approaches, 
local approaches have the potential to be significantly more scalable and applicable 
to much larger graphs, as well as graphs which are not completely visible due to 
privacy restrictions. Moreover, local approaches to community detection also hold 
the potential to detect multiple community structures - global approaches assign each 
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node to exactly one community, even if multiple such structures exist. Finally, local 
approaches allow for natural decentralization, as the computation can be trivially 
divided up and distributed. 
Clauset [31] proposed one of the first local approaches to community detection, 
which was based on the greedy construction of a community around a source node. 
The algorithm creates a community by adding vertices one-by-one, choosing the vertex 
at each step that maximizes the ratio of intra-community edges to inter-community 
edges for the nodes on the "fringe" of the community. Thus, this algorithm tries to 
create a strong community by greedily picking nodes that have many links inside the 
community. Bagrow et al. [14] proposed an alternative algorithm, which adds all of the 
fc-hop vertices at each step, until the ratio of inter-community to intra-community 
links falls below a threshold. Both of these were shown to detect communities in 
synthetic graphs, as well as a real-world product recommendation network. Recently, 
Wakita et al. [155] proposed a modification to the Clauset algorithm, which is capable 
of identifying communities in social networks with up to 5 million users. However, 
their work does not provide any validation of the community structure inferred from 
the network. 
Additionally, two new local community detection algorithms have been proposed 
to improve the speed and performance of community detection. Luo et al. [99] pro-
posed an algorithm similar to Clauset's, with the exception that it iteratively adds 
and removes nodes, continuing until adding or removing any single vertex would not 
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result in a better community. Bagrow [13] evaluated the performance of the various 
algorithms (and one additional newly proposed one), and found that the algorithm 
of Leo et al. performed the best on synthetically generated graphs. 
It is important to note that none of these algorithms has been validated on a 
large-scale social network, primarily due to the lack of data availability. Typically, the 
algorithms are evaluated on synthetically generated graphs, product recommendation 
networks, or very small social networks such as Zachary's karate club [171], consisting 
of 34 members. Thus, it is not known whether they can detect communities in online 
social networks. In this thesis, we demonstrate the limitations of these approaches on 
data taken from an online social network, and present a new algorithm that addresses 
these limitations. 
3.3.4 Observations of communities 
A few studies have examined the community structures that exist in online social 
networks. The most notable of these is the work by Nazir et al. [113], which presented 
a large-scale measurement study of usage characteristics of applications in Facebook. 
They launched a few Facebook applications and, using the data collected from these 
applications, they characterized the workload, the structure of user interactions, and 
the existence of communities in the network. Their results, however; do not paint a 
complete picture of the Facebook network as they are only able to collect data on 
users who installed one of their applications. In contrast, we are able to collect data 
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on the majority of members of multiple Facebook networks, and do not require users 
to install any applications. 
3.4 Preventing unwanted communication 
Later in this thesis, we present Ostra, a system that leverages the difficulty in estab-
lishing and maintaining relationships in social networks to prevent malicious users 
from sending unwanted communication. Thus, we now describe related approaches, 
encompassing work that aims to prevent unwanted communication and work that 
leverages relationships in online social networks for other purposes. 
Unwanted communication has long been a problem in the form of email spam, and 
many strategies have been proposed to deal with it. However, the problem increas-
ingly afflicts other communication media such as IM, VoIP, and social networking 
and content-sharing sites. At a high level, there are three approaches for preventing 
unwanted communication in unicast systems. First, one can examine the content of 
the communication itself, looking for messages that are likely to be unwanted. Sec-
ond, one can look at the reputation of the sender, focusing on users who send lots 
of unwanted communication. Third, one can impose a cost on the sender, with the 
hope that this cost will discourage the sending of unwanted messages. Additionally, 
in systems that allow multiple recipients, one can also look at allowing recipients to 
vote on whether content is wanted or not. These four approaches are discussed in 
detail below. 
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3.4.1 Content-based filtering 
The most widespread approach to fighting unwanted communication is content-based 
filtering, where recipients have software that uses heuristics to automatically classify 
communication based on its contents. Popular examples are email filtering systems 
like SpamAssassin [148] and dSPAM [45]. Since content-based filters are installed at 
the email receiver, they lend themselves to customization and incremental deploy-
ment. Today's state-of-the-art filters are effective at blocking most spam, with some 
reporting correct classification of over 99% of messages [45]. Content-based filters are 
also used for other types of unwanted communication, such as blog spam [103] and 
network-based security attacks [84]. 
Content-based filtering, however, is subject to both false positives and false nega-
tives. False negatives — that is, when unwanted communication is classified as wanted 
— are a mere inconvenience. False positives [5] are a much more serious concern, be-
cause relevant messages are marked as unwanted and thus may not be received [65]. 
Moreover, there is a continual arms race [64] between spammers and filter developers, 
because the cognitive and visual capabilities of humans allow spammers to encode 
their message in a way that users can recognize but filtering programs have difficulty 
detecting. When early spam filters looked for certain keywords and text patterns in 
messages, spammers started to misspell telltale words and include random text to 
escape detection. Nowadays, spammers embed text in images, requiring spam filters 
to use optical character recognition (OCR) components. 
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3.4.2 Originator-based filtering 
Another approach for eliminating unwanted communication is to classify content 
based on the originator's history and reputation. One technique is whitelisting, where 
each user specifies a list of users who they are willing to receive content from. 
Whitelisting is commonly deployed in IM applications such as iChat and AIM, 
in VoIP systems such as Skype, and in social networking sites such as Linkedln. In 
these cases, users have to be on each other's whitelists (i.e., their lists of contacts) 
to be able to exchange messages. To get on each other's whitelists, two users must 
exchange a special invitation. If the invitation is accepted, the two parties are added 
to each other's whitelists. If the invitation is rejected, then the inviter is added to 
the invitee's blacklist, which prevents the inviter from contacting the invitee again. 
R E [57] extends whitelists to automatically and securely include friends of friends. 
To be effective, whitelisting requires that users have unique identifiers and that 
content can be authenticated; otherwise, it is easy for malicious users to make their 
communication seem to come from a whitelisted source. In most deployed email 
systems, messages cannot be reliably authenticated. However, secure email services, 
IM, VoIP services, and social networking sites can authenticate content. Whitelisting, 
however, cannot eliminate unwanted invitations, which represents another form of 
unwanted communication. 
Another, similar approach is blacklisting, where each user or site specifies a list 
of users who they are unwilling to receive content from. To be effective, though, 
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blacklisting requires strong user identities, as malicious users could otherwise trivially 
change identities. However, to date, no such large-scale strong identity system has 
been deployed, and the political, legal, and social issues associated with such a system 
make deployment in the near future unlikely. 
3.4.3 Imposing a cost on the sender 
A third approach taken to discourage unwanted communication is imposing a cost on 
the originators of either all communication or unwanted communication. The cost 
can be monetary or in terms of another limited resource. Optionally, systems can 
impose a cost only on the senders of unwanted communications, instead of imposing 
a cost on senders of both wanted and unwanted communication. We discuss some 
specific proposals below. 
Quotas and micropayments 
Quota- and payment-based approaches attempt to change the economics of unwanted 
communication by imposing a marginal cost on the transmission of an (unwanted) 
message. 
Systems have been proposed where senders must commit to paying a per-message 
fee prior to sending digital communication [50,138], and, occasionally, one-time fees 
imposed by a trusted organization [59]. These solutions attempt to model the offline 
postal service; they are based on the assumption that the cost will discourage mass 
distribution of unwanted messages. There are a few examples of deployed systems 
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that charge a per-message fee, such as Linkedln [95] and Goodmail [59]. 
In some of the proposed systems, the per-message fee is charged only if the receiver 
classifies the messages as unwanted. This feature is desirable because it preserves the 
ability of any legitimate content originator to reach a large audience at low cost. 
Otherwise, users who send a large amount of wanted communication are subject to 
prohibitively high fees, thereby reducing the usefulness of the communication medium. 
In general, one significant disadvantage of these proposals is that they typically 
require an extensive micropayment infrastructure, which some have claimed is im-
practical [2,88,120]. Additionally, the cost could be in terms of a resource other 
than money [139]. However, it may be difficult to ensure that the resource is readily 
available to anyone in quantities sufficient for legitimate communication, but hard to 
acquire in quantities needed for unwanted communication at a large scale. 
Alternative systems impose a per-user quota on sending messages [156], limiting 
each user to sending only a certain number of messages per day. Systems based on 
quotas do not need micropayments but still require a market for the distribution 
of the user quotas. This market must ensure that legitimate senders can obtain a 
sufficient quota at reasonable cost, while the cost for spammers must be high enough 
to discourage large-scale unwanted communication. 
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Challenge-response systems 
In so-called challenge-response systems, the sender of a message must prove she is 
a human (as opposed to a computer program) before the message is delivered. Like 
micropayment systems, challenge-response systems impose a cost on senders, but 
unlike micropayment systems, the cost is the human attention necessary to complete 
the challenge, rather than money. 
Although challenge-response systems can limit the amount of unwanted commu-
nication, these systems have several disadvantages. One disadvantage is that they 
eliminate all automatically generated email messages, even when such messages are 
wanted. The typical way that this issue is handled is by having users specify a special 
email address to avoid false positives. Moreover, the need to complete a challenge may 
annoy and discourage some legitimate senders, as has been observed with captchas 
today [166]. Finally, if challenge-response systems were widely deployed, their de-
signers could face an arms race to develop challenges that can be easily answered by 
most human users, yet cannot be answered by a program. 
Legislation 
Some countries have passed legislation that mandates a penalty for those sending 
unwanted communication. There is little evidence that it has significantly reduced 
the level of email spam received by users. There are at least two reasons why such 
laws have had limited impact. First, spammers are using technical means to obscure 
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the origin of unwanted communication. Second, the global nature of the Internet 
makes it easy for spammers to operate from a location where they face little or no 
risk of prosecution. 
3.4.4 Content rating 
Finally, a few proposals have looked at detecting unwanted communication in one-
to-many communication systems (unlike one-to-one communication systems that we 
have discussed before). Many content-sharing sites (e.g., YouTube [167]) use content 
rating. Users can indicate the level of interest, relevance, and appropriateness of 
a content item they have viewed. The content is then tagged with the aggregated 
user ratings. Content ratings can help users to identify relevant content and avoid 
unwanted content. These ratings can also help system administrators to identify po-
tentially inappropriate content, which they can then inspect and possibly remove. 
Moreover, content-rating systems can be manipulated, particularly in a system where 
new user identities can be created without significant cost. A recent proposal has 
looked at limiting the impact of multiple identities in the context of content rat-
ing [151], but has not been evaluating in a real-world system as of this writing. 
3.4.5 Leveraging relationships 
As Ostra uses the difficulty of establishing and maintaining links between users in 
a social network, we now briefly describe other work which leverages social network 
relationships. Trust between participating users has been used to replace certain 
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centralized functions. For example, the use of transitive trust has been leveraged in 
the PGP Web of Trust [172] to eliminate the need for a central certificate authority. 
SybilGuard [169] and SybilLimit [168] use social network links to identify users with 
many fake identities (Sybils). In brief, these systems look for large subsets of the 
network that are connected to the rest of the network by just a few edges, suggesting 
that the subset contains a number of fake identities. 
Online social relationships are also used in several web-based applications to per-
form other tasks, such as content sharing [167], socializing [49], and_ professional 
networking [95]. Linkedln uses implicit whitelisting of a user's friends and offers a 
(manual) introduction service based on the social network. Similarly, F2F [89] uses 
trust between users to provide a reliable storage system for user backups. However, 
none of these systems leverage the social network to automatically enable legitimate 
communication among users who have not had prior contact, while thwarting un-
wanted communication. 
3.5 Personalized web search 
Finally, in the last chapter of this thesis, we present the PeerSpective system, which 
integrates Web search with online social networks and displays pages browsed by 
friends in the results of a Web search. In this section, we describe systems which 
have similar aims. Several projects have looked at replacing the functionality of the 
large centralized Web search engines with a decentralized system. This architecture is 
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similar to PeerSpective, as they are built from contributing users' desktops [90]. Both 
Minerva [19] and YaCy [164] implement a peer-to-peer Web search engine without any 
points of centralization. Additionally, other projects [124,141] have examined replac-
ing the centralized PageRank computation of Google with a decentralized approach. 
All of these projects, though, are primarily focused on replacing the functionality 
of existing centralized search engines with a decentralized architecture, rather than 
improving or personalizing Web search. 
A few systems have looked at personalizing responses to queries by taking a. user's 
preferences and interests into account when ranking pages. Most notably, A9 [1] 
and Google Personalized Search [61] allow users to create profiles to which search 
results are tailored. However, these systems require users to create detailed profiles 
to perform well, which represents a significant burden on users. There has also been 
much research into methods for automatically personalizing search queries by inferring 
user interests [68,150]. While these projects are concerned with personalization, the 
approach taken PeerSpective is complementary in that we obtain personalization by 
using social links to improve search results. 
The MAAY [100] project has examined combining both of the above approaches, 
providing a decentralized and personalized search engine. In ISpy [146], organizations 
deploy a single web proxy which records the results of past queries and uses these to 
influence future ones. Their approach is limited to the single social group consisting 
of an organization, in contrast, PeerSpective is able to use an arbitrary social network 
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graph to influence search results. 
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Chapter 4 
Measurement Methodology 
We now describe the data used in this thesis, and the methodology used to collect 
it. We were not able to obtain data directly from the respective site operators, as 
most sites are hesitant to provide even anonymized data. Instead, we chose to crawl 
the user graphs by accessing the public web interface provided by the sites. This 
methodology gives us access to large data sets from multiple sites. 
We discuss the data collected for each of the three measurement studies sepa-
rately. First, we detail general challenges faced when crawling large social networks. 
Second, we describe the data collected for our analysis of the structure of online social 
networks, which includes data from multiple online social networks and the Web. We 
then describe the data collected to study how online social networks grow, and finally, 
we detail the data collected to study community structures. 
4.1 Challenges in crawling large graphs 
Crawling large, complex graphs presents unique challenges. In this section, we dis-
cussing the details of how we crawled each network after we describe our general ap-
proach. Most real-world graphs have been shown to have a dominant large connected 
component [23], which we call the large WCC. Therefore, we focus our methodology 
on crawling this component of the graph. 
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4.1.1 Crawling the entire large WCC 
The primary challenge in crawling large graphs is covering the entire giant connected 
component. At each step, one can generally only obtain the set of links into or out of 
a specified node. In the case of online social networks, crawling the graph efficiently 
is important since the graphs are large and highly dynamic. Common algorithms for 
crawling graphs include breadth-first search (BFS) and depth-first search. 
Often, crawling the entire giant connected component is not feasible, and one must 
resort to using samples of the graph. Crawling only a subset of a graph by ending 
a BFS early (called the snowball method) is known to produce a biased sample of 
nodes [85]. In particular, partial BFS crawls are likely to overestimate node degree 
and underestimate the level of symmetry [18]. In social network graphs, collecting 
samples via the snowball method has been shown to underestimate the power-law 
coefficient, but to more closely match other metrics, including the overall clustering 
coefficient [85]. However, some previous studies of social networks have used small 
graph samples. Example studies have used samples of 0.3% of Orkut users [6], less 
than 1% of LiveJournal communities [12], and 0.08% of MySpace users [6]. In this 
thesis, we obtain and study much larger samples of the user graphs. 
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4.1.2 Using only forward links 
Crawling directed graphs, as opposed to undirected graphs, presents additional chal-
lenges. In particular, many graphs can only be crawled by following links in the 
forward direction (i.e., one cannot easily determine the set of nodes which point into 
a given node). Using only forward links does not necessarily crawl an entire WCC; 
instead, it explores the connected component reachable from a set of seed users. This 
limitation is typical for studies that crawl online networks, such as the Web [23]. 
V~"~"% '-- V ^ BOTH FORWARD 
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Figure 4.1 : Users reached by crawling different link types. If only forward links 
are used, we can reach only the inner cloud (shaded cloud); using both forward and 
reverse links, we can reach the entire WCC (dashed cloud). 
Figure 4.1 shows an example of a directed graph crawl. The users reached by 
following only forward links are shown in the shaded cloud, and those reached using 
both forward and reverse links are shown in the dashed cloud. Using both forward 
and reverse links allows us to crawl the entire WCC, while using only forward links 
results in a subset of the WCC. 
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4.2 Capturing social networks' structure 
We now discuss our methodology for crawling each of the networks, their limitations, 
and high-level statistics of the resulting data sets. Using automated scripts on a 
cluster of 58 machines, we crawled the social network graphs of Flickr, LiveJournal, 
Orkut, and YouTube. We chose these four sites because they are among the most 
popular social networking sites and they allow us to view the links out of any user 
in the network. In each step of our crawls, we retrieved the list of friends for a user 
we had not yet visited and added the retrieved users to the list of users to visit. We 
continued until we exhausted the list. This corresponds to a BFS of the social network 
graphs. High-level statistics of the resulting data sets are presented in Table 5.1. 
Since the focus of this part is to investigate the structure of online social networks, 
we focus on the large WCC of the corresponding graphs in the rest of this thesis. As 
we show later in this section, the large WCC is structurally the most "interesting" 
part of the network. The nodes not included in the large WCC tend to be either part 
of very small, isolated clusters or are not connected to other users at all. 
4.2.1 Flickr 
Flickr (www. f l i c k r . com) is a photo-sharing site based on a social network. The Flickr 
data presented in this thesis is from a crawl of the large WCC conducted on January 
9th, 2007, and contains over 1.8 million users and 22 million links. Flickr exports an 
API for third-party developers, and we used this API to conduct the crawl. We also 
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obtained group membership information via Flickr's API.1 
Flickr only allows us to query for forward links. Therefore we were unable to crawl 
the entire large WCC. To estimate the fraction of users who are part of the WCC 
but missing in our crawl, we performed the following experiment. We used the fact 
that the vast majority of Flickr user identifiers take the form of [randomly selected 8 
digit number]@N00. We generated 100,000 random user identifiers of this form (from 
a possible pool of 90 million) and found that 6,902 (6.90%) of these were assigned 
usernames. These 6,902 nodes form a randomsample of Flickr users. _ 
Among these 6,902 users, 1,859 users (26.9%) had been discovered during our 
crawl. Focusing on the 5,043 users not previously discovered by our crawl, we con-
ducted a BFS starting at each user to determine whether or not they could reach 
our set of previously crawled users. We found that only 250 (5.0%) of the missed 
users could reach our crawled set and were definitively in the WGC. While we cannot 
conclusively say that the remaining 4,793 (95.0%) missed users are not attached to 
the WCC (there could be some other user who points to them and to the WCC), the 
fact that 89.7% of these have no forward links suggests that many are not connected 
at all. 
Finally, to explore how the remaining missing nodes are connected, we crawled 
the social network using these missing users as seeds, and compared the results with 
1
 Flickr also allows users to form private groups, which do not appear in the user's profile list. 
We were unable to determine any information about the membership of such groups. 
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our initial crawl. We found only 11,468 new nodes that were not in the connected 
component of 1.8 million nodes discovered in the original crawl. Of these new nodes, 
5,142 (44.8%) were nodes with no forward links, 3,370 (29.3%) had one link, 620 
(5.4%) had two or three links, and 2,336 (20.3%) had four or more links. Thus, the 
nodes missing from our crawls tend to have low degree and are connected only to small 
clusters that are not reachable from the large connected component we crawled. 
Thus, we believe that our crawl of the large WCC, although not complete, covers 
a large fraction of the users who are part of the WCC. Further, our experience with 
the randomly generated Flickr user identifiers indicates that (at least for Flickr), the 
nodes not in the largest WCC do not form large subgraphs. 
4.2.2 LiveJournal 
LiveJournal (www.livejournal.com) is a popular blogging site whose users form a 
social network. The LiveJournal data set considered in this thesis is the largest we 
examine: it contains over 5.2 million users and 72 million links. Due to its size, the 
LiveJournal crawl took several days, from December 9-11, 2006. LiveJournal offers 
an API that allows us to query for both forward and reverse links. We followed 
both link types to crawl the entire large WCC. We also obtained group membership 
information via LiveJournal's API.2 
To estimate the fraction of the LiveJournal network covered by our crawl, we 
2We inferred groups in LiveJournal by crawling the interests specified by users. 
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used a feature of LiveJournal3 that returns random users. We selected a list of 5,000 
random LiveJournal users and then checked how many of these random users our crawl 
had already covered. We found that we had already crawled 4,773 (95.4%) of these 
users, showing that our LiveJournal crawl covers the vast majority of the LiveJournal 
population. Finally, we started another crawl from the previously unknown 227 users 
to determine how many additional users could be discovered. This technique found 
only 73 additional users. These results suggest that our LiveJournal crawl covers 
almost the entire LiveJournal user population, and that the users not included in our 
crawl are part of small, isolated clusters. 
Using the entire WCC from LiveJournal, we calculated the fraction of the WCC 
that is not reachable by using only forward links (as we did for the Flickr and YouTube 
crawls). We found that of the 5,284,457 nodes in the discovered WCC, only 404,134 
(7.64%) would have been missed had we followed only forward links. Finally, we 
examined the 404,134 users who would have been missed to see how well these users 
were connected. We found that 201,694 (49.9%) of these users had a single forward 
link, 86,561 (21.1%) had two or three links, and 78,463 (19.4%) of the users had four 
or more forward links. Since, as we will show later, Flickr and YouTube share many 
characteristics with LiveJournal, this result suggests that the users that are missing 
in our Flickr and YouTube crawls tend to be small in number and have relatively 
small outdegree. 
3 ht tp : / /www.l ive j ournal.com/random.bml 
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4.2.3 Orkut 
The next site we examined is Orkut (www.orkut.com), a social networking site run 
by Google. Orkut is a "pure" social network, as the sole purpose of the site is social 
networking, and no content is being shared. In Orkut, links are undirected and link 
creation requires consent from the target. Since, at the time of the crawl, new users 
had to be invited by an existing user to join the system, the Orkut graph forms a 
single SCC by definition. 
The Orkut data considered in this thesis was collected during a crawl performed 
between October 3rd and November 11th, 2006. Because Orkut does not export an 
API, we had to resort to the bandwidth-intensive process of HTML screen-scraping 
to conduct our crawl. We obtained group information in a similar manner. Crawl-
ing Orkut presented other challenges, as Orkut limits the rate at which a single IP 
address can download information and requires a logged-in account to browse the 
network. As a result, it took more than a month to crawl a total of 3,072,441 users, 
at which point we stopped. This subset of the entire network corresponds to 11.3% of 
Orkut's user population of about 27 million users at the time of the crawl. The Orkut 
data considered in this thesis, therefore, is limited to this connected component and 
disregards all links from this component to other, uncrawled users. 
Because our Orkut data set contains only a sample of the entire Orkut network, 
there are two potential concerns with the representativeness of the data. The first 
concern is whether the 11.3% subset of the network we gathered would be similar to 
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a different 11.3% subset gathered in the same way. In other words, are the properties 
of our sample representative of other samples of similar size? The second concern 
is whether the properties of our sample are representative of the properties of the 
network as a whole. 
To explore the first of these concerns, we conducted five separate, small crawls 
of Orkut starting from random locations. Our random starting locations were cho-
sen using Maximum-Degree random sampling [11] configured with a path length of 
100,000 hops. Each of the five crawls was configured to cover 80,000 nodes in the 
same manner as our single, large crawl. We then compared the properties of the 
resulting samples. 
We found that the properties of the five smaller crawls were similar, even though 
these crawls covered only 0.29% of the network each. For example, we found that the 
clustering coefficient of these crawls had an average of 0.284 with a standard deviation 
of 0.040. Similarly, we found that the scale-free metric had an average of 0.550 with 
a standard deviation of 0.083 (both of these metrics are discussed in more detail in 
the following section). Thus, we believe that the properties of our 11.3% sample of 
the network are likely to be similar to other crawls of similar size that are done in 
the same manner. 
However, we caution the reader to be mindful of the second concern when extrap-
olating the results from our crawl to the entire Orkut network. Partial BFS crawls 
are known to over-sample high-degree nodes, and under-sample low-degree nodes [85]. 
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This has been shown to overestimate the average node degree and to underestimate 
the level of symmetry [18]. Thus, our results may not be representative of the Orkut 
network as a whole. 
4.2.4 YouTube 
YouTube (www.youtube.com) is a popular video-sharing site that includes a social 
network. The YouTube data we present was obtained on January 15th, 2007 and 
consists of over 1.1 million users and 4.9 million links. Similar to Flickr, YouTube 
exports an API, and we used this feature to conduct our crawls. 
YouTube allows links to be queried only in the forward direction, similar to Flickr. 
Unfortunately, YouTube's user identifiers do not follow a standard format,4 and we 
were therefore unable to create a random sample of YouTube users. Also, YouTube 
does not export group information via the API. Instead, we obtained group member-
ship information by screen-scraping the HTML pages attached to user profiles. 
Because we were unable to crawl reverse links or estimate the size of the user 
population in YouTube, we advise the reader to be cautious in extrapolating the 
YouTube results to the entire YouTube population, as we do not know the number 
of users who do not participate in the social network. 
4YouTube's user identifiers are user-specified strings. 
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4.2.5 Web graph 
In order to compare the structure of social networks with that of the Web, we made 
use of data collected by the Stanford WebBase Project [149]. We employed the data 
from their crawl of November 2003. The crawl includes 8.6 million pages and 132 
million hyperlinks collected from over 3900 crawled Web sites. 
4.2.6 Summary 
Our results indicate that -
• The Flickr and YouTube data sets may not contain some of the nodes in the 
large WCC, but this fraction is likely to be very small. 
• The LiveJournal data set covers almost the complete population of LiveJournal, 
and contains the entire large WCC. 
• The Orkut data set represents a modest portion of the network, and is subject 
to the sampling bias resulting from a partial BFS crawl. 
Moreover, the results also indicate that the vast majority of missed nodes in Flickr, 
LiveJournal, and YouTube have low degree and are likely to be part of small, isolated 
clusters. 
Based on the number of user accounts each site claimed to have at the time of 
the crawl, we estimate the fraction of nodes our crawls cover in Table 4.1. Note 
that, unfortunately, we do not know the number of accounts in YouTube and were 
Users crawled Total population Coverage 
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Flickr 1,846,198 6,800,000 26.9% 
LiveJournal 5,284,457 5,500,000 95.4% 
Orkut 3,072,441 27,000,000 11.3% 
YouTube 1,157,827 n/a n/a 
Table 4.1 : Coverage of social networking site crawls. 
therefore unable to estimate the fraction of the population that our 1.1 million crawled 
YouTube users represent. 
4.3 Capturing group membership 
All the sites we considered allow users to form groups. We determined a user's 
group membership using corresponding APIs in Flickr and LiveJournal. On YouTube 
and Orkut, we determined a user's groups by screen-scraping the HTML pages that 
contain the user's profile. Note that since Flickr allows users to form private groups, 
we were unable to determine any information about the membership of such groups. 
4.4 Capturing social networks' growth 
We now describe the methodology for collecting information on the evolution of online 
social networks, and the data we collected. In order to compare our results to the 
evolution of other, well-understood networks, we also collected data on the evolution 
of the Wikipedia article network and the Internet's autonomous system network. 
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Descriptions of the methodology for collecting data on these are also included below. 
Using automated scripts on a cluster of 58 machines, we crawled the social network 
graphs of Flickr and YouTube once per day. We chose these sites because they 
represent different types of online social networking sites and because it is possible to 
crawl the entire network once per day. On each day, we revisited every user we had 
previously discovered, in additional to all nodes that were reachable from the seed 
node, and recorded any newly created or removed links and nodes. 
Since the sites do not provide the time of creation for any node or link, our growth 
data for the social networks has a granularity of one day for the links we observed 
being created. As a result, we cannot determine the exact time of link creation, or the 
order in which links were created within a single day. Moreover, new nodes cannot be 
observed until they become connected to one of the nodes we have already crawled. 
Additionally, in the rest of the thesis, we only examine links that we observed being 
created. In other words, we may discover a new node that has a few established links, 
but we do not examine these previously established links in our growth analysis, as 
we did not observe them being created. 
4.4.1 Flickr 
We crawled the Flickr network daily between November 2nd, 2006 and December 3rd, 
2006, and again daily between February 3rd, 2007 and May 18th, 2007, representing 
a total of 104 days of growth. During that period of daily growth observations, we 
70 
observed over 10.7 million new links being formed and discovered over 680,000 new 
users. This represents, relative to the initial network snapshot, over 42% growth in 
the number of users and over 63% growth in the number of links. 
4.4.2 YouTube 
We crawled the YouTube network daily between December 10th, 2006 and January 
15th, 2007, and again daily between February 8th, 2007 and July 23rd, 2007, rep-
resenting 201 days of growth. Between the two date ranges of our crawls, YouTube 
changed its policy to require confirmation from the destination of a link (previously, 
this approval was not required). Thus, between our two observation periods, YouTube 
changed from a directed network to an undirected network. To properly analyze the 
data before and after this significant change in policy, we treat the two YouTube net-
works separately — we denote the first set of growth data covering the directed graph 
as YouTube-D and the second set representing the undirected graph as YouTube-U. 
The YouTube-D data set represents the growth of a directed network over a period 
of 36 days. During that period of daily growth observations, we observed over 540,000 
new links being formed and discovered over 130,000 new users. This represents, 
relative to the initial network snapshot, over 13% growth in the number of users and 
over 12% growth in the number of links. 
The YouTube-U data set represents the growth of an undirected network over a 
period of 165 days. We observed the network grow by over 11.7 million links and over 
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1.8 million users. This represents, relative to the initial network snapshot, over 129% 
growth in the number of users and over 173% growth in the number of links. 
4.4.3 Wikipedia 
Wikipedia (www.wikipedia.org) is a popular online encyclopedia that allows any 
user to add or edit content. Wikipedia makes its entire edit history available on a 
monthly basis, and we downloaded the edit history of the English language Wikipedia 
as of April 6th, 2007. 
To extract the graph of links between Wikipedia pages, we used the following 
method: for each link in the current snapshot, we determined the time when this 
link was first created. We then construct a graph using these derived links and the 
associated timestamps. This method allows us to remove the effects of page van-
dalism, where malicious users sometimes overwrite entire pages, thereby temporarily 
removing all of the links from vandalized pages. 
Since Wikipedia allows pages to redirect to other pages, we configured our tool 
to follow the redirects, and treat a link to a redirect page as if it was a link to the 
destination page. Thus, if page A originally linked to B at time t, but later, B was 
set to redirect to C, we treat this like a link from A to C established at time t. This 
allows us to handle multiple layers of redirect pages, as well as large-scale naming 
convention changes. 
Since the data represents the complete history of a complex network, we exclude 
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startup effects by limiting our analysis to the recent history. This is similar to previous 
studies [25,114]. In particular, we only consider links created between January 1st, 
2005 and April 6th, 2007, a period of 826 days. During this period, we observed over 
1.1 million new pages and over 33 million new links, representing 169% growth in the 
number of pages and 500% growth in the number of links relative to the snapshot on 
January 1st, 2005. 
4.4.4 Internet topology 
The Internet can be viewed as a collection of autonomous systems (AS), where each 
AS represents a single administrative domain (typically, an ISP). The inter-domain 
routing protocol of the Internet, BGP, uses unique AS numbers to allow ASes to 
advertise their connections to their neighbors. The union of these advertisements 
forms an undirected graph representing the AS-level connectivity of the Internet. 
We used the AS topology graphs collected by CAIDA [24] to study the evolution 
of the AS network. CAIDA creates weekly (monthly for the first two years) snapshots 
of the AS topology using a number of BGP monitoring machines. We downloaded the 
entire history of their measurements, which covers the period from January 5th, 2004 
until July 9th, 2007. The AS topology evolution data therefore covers 1,282 days of 
growth. During this period, the number of ASes in the network grew from 9,978 to 
25,526, a growth of 155%. Similarly, the number of AS links grew from 29,504 to 
104,824, a growth of 255%. 
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4.5 Capturing communities 
In this section, we describe the data set we collected for close analysis of community 
information, and we discuss its limitations. 
4.5.1 Measurement methodology 
Our data set was collected by crawling part of the Facebook [49] social network 
through the site's public web interface. We crawled the part of the Facebook social 
network that consists of Rice University students and alumni. We started by logging 
into the Facebook user account of one of the authors, who is a student at Rice 
University. We then conducted a breadth-first-search (BFS) of all reachable users in 
the Rice network, in the same manner as in previous work [105]. By default, Facebook 
allows all users whose email addresses have the same domain ( r i ce . edu in this case) 
to view each others' friends, and we were thus able to crawl a large portion of the 
Rice Facebook network. 
The data collected for this thesis is from a crawl conducted over 9 hours on May 
17th, 2008. In total, we discovered 6,156 users in our crawl, who are connected 
together with 377,350 links. This represents a network with an average user degree 
of 61.29. 
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4.5.2 Collected data 
From the Facebook crawl, we only collected the names of the users and their list of 
friends. We collected additional information about the users by querying the Rice 
University Student Directory [136] and the Rice University Alumni Directory [135]. 
From these two directories, we were able to determine the users' matriculation year, 
graduation year, residential college5, and major(s) or department. 
To correlate the Facebook user list with the directories, we first looked up each 
user's name in the Student Directory, and then the Alumni Directory. If a single 
entry was found in either directory, the information from that entry was used. If 
multiple entries were found that exactly matched the student's name, we disregarded 
the student. We used a conservative matching policy: only exact name matches were 
used.6 
Overall, we found unique matches for 1,781 students in the Student Directory and 
2,093 additional students in the Alumni Directory. This left us with 2,282 Facebook 
users who we were unable to match with a directory listing; we disregarded these 
users. Of the 3,874 students we were able to find records for, 1,233 (31.8%) were 
5Rice University has nine residential colleges, to which incoming undergraduate students are 
randomly assigned. The colleges serve as dormitories, cafeterias, and social circles; students stay at 
the same college during their entire undergraduate tenure. 
6The only exception was a list of common nicknames, such as Bob for Robert and Chris for 
Christopher. In these cases, a match between a name and a nickname was allowed if there was only 
one entry found in the Facebook crawl and in the student or alumni directory. 
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current undergraduate students, 548 (14.1%) were current graduate students, 1,856 
(47.9%) were undergraduate alumni, and 237 (6.11%) were graduate alumni. 
As a point of reference, the total number of current undergraduate and graduate 
students at Rice is 3,001 and 2,144, respectively [134]. Thus, we were able to locate 
41.1% of the current undergraduate and 25.6% of the current graduate students in 
Facebook. 
4.5.3 Limitations 
Our Facebook crawl includes only those users who had not changed the default Face-
book privacy setting, which shares the friend list with users whose email address has 
the same domain. During our crawl, we found that 360 of the 6,156 users (5.85%) 
had changed their privacy settings so that their friend list was not accessible to us. 
Our crawl is also limited by our ability to match names between Facebook accounts 
and information in the directories. Rice students can elect to remove their information 
from the online directory; in this case, we would not be able to find corresponding 
entries in the directories. Additionally, users with all but the most common nicknames 
are likely to be missed by our correlation procedure. Indeed, we found that we were 
unable to match 37.1% of the Facebook users we discovered with entries in either 
online directory. 
Additionally, there may be users who were not connected to the large, strongly 
connected component of the social network we crawled. Because Facebook does not 
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provide a way to select random user accounts, we are unable to estimate the fraction 
of Rice University Facebook accounts that we were unable to crawl. 
4.6 Data availability 
All of the data sets considered in this thesis, with the exception of the Facebook data 
from Rice University, are available to the research community. The data has been 
anonymized in order to ensure the privacy of the social network users. A detailed 
description of the data format and downloading instructions are available at 
ht tp: / /socialnetworks.mpi-sws.org 
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Chapter 5 
Network Structure 
Unlike the Web, which is largely organized around content, online social networks 
are organized around users. Participating users join a network, publish their profile 
and any content, and create links to any other users with whom they associate. 
The resulting social network provides a basis for maintaining social relationships, for 
finding users with similar interests, and for locating content and knowledge that has 
been contributed or endorsed by other users. 
An in-depth understanding of the graph structure of online social networks is 
necessary to evaluate current systems, to design future online social network based 
systems, and to understand the impact of online social networks on the Internet. 
For example, understanding the structure of online social networks might lead to 
algorithms that can detect trusted or influential users, much like the study of the 
Web graph led to the discovery of algorithms for finding authoritative sources in 
the Web [74]. Moreover, recent work has proposed the use of social networks to 
mitigate email spam [57], to improve Internet search [104], and to defend against 
Sybil attacks [169]. However, these systems have not yet been evaluated on real 
social networks at scale, and little is known to date on how to synthesize realistic 
social network graphs. 
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In this chapter, we characterize the structural properties of four online social net-
works. We compare the networks to each other, and we compare their properties with 
those previously observed for the Web. The Web is one of the most well-studied online 
networks, and our study shares much of its methodology with previous studies of the 
Web. Thus, it is perhaps natural to tend to compare our results with the structure 
of the Web. However, we are well aware that the user graph in social networks is 
fundamentally different from the interconnection of web pages; our comparisons serve 
more to calibrate our results than to point out (expected) differences. 
The focus of our work is the social network users within the sites we study. More 
specifically, we study the properties of the large WCC in the user graphs of four 
popular sites. We do not attempt to study the entire user community (which would 
include users who do not use the social networking features), information flow, or 
workload of online social networking sites. While these topics are important, they are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5.1 High-level data statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the high-level statistics of the four networks we examine in this 
chapter. The crawled network sizes vary by almost a factor of five (1.1 million users 
in YouTube versus 5.2 million in Live Journal), and the number of links varies by al-
most two orders of magnitude (4.9 million in YouTube versus 223 million in Orkut). 
Similarly, other metrics such as the average number of friend links per node and user 
79 
Number of users 
Estimated coverage 
Dates of crawl 
Number of links 
Friends per user 
Fraction symmetric links 
Number of groups 
Memberships per user 
Flickr 
1,846,198 
26.9% 
Jan 9, 2007 
22,613,981 
12.24 
62.0% 
103,648 
4,62 
LiveJournal 
5,284,457 
95.4% 
Dec 9 - 11, 2006 
77,402,652 
16.97 
73.5% 
7,489,073 
21.25 
Orkut 
3,072,441 
11.3% 
Oct 3 - Nov 11, 2006 
223,534,301 
106.1 
100.0% 
8,730,859 
106.44 
YouTube 
1,157,827 . 
unknown 
Jan 15, 2007 
4,945,382 
4.29 
79.1% 
30,087 
0.25 
Table 5.1 : High-level statistics of social networking site crawls. 
participation in shared interest groups also vary by two to three orders of magni-
tude. Our analysis later will show that despite these differences, these graphs share 
a surprisingly large number of key structural properties. 
5.2 Link symmetry 
The fact that links are directed can be useful for locating content in information 
networks. For example, in the Web graph, search algorithms such as PageRank [122] 
consider a directed link from a source to a destination as an endorsement of the 
destination by the source, but not vice-versa. For instance, numerous Web pages 
point to sites like cnn.com or nytimes.com, but very few pages receive pointers 
back from these sites. Search engines leverage this to identify reputed sources of 
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information, since pages with high indegree tend to be authorities [74]. 
With the exception of Orkut, links in the social networks we studied are directed 
and users may therefore link to any other user they wish. The target of the link may 
reciprocate by placing a link pointing, back at the source. Our analysis of the level of 
symmetry in social networks, shown in Table 5.1, reveals that all three social networks 
with directed links (Flickr, LiveJournal, and YouTube) have a significant degree of 
symmetry. Their high level of symmetry is consistent with that of offline social 
networks [63]. Furthermore,-social networking sites inform users of new incoming 
links, which may also contribute to the high level of symmetry. 
Independent of the causes, the symmetric nature of social links affects the net-
work structure. For example, symmetry increases the overall connectivity of the 
network and reduces its diameter. Symmetry can also make it harder to identify 
reputable sources of information just by analyzing the network structure, because re-
puted sources tend to dilute their importance when pointing back to arbitrary users 
who link to them. 
5.3 Power-law node degrees 
We begin to examine the graph structure by considering the node degree distribu-
tion. As discussed in Chapter 3, the degree distributions of many complex networks, 
including offline social networks, have been shown to conform to power-laws. Thus, 
it may not be surprising that social networks also exhibit power-law degree distri-
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butions. However, as our analysis shows, the degree distributions in social networks 
differ from that of other power-law networks in several ways. 
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Figure 5.1 : Log-log plot of outdegree complementary cumulative distribution func-
tions (CCDF). All social networks show properties consistent with power-law net-
works. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 shows the outdegree and indegree complementary cumulative 
distribution functions (CCDF), respectively, for each measured social network. All 
of the networks show behavior consistent with a power-law network; the majority of 
the nodes have small degree, and a few nodes have significantly higher degree. To 
test how well the degree distributions are modeled by a power-law, we calculated the 
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Figure 5.2 : Log-log plot of indegree complementary cumulative distribution functions 
. All social networks show properties consistent with power-law networks. 
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best power-law fit using the maximum likelihood method [33]. Table 5.2 shows the 
estimated power-law coefficient along with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit 
metric [33]. While the best power-law coefficients approximate the distributions very 
well for Flickr, Live Journal, and YouTube, the Orkut data deviates significantly. 
Two factors contribute to this deviation. First, our Orkut crawl reached only 
11.3% of the network — partial BFS crawls tend to undersample nodes with lower 
degree, which can explain the flat head of the distribution [85]. Second, both Live-
Journal and Orkut artificially cap a user's number of outgoing links,1 which leads to 
a distortion in the distribution for high degrees. 
Network 
Web [23] 
Flickr 
LiveJournal 
Orkut 
YouTube 
Outdegree 
a 
2.67 
1.74 
1.59 
1.50 
1.63 
D 
-
0.0575 
0.0783 
0.6319 
0.1314 
Indegree 
a 
2.09 
1.78 
1.65 
1.50 
1.99 
D 
-
0.0278 
0.1037 
0.6203 
0.0094 
Table 5.2 : Power-law coefficient estimates (a) and corresponding Kolmogorov-
Smirnov goodness-of-fit metrics (D). The Flickr, LiveJournal, and YouTube networks 
are well approximated by a power-law. 
1Orkut caps the outdegree at 1,000, and LiveJournal at 750. Both of these caps were instituted 
after the networks were established, and some users therefore exceed the caps. Also, Flickr has since 
instituted a cap of 3,000 non-reciprocal links; however, the data shown here was collected before this 
cap was established. 
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Additionally, we tested the stability of the power-law coefficient estimates by 
running the maximum likelihood estimator over varyingly sized subsamples of our 
data [162]. We found that the estimates of the power-law coefficient were remarkably 
stable; the estimates varied by less than 6% from those provided in Table 5.2 when 
we considered as few as 1,000 data points. 
Table 5.2 also shows a difference between the structure of social networks and 
that of previously observed networks. In the Web, for example, the indegree and 
outdegree power-law exponents have been shown to differ significantly, while the 
power-law exponents for the indegree and outdegree distributions in each of our social 
networks are very similar. This implies that in online social networks, the distribution 
of outgoing links is similar to that of incoming links, while in the Web, the incoming 
links are significantly more concentrated on a few high-degree nodes than the outgoing 
links. 
I 
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Fraction of Users 
Figure 5.3 : Plot of the distribution of links across nodes. Social networks show 
similar distributions for outgoing and incoming links, whereas the Web links shows 
different distributions. 
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Focusing on this difference, Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of incoming and 
outgoing links over nodes in the Web and Flickr graphs.2 The difference is readily 
apparent: 5% of the Web nodes account for 75% of all incoming links, but for only 
25% of all outgoing links. In all social networks we considered, the distributions of 
incoming and outgoing links across the nodes are very similar. We now examine this 
phenomenon in more detail. 
5.4 Correlation of indegree and out degree 
Studies of the indegree and outdegree distributions in the Web graph helped re-
searchers find better ways to find relevant information in the Web. In the Web, the 
population of pages that are active (i.e., have high outdegree) is not the same as 
the population of pages that are popular (i.e., have high indegree) [74]. For exam-
ple, many Web pages of individual users actively point to a few popular pages like 
wikipedia.org or cnn.com. Web search techniques are very effective at separating 
a very small set of popular pages from a much larger set of active pages. 
In social networks, the nodes with very high outdegree also tend to have very high 
indegree. In our study, for each network, the top 1% of nodes ranked by indegree 
has a more than 65% overlap with the top 1% of nodes ranked by outdegree. The 
corresponding overlap in the Web is less than 20%. Hence, active users (i.e., those 
2The Flickr topology is representative of all four networks; we omitted the others in the plot for 
readability. 
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Figure 5.4 : Plot of the overlap between top x% of nodes ranked by outdegree and 
indegree. The high-indegree and high-outdegree nodes are often the same in social 
networks, but not in the Web. 
who create many links) in social networks also tend to be popular (i.e., they are the 
target of many links). Figure 5.4 shows the extent of the overlap between the top x% 
of nodes ranked by indegree and outdegree. 
u. 
Q 
O 
Outdegree to Indegree Ratio 
Figure 5.5 : CDF of outdegree to indegree ratio. Social networks show much stronger 
correlation between indegree and outdegree than the Web. 
Next, we compared the indegree and outdegree of individual nodes in the social 
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networks. Figure 5.5 plots the cumulative distributions of the outdegree-to-indegree 
ratio for the four social networks and the Web. The social networks show a remarkable 
correspondence between indegree and outdegree; for all networks, over 50% of nodes 
have an indegree within 20% of their outdegree. The distribution for the Web is 
markedly different; most nodes have considerably higher outdegree than indegree, 
while a small fraction of nodes have significantly higher indegree than outdegree. 
The high correlation between indegree and outdegree in social networks can be 
explained by the high number of symmetric links. The-high symmetry may be due to 
the tendency of users to reciprocate links from other users who point to them. This 
process would result in active users (who place many outgoing links) automatically 
receiving many incoming links, and lead to the distributions we have observed. 
5.5 Path lengths and diameter 
Next, we look at the properties of shortest paths between users. Table 5.3 shows the 
average path lengths, diameters, and radii3 for the four social networks. In absolute 
terms, the path lengths and diameters for all four social networks are remarkably 
short. Interestingly, despite being comparable in size to the Web graph we considered, 
the social networks have significantly shorter average path lengths and diameters. 
This property may again result from the high degree of reciprocity within the social 
3Due to the computational complexity associated with determining the actual radius and diam-
eter, the numbers presented here are from determining the eccentricity of 10,000 random nodes in 
each network. 
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networks. Incidentally, Broder et al. [23] noted that if the Web were treated as an 
undirected graph, the average path length would drop from 16.12 to 7. 
Network 
Web [23] 
Flickr 
LiveJournal 
Orkut 
YouTube 
Average Path Length 
16.12 
5.67 
5.88 
4.25 
5.10 
Radius 
475 
13 
12 
6 
13 
Diameter 
905 
27 
20 
9 
21 
Table 5.3 : Average path length, radius, and diameter of the studied networks. The 
path length between random nodes is very short in social networks. 
5.6 Link degree correlations 
To further explore the difference in network structure between online social networks 
and previously observed networks, we examine which users tend to connect to each 
other. In particular, we focus on the joint degree distribution (JDD), or how often 
nodes of different degrees connect to each other. 
5.6.1 Joint degree distribution 
The JDD is approximated by the degree correlation function knn, which is a mapping 
between outdegree and the average indegree of all nodes connected to nodes of that 
outdegree. Clearly, an increasing knn indicates a tendency of higher-degree nodes to 
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connect to other high-degree nodes; a decreasing knn represents the opposite trend. 
Figure 5.6 shows a plot of knn for the four networks we studied. 
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Figure 5.6 : Log-log plot of the outdegree versus the average indegree of friends. The 
scale-free metrics, included in the legend, suggest the presence of a well-connected 
core. 
The trend for high-degree nodes to connect to other high-degree nodes can be 
observed in all networks except YouTube (the unexpected bump at the head of the 
Orkut curve is likely due to the undersampling of users). This suggests that the high-
degree nodes in social networks tend to connect to other high-degree nodes, forming 
a "core" of the network. Anecdotally, we believe that the different behavior seen in 
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YouTube is due its more "celebrity"-driven nature; there are a few extremely popular 
users on YouTube to whom many unpopular users connect. 
To quantitatively explore this phenomenon, we next examine two metrics based 
on the joint degree distribution: the scale-free metric s and the assortativity r. 
5.6.2 Scale-free behavior 
The scale-free metric of the networks are shown in the legend of Figure 5.6. All of 
the networks with the exception of YouTube show a significant s, indicating that 
high-degree nodes tend to connect to other high-degree nodes, and low-degree nodes 
tend to connect to low-degree nodes. 
5.6.3 Assortativity 
The scale-free metric is related to the assortativity coefficient r, which is a measure of 
the likelihood for nodes to connect to other nodes with similar degrees. Recent work 
has suggested that the scale-free metric is more suitable for comparing the structure 
of different graphs [8], as it takes into account the possible configurations of networks 
with properties including connectedness and no self-loops. However, for completeness, 
we calculated the assortativity coefficients for each of the networks, and found 0.202 
for Flickr, 0.179 for Live Journal, 0.072 for Orkut, and -0.033 for YouTube. 
The assortativity shows yet another difference between the social networks and 
other previously observed power-law networks. For example, the Web and the In-
ternet have both been shown to have negative assortativity coefficients of -0.067 and 
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-0.189, respectively [116]. On the other hand, many scientific coauthorship networks, 
a different type of social network, have been shown to have positive r [116]. 
Taken together, the significant scale-free metric and the positive assortativity 
coefficient suggests that there exists a tightly-connected "core" of the high-degree 
nodes which connect to each other, with the lower-degree nodes on the fringes of the 
network. In the next few sections, we explore the properties of these two components 
of the graph in detail. 
5.7 Densely connected core 
We loosely define a core of a network as any (minimal) set of nodes that satisfies 
two properties. First, the core must be necessary for the connectivity of the network 
(i.e., removing the core breaks the remainder of the nodes into many small, discon-
nected clusters). Second, the core must be strongly connected with a relatively small 
diameter. Thus, a "core" is a small group of well-connected group of nodes that is 
necessary to keep the remainder of the network connected. 
To more closely explore the core of the network, we use an approximation previ-
ously used in Web graph analysis [23]. Specifically, we remove increasing numbers of 
the highest degree nodes and analyze the connectivity of the remaining graph.4 We 
calculate the size of the largest remaining SCC, which is the largest set of users who 
can mutually reach each other. 
4The large size of the graphs we study makes a cut set analysis computationally infeasible. 
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As we remove the highest degree nodes, the largest SCC begins to split into 
smaller-sized SCCs. Figure 5.7 shows the composition of the splits as we remove 
between 0.01% and 10% of the highest-degree nodes in Flickr. The corresponding 
graphs for the other social networks look similar, and we omit them for clarity. Once 
we remove 10% of the highest indegree nodes,5 the largest SCC partitions into millions 
of very small SCCs consisting of only a handful of nodes. 
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Figure 5.7 : Breakdown of network into SCCs when high-degree nodes are removed, 
grouped by SCC size. 
To understand how much the network core contributes towards the small path 
lengths, we analyzed the path lengths of subgraphs containing only the highest-degree 
nodes. Figure 5.8. shows how path lengths increase as we generate larger subgraphs 
of the core by progressively including nodes ordered inversely by their degree. The 
average path length increases sub-logarithmically with the size of the core. In Flickr, 
5We obtained the similar results when using both indegree and outdegree, thus we only present 
the indegree results here. 
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for example, the overall average path length is 5.67, of which 3.5 hops involve the 
10% of nodes in the core with the highest degrees. This suggests that the high-degree 
core nodes in these networks are all within roughly four hops of each other, while the 
rest of the nodes, which constitute the majority of the network, are at most a few 
hops away from the core nodes. 
0.0001% 0.001% 0.01% 0.1% 1% 10% 
Fraction of Network 
Figure 5.8 : Average path length among the most well-connected nodes. The path 
length increases sub-logarithmically. 
Thus, the graphs we study have a densely connected core comprising of between 
1% and 10% of the highest degree nodes, such that removing this core completely 
disconnects the graph. 
The structure of social networks, with its high dependence on few highly connected 
nodes, may have implications for information flow, for trust relationships, and for the 
vulnerability of these networks to deliberate manipulation. The small diameter and 
path lengths of social networks are likely to impact the design of techniques for finding 
paths in such networks, for instance, to check how closely related a given pair of nodes 
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is in the network. Such techniques have applications, for instance, in social networks 
used to verify the trustworthiness or relevance of received information [57]. 
5.8 Tightly clustered fringe 
Next, we consider the graph properties at the scale of local neighborhoods outside of 
the core. We first examine clustering, which quantifies how densely the neighborhood 
of a node is connected. 
Network 
Web [3] 
Flickr 
LiveJournal 
Orkut 
YouTube 
C 
0.081 
0.313 
0.330 
0.171 
0.136 
Ratio to Random Graphs 
Erdos-Renyi 
7.71 
47,200 
119,000 
7,240 
36,900 
Power-Law 
-
25.2 
17.8 
5.27 
69.4 
Table 5.4 : The observed clustering coefficient, and ratio to random Erdos-Reyni 
graphs as well as random power-law graphs. 
Table 5.4 shows the clustering coefficients for all four social networks. For compar-
ison, we show the ratio of the observed clustering coefficient to that of Erdos-Reyni 
(ER) random graphs [48] and random power-law graphs constructed with preferential 
attachment [15], with the same number of nodes and links. ER graphs have no link 
bias towards local nodes. Hence, they provide a point of reference for the degree of 
local clustering in the social networks. Graphs constructed using preferential attach-
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ment also have no locality bias, as preferential attachment is a global process, and 
they provide a point of reference to the clustering in a graph with a similar degree 
distribution. 
The clustering coefficients of social networks are between three and five orders 
of magnitude larger than their corresponding random graphs, and about one order 
of magnitude larger than random power-law graphs. This unusually high clustering 
coefficient suggests the presence of strong local clustering, and has a natural expla-
nation in social networks: people tend to be introduced to other people via mutual 
friends, increasing the probability that two friends of a single user are also friends. 
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Figure 5.9 : Clustering coefficient of users with different outdegrees. The users with 
few "friends" are tightly clustered. 
Figure 5.9 shows how the clustering coefficients of nodes vary with node outdegree. 
The clustering coefficient is higher for nodes of low degree, suggesting that there is 
significant clustering among low-degree nodes. This clustering and the small diameter 
of these networks qualifies these graphs as small-world networks [159], and further 
indicates that the graph has scale-free properties. 
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5.9 Groups 
In many online social networks, users with shared interests may create and join groups. 
Table 5.5 shows the high-level statistics of user groups in the four networks we study. 
Participation in user groups varies significantly across the different networks: only 
8% of YouTube users but 61% of LiveJournal users declare group affiliations. Once 
again, the group sizes follow a power-law distribution, in which the vast majority 
have only a few users each. 
Network 
Flickr 
LiveJournal 
Orkut 
YouTube 
Groups 
103,648 
7,489,073 
8,730,859 
30,087 
Usage 
21% 
61% 
13% 
8% 
Average Size 
82 
15 
37 
10 
Average C 
0.47 
0.81 
0.52 
0.34 
Table 5.5 : Table of the high-level properties of network groups including the fraction 
of users which use group features, average group size, and average group clustering 
coefficient. 
Note that users in a group need not necessarily link to each other in the social 
network graph. As it turns out, however, user groups represent tightly clustered 
communities of users in the social network. This can be seen from the average group 
clustering coefficients of group members, shown in Table 5.5.6 These coefficients are 
6
 We define the group clustering coefficient of a group G as the clustering coefficient of the subgraph 
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higher than those of the corresponding network graph as a whole (shown in Table 5.4). 
Further, the members of smaller user groups tend to be more clustered than those 
of larger groups. Figure 5.10 shows this by plotting the average group clustering 
coefficient for groups of different sizes in the four observed networks. In fact, many 
of the small groups in these networks are cliques. 
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Figure 5.10 : Plot of group size and average group clustering coefficient. Many small 
groups are almost cliques. 
Finally, Figure 5.11 shows how user participation in groups varies with outdegree. 
Low-degree nodes tend to be part of very few communities, while high-degree nodes 
tend to be members of multiple groups. This implies a correlation between the link 
creation activity and the group participation. There is a sharp decline in group 
participation for Orkut users with over 500 links, which is inconsistent with the 
behavior of the other networks. This result may be an artifact of our partial crawl of 
the Orkut network and the resulting biased user sample. 
of the network consisting of only the users who are members of G. 
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Figure 5.11 : Outdegree versus average number of groups joined by users. Users with 
more links tend to be members of many groups. 
In general, our observations suggest a global social network structure that is com-
prised of a large number of small, tightly clustered local user communities held to-
gether by nodes of high degree. This structure is likely to significantly impact tech-
niques, algorithms and applications of social networks. 
5.10 Discussion 
We discuss some implications of our findings from this chapter. Our measurements 
indicate that online social networks have a high degree of reciprocity, a tight core 
that consists of high-degree nodes, and a strong positive correlation in link degrees 
for connected users. What do these findings mean for developers? Alternately, how 
should applications for social networks be designed to take advantage of these prop-
erties? Do these properties reveal straightforward attacks on the social structure? 
Finally, does it make sense to "optimize" algorithms and applications based upon our 
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findings, since these networks are still growing rapidly and any property we assert 
now may soon change? 
While our findings are likely applicable to many different applications, we concen-
trate on their effect on information dissemination, search, and trust inference. 
5.10.1 Information dissemination and search 
Social networks are already used as a means for rapidly disseminating information, 
as witnessed by the popularity of "hot" videos on YouTube. The existence of a small, 
well-connected core implies that information seeded via a core node will rapidly spread 
through the entire network. This is both a strength and a weakness, as spam or viruses 
could be disseminated this way, as well as important information. 
Similarly, searches that proceed along social network links will quickly reach the 
core. This suggests that simple unstructured search algorithms could be designed 
if the core users were to store some state about other users. In effect, the users in 
the core represent "supernodes" in a two-level hierarchy, similar to existing search 
protocols for unstructured networks, such as Gnutella. 
5.10.2 Trust 
Social networking sites are the portals of entry into the Internet for many millions 
of users, and they are being used both for advertisement as well as for the ensuing 
commerce. Many of these applications, ranging from mail to auctions, implicitly rely 
on some form of trust. For example, when a user accepts email from an unknown 
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user, she is trusting the other party not to send spam. When a user selects a winning 
bidder in an auction, she is trusting the other party to pay the winning amount, and 
the winning user is trusting the seller to produce the auctioned item. 
In a social network, the underlying user graph can potentially be used as a means 
to infer some level of trust in an unknown user [86], to check the validity of a public 
key certificate [110], and to classify potential spam [57]. In all of these, trust is 
computed as a function of the path between the source and target user. 
Our findings have interesting implications for trust inference algorithms. The 
tight core coupled with link reciprocity implies that users in the core appear on a 
large number of short paths. Thus, if malicious users are able to penetrate the core, 
they can skew many trust paths (or appear highly trustworthy to a large fraction 
of the network). However, these two properties also lead to small path lengths and 
many disjoint paths, so the trust inference algorithms should be adjusted to account 
for this observation. In particular, given our data, an unknown user should be highly 
trusted only if multiple short disjoint paths to the user can be discovered. 
The correlation in link degrees implies that users in the fringe will not be highly 
trusted unless they form direct links to other users. The "social" aspect of these 
networks is self-reinforcing: in order to be trusted, one must make many "friends", 
and create many links that will slowly pull the user into the core. 
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5.11 Summary 
We end this chapter with a brief summary of important structural properties of social 
networks which we observed in our data. 
• The degree distributions in social networks follow a power-law, and the power-
law coefficients for both indegree and outdegree are similar. Nodes with high 
indegree also tend to have high outdegree. 
• Social networks appear to be composed of a large number of highly connected 
clusters consisting of relatively low-degree nodes. These clusters connect to each 
other via a relatively small number of high-degree nodes. As a consequence, the 
clustering coefficient is inversely proportional to node degree. 
• The networks each contain a large, densely connected core. Overall, the network 
is held together by about 10% of the nodes with highest degree. As a result, 
path lengths are short, but almost all shortest paths of sufficient length traverse 
the highly connected core. 
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Chapter 6 
Network Growth 
To date, most measurement and analysis of online social networks (including the 
preceding chapter) has focused on the properties of static network snapshots. Despite 
the different goals and purposes of the various online social networking sites, the 
underlying social networks have been shown to exhibit a surprising number of common 
structural features, such as a highly skewed (power-law) degree distribution, a small 
diameter, and significant local clustering [6,105]. This intriguing similarity suggests 
that the same underlying network growth processes may be at play in the different 
sites. 
A proper understanding of these growth processes can provide insights into the 
observed network structure, allow predictions of future network growth, and enable 
simulation of systems on social networks of arbitrary size. However, most work on 
growth processes for large-scale networks has focused on theoretical models, instead of 
deriving the growth properties from empirical data. For example, two of the popular 
theoretical growth models are the Barabasi-Albert model [15], where users connect 
to other users in proportion to the destination's popularity, and the random walk 
model [142,154], where users connect to other users who are already close in the 
network. 
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In this chapter, we use network growth data from two online social networks and 
two other real-world networks to validate existing models of network growth. In 
particular, we study how well the empirical data matches the predictions of growth 
models that have been proposed. As before, we compare our results to those for 
other, well-understood networks in order to ground our analysis. However, we are 
well aware that the user graph in social networks is fundamentally different from the 
interconnection of web pages or the connections between autonomous systems in the 
Internet. 
It is important to note that we can only study how well a particular model predicts 
the link creation that occurs in the empirical data. We fundamentally do not know 
why new links were established; we can only observe the source and destination of 
new links. Thus, we cannot ultimately prove or disprove any particular model; we can 
only examine the correlation between the observed data and what each model would 
predict. Nevertheless, knowing how well different models predict link creation in the 
data can improve our understanding of network evolution, and can provide clues as 
to the actual underlying processes. 
6.1 High-level data characteristics 
Table 6.1 shows the high-level statistics of the data we gathered in order to study 
the growth of large networks at scale. The network sizes vary by over three orders 
of magnitude. Similarly, other metrics, such as the average number of links per node 
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and the yearly growth rate also vary greatly between the networks. Despite these 
differences, as our analysis later shows, the growth of these complex networks shows 
a number of commonalities. 
Network Type 
Days Observed 
Resolution 
Symmetric Links 
Initial Nodes 
Final Nodes 
Nodes Growth 
Growth per Year 
Initial Links 
Final Links 
Link Growth 
Growth per Year 
Flickr 
directed 
104 
day 
62% 
1,620,392 
2,570,535 
58%. 
242% 
17,034,807 
33,140,018 
63% 
455% 
Wikipedia 
directed 
825 
second 
17% 
695,353 
1,892,691 
169% 
54% 
6,637,456 
39,953,145 
500% 
120% 
YouTube-D 
directed 
36 
day 
79% 
1,003,975 
1,137,638 
13% 
145% 
4,391,336 
4,945,382 
12% 
215% 
YouTube-U 
undirected 
165 
day 
-
1,402,949 
3,218,658 
129% 
525% 
6,783,917 
18,524,095 
173% 
822% 
Internet 
undirected 
1,281 
month/week 
-
9,978 
25,526 
155% 
31% 
29,504 
104,824 
255% 
43% 
Table 6.1 : High-level statistics of the network growth data. 
105 
6.2 Growth dominates network evolution 
In all of the networks we examined, we found that link addition was significantly more 
frequent than link removal. In particular, we found that in Flickr, link additions 
exceeded link removals in our data sets at a rate of 2.43:1. Similar characteristics 
were observed in the other networks we studied: in YouTube-U, the ratio of link 
additions to removals was 3.71:1, and in the Internet, we found that the ratio was 
2.06:1. Unfortunately, we did not record removed links for the YouTube-D data set, 
and we are unable to estimate the fraction of removed links in Wikipedia due to 
the effects of page vandalism (i.e., vandalized pages often have their entire text, and 
therefore all of their outgoing links, replaced and then added back). 
In summary, in the networks in which we were able to record link removals, we 
observed that link addition significantly exceeded link removal. Thus, in the rest of 
this chapter, we focus only on how links are added to growing networks, and we leave 
examining link removal to future work. 
All of the networks we observed showed a high growth rate: normalizing for 
different observation periods across the networks reveals an average growth rate of 
between 31% and 525% per year in terms of nodes, and a growth rate of between 
43% and 822% per year in terms of links. These rapidly growing networks offer us a 
unique opportunity to observe new link creation. 
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6.3 Reciprocation 
We begin by first examining reciprocation, a growth mechanism that exists only in 
directed graphs. Reciprocation occurs when the creation of a directed link between 
two nodes causes the reverse link be established. Since undirected graphs are, by 
definition, symmetric, reciprocation does not make sense in the context of undirected 
graphs. Reciprocation has been proposed as an independent growth mechanism for 
large-scale directed graphs [56,173]. 
Since we do not know why links were established, we rely on the timing between 
the creation of the two directed links of a symmetric link to guess whether the creation 
of the first causally affected the second. Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the time 
between the establishment of the two links of a given symmetric link in the three 
directed graphs (Flickr, YouTube-D, and Wikipedia) that we studied. 
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Figure 6.1 : CDF of time between establishment of the two directed links of a sym-
metric link. In both Flickr and Youtube, links are quickly reciprocated. 
From Figure 6.1, it is clear that in the two social networks we observed, users 
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often respond to incoming links by quickly establishing a reciprocal link back to the 
source node. In fact, over 83% of all symmetric links we observed in both Flickr 
and YouTube-D were established within 48 hours after the initial link creation. We 
hypothesize that this rapid link creation is enabled by the mechanisms on the online 
social networking sites: most sites email users of new incoming links and provide an 
easy mechanism for creating a reciprocal link in response. 
Thus, our data suggests that users tend to quickly reciprocate links, if they recip-
rocate at all. It is therefore highly likely that the establishment of the first link in 
these networks prompted the creation of the reciprocal link. The Wikipedia data, on 
the other hand, indicates a lower degree of reciprocation; only 30% of the symmetric 
links in Wikipedia had both halves of the link created within 48 hours of each other. 
Our data suggests that reciprocation is an independent mechanism shaping the 
growth of directed networks. The degree of reciprocation is dependent on the net-
work: the two social networks show significant reciprocation, while Wikipedia shows 
reciprocation, but to a less significant degree. 
6.4 Preferential attachment 
Preferential attachment [15], colloquially referred to as the "rich get richer" phe-
nomenon, is a growth model in which new links in a network are attached preferentially 
to nodes that already have a large number of links. Under preferential attachment, 
the probability that a new link attaches to a given node is proportional to the node's 
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current degree. 
To examine whether preferential attachment predicts the observed growth data, 
we calculated how the number of new links per day varies with the node degree. If 
preferential attachment is taking place, we would expect to see a positive correlation 
between the degree of a node and the number of new links it creates or receives. 
However, it is important to note that a positive correlation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for the validity of the preferential attachment mechanism, as other 
mechanisms could also result in such a correlation. For example, the "connecting 
nearest neighbors" model [154] has been shown to also exhibit such a correlation. 
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Figure 6.2 : Log-log plot of outdegree versus number of new links per day. All 
networks show strong evidence of preferential attachment. 
Figure 6.4 plots this distribution in log-log scale for each of the five networks we 
studied. For the three directed graphs, we separately plot the number of new links 
created and received, with respect to the node's current outdegree and indegree. 
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Figure 6.3 : Log-log plot of indegree versus number of new links per day. All networks 
show strong evidence of preferential attachment. 
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Figure 6.4 : Log-log plot of degree versus number of new links per day. All networks 
show strong evidence of preferential attachment. 
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6.4.1 Undirected networks 
For the two undirected networks, YouTube-U and the AS-level Internet, we show how 
the degree of a node correlates with the number of new links per day. We find a strong 
positive correlation between the current degree and the number of newly created links 
in both of the networks. 
6.4.2 Directed networks 
For the three directed networks, we separate the preferential attachment model into 
two aspects: preferential creation and preferential reception. Preferential creation 
describes the mechanism by which nodes create new links in proportion to their 
outdegree, and preferential reception describes the mechanism where nodes receive 
new links in proportion to their indegree. This distinction is consistent with previously 
proposed models of preferential attachment on directed graphs [25]. 
It is important to understand why we separate preferential attachment into pref-
erential creation and preferential reception for directed networks. Preferential at-
tachment was originally defined for undirected graphs [15], and therefore does not 
distinguish between node indegree and outdegree. However, in the directed networks 
we study, link creation is very different from link reception. Nodes are in complete 
control over their outgoing links, since they decide who they link to, but they are not 
in control of their indegree, since it depends upon who they receive links from. 
For the three directed networks, Flickr, Wikipedia, and YouTube-D, we separately 
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examine how the current outdegree and indegree of a node is related to the number 
of newly created and received links per day. Figure 6.4 shows that the outdegree 
of nodes is positively linearly correlated with the number of new links created per 
node per day. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the validity of 
the preferential creation mechanism. Figure 6.4 also shows, for the three directed 
networks, that the increase in node indegree is linearly correlated with the current 
indegree of the node. Similarly, this is a necessary condition for the validity of the 
preferential reception mechanism. 
6.4.3 Discussion 
Our data shows that a necessary condition for preferential attachment, a positive 
correlation between the degree of a node and the number of new links, is present 
in all five networks. However, this alone is insufficient to claim that any specific 
mechanism (such as the BA model) is the mechanism that is causing the growth, as 
a number of different mechanisms could also result in this correlation. In the next 
section, we more closely examine the growth data to look for further evidence of 
specific growth mechanisms. 
6.5 Proximity bias in link creation 
In this section, we take a closer look at our growth data to look for evidence of 
specific global or local mechanisms that lead to preferential attachment. We look for 
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evidence of models based on local rules by focusing on the distance between newly-
linked users. Specifically, we examine the shortest path distance between the source 
and destination of newly created links, before a new link is created between them. If, 
for example, the BA model is the underlying mechanism, then the observed distance 
distribution between users should match that predicted by the model. Otherwise, 
if we see a stronger bias towards close users, it may suggest that users follow local, 
rather than global, rules for selecting the destinations for new links. 
Over 50% of the links in all five networks are between nodes that have, a priori, 
some network path between them (the remainder of the observed new links are be-
tween users which are, a priori, disconnected).1 For these new links among already 
connected users, Figure 6.5 shows the cumulative distribution of shortest-path hop 
distances between source and destination nodes. It reveals a striking trend: over 80% 
of such new links in Flickr connect nodes that were only two hops apart, meaning 
that the destination node was a friend-of-a-friend of the source node. Similarly, this 
fraction is over 42% in YotiTube-D, over 50% in Wikipedia, over 45% in YouTube-U, 
and over 57% in the Internet topology. 
One might wonder whether in small diameter networks like the ones we observe, 
this high level of proximity in link establishment is simply a result of preferential 
attachment. This is plausible, since the high-degree nodes that preferential attach-
ment prefers tend to be close to many nodes. To test this hypothesis, for each newly 
1For directed networks, we only count directed paths. 
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created link, we computed the expected distance from the source to the destination, if 
the destination is chosen using the BA model. Figure 6.5 also plots this distribution 
for each network. 
In all five networks that we study, the observed distances between the source and 
destination of links shows a significant bias towards nearby nodes, relative to what 
the BA model would predict. In fact, in Flickr, Wikipedia, and YouTube-D, we 
found that the number of new links connecting 2-hop neighbors in the empirical data 
exceeded that predicted by the BA model by a factor of three. 
This result shows that while new link formation in our observed networks follows 
preferential attachment, the link creation process cannot be explained by the BA 
model alone. Nodes are far more likely to link to nearby nodes than the model would 
suggest. This result is consistent with the previous observations on static networks, 
which showed that the clustering coefficient was significant higher than would be 
predicted by the BA model. In the next section, we focus on how nodes choose which 
nearby node to link to. 
6.6 Mechanisms causing proximity bias 
In the previous section, we showed that newly created links show a strong bias towards 
nodes which are close together, relative to what the BA model would predict. This 
suggests that an alternate mechanism is causing the establishment of new links. In 
this section, we take a closer look at the newly created links, and see if the growth 
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Figure 6.5 : CDF of distance between source and destination of observed links (Obs). 
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them. All networks show a proximity bias that is not predicted by the BA model. 
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data matches the expected properties of other proposed mechanisms. 
In particular, we examine network growth models that are known to have a 
stronger bias towards proximity than preferential attachment. To make the anal-
ysis tractable, we focus on new links that occur between nodes that are two hops 
apart. Such links account for over 45% of the links in all networks. We consider the 
BA model for preferential creation, combined with five different proposed mechanisms 
for selecting the destination of a newly established link: 
• Random selection (RS), where a node choses the destination randomly from its 
set of two-hop neighbors. This mechanism serves as a baseline for evaluating 
the other mechanisms. 
• Random two-hop walk (RW), where a node performs a random two-hop walk to 
find the destination [154]. 
• Preferential selection (PS), where a node choses from its set of two-hop neigh-
bors preferentially according to the nodes' indegrees. This is. similar to the BA 
model, except that a node only considers its two-hop neighbors [93]. 
• Common neighbors (CN), where a source makes a weighted random choice 
among its set of two-hop neighbors. The likelihood that a given candidate 
is chosen is proportional to the number of neighbors the source shares with the 
candidate [114]. 
• Jaccard's coefficient (JC), where a source makes a weighted random choice 
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among its set of two-hop neighbors. Here, the likelihood that a given candidate 
is chosen is proportional to the number of neighbors the source shares with the 
candidate divided by the candidate's indegree [93]. 
We examined newly established links in all networks that connect nodes that were 
previously two hops apart. We then calculated the expected indegree distribution of 
nodes that would have been selected using each of the five mechanisms above. We 
then compared the results to the distribution in the empirical data. Figure 6.6 plots 
these distributions for each network. 
From Figure 6.6, we can see that no one mechanism closely matches the empirical 
data in all networks. In fact, in two of the networks (Flickr and Wikipedia), the 
random walk mechanism most closely matches,the observed data. However, in the 
other three networks, the results are less conclusive. To better quantify how well the 
various mechanisms predict the selected destination of new links, we calculated the 
accuracy of each mechanism, in the same manner as previous studies [93]. Thus, for 
each newly created link, we calculated the fraction of time each mechanism correctly 
predicted the selected destination. The results are shown in Table 6.2, relative to the 
random selection model. 
The accuracy results in Table 6.2 shows that no one model dominates in terms 
of accuracy across different networks. However, closely examining the results reveals 
that the two mechanisms that take into account the indegree of the destination (RW 
and PS) do tend to have higher accuracy. This suggests either that different mecha-
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Figure 6.6 : CDF of nodes receiving new links by indegree. Plots are shown for 
observed data (Obs), and simulated mechanisms: random selection (RS), random 2-
hop walk (RW), preferential selection (PS), common neighbors (CN), and Jaccard's 
coefficient (JC). The observed data does not match any one mechanism, suggesting 
that different mechanisms are at play in different networks. 
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Flickr 
Wikipedia 
YouTube-D 
YouTube-U 
In te rne t 
RS 
0.17% 
0.15% 
0.35% 
0.59% 
0.53% 
RW 
2.0 
2.9 
1.6 
1.7 
1.9 
P S 
1.1 
2.9 
1.5 
1.3 
4.1 
CN 
1.2 
1.3 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
J C 
1.2 
0.7 
1.0 
1.4 
0.5 
Table 6.2 : Prediction accuracy of two-hop link creation mechanisms relative to the 
baseline random selection mechanism. While no one mechanism appears to be the 
most accurate across all networks, Random Walk and Preferential Selection tend to 
have higher accuracy. 
nisms may be at play in different networks, or that the actual mechanism driving link 
creation is not among the ones we evaluated, or that the actual mechanism is a com-
plex combination of some of the mechanisms we tested. This result is not surprising, 
though, as each of the networks represents a different system, and it is unlikely that 
one single mechanism would describe the link creation behavior in all of them. 
6.7 Discussion 
In this chapter, we used empirical growth data from multiple large-scale complex 
networks to test if previously proposed growth models actually are at play in these 
networks. We have chosen to focus on the well-known BA model model because it 
is simple and has been suggested as the underlying growth mechanism in different 
contexts. Clearly, the BA model leads to global degree distributions of the type 
11.9 
observed in many diverse networks, and absent other data, it is an attractive choice 
for researchers to explain static snapshots of crawled networks. 
6.7.1 Is proximity fundamental? 
We believe that some notion of proximity is inherent in the link creation processes 
underlying large networks. As a network grows larger, it is increasingly unlikely 
that nodes are influenced by knowledge of the global degree ranking when choosing 
their neighbors. In many networks (in particular, many social networks), it may not 
even be possible to discover the global degree ranking of nodes, knowledge of which 
is required for pure preferential attachment. Other mechanisms that rely on global 
properties are equally unlikely because of technical and policy issues with computing 
global metrics. 
In the networks we have examined, the bias towards proximity can be explained 
by considering the node discovery mechanisms available to users and the factors that 
constrain them. In the social networks (YouTube and Flickr), the primary mechanism 
available to users for exploring the network is to walk their neighborhood. This 
might explain our observation in Flickr and YouTube that there is a much stronger 
bias in link creation towards nearby nodes than would be predicted by preferential 
attachment alone, yet there still is a bias towards high-degree nodes (see Table 6.2). 
On Wikipedia, semantically closer pages are likely to be proximal in the network, 
leading to a proximity bias in link creation. 
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The Internet AS graph is fundamentally different because each AS consists of many 
different routers and there is a significant cost associated with creating new links. A 
model for AS link formation is given in [27], and our observations are consistent with 
the reasoning therein. The AS graph is naturally "tiered" with many small stub 
ASes interconnected by a few large backbone providers (who also tend to have high 
connectivity/degree). AS link creation is often constrained by financial, technical, 
and geographical factors: for most stub ASes, links to far away ASs tend to be costly 
(especially if the geographic distance is large) and are unlikely to be profitable since 
the upstream provider already provides transit to reach these ASes. Such links only 
make sense in specific cases where business relationships mandate a specific inter-AS 
peering. Thus, stub ASes tend to connect to their nearby backbone AS providers, 
and the resulting AS graph shows proximity bias coupled with strong preferential 
selection. 
6.7.2 Proximity mechanisms 
While our growth data cannot assert which mechanism are at play when links are 
formed, it can be used to disprove existing hypotheses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, we 
find that the simplest mechanisms (such as the BA model) are not sufficient to explain 
our observations. In particular, we have shown that to explain the empirical growth 
data, we must include some notion of proximity in the growth models. While prox-
imity has been previously suggested as a factor in link creation in large networks, we 
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believe we are the first to provide empirical date from multiple large-scale networks 
to support this conjecture. 
The analysis in the previous section revealed some insights into how proximity 
affects the growth of complex networks. While our results are not conclusive, it 
appears that growth models that take into account the indegree of the destination 
(e.g. Preferential Selection and Random Walk) match the data more closely than 
other models. Moreover, Preferential Selection outperforms Random Walk only for 
the Internet AS graph. ......:.... 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we closely examined network growth data from five different networks 
and compared the empirical data to the predictions of previously proposed growth 
mechanisms. We end this chapter with a brief outline of our most important findings. 
• We found evidence of reciprocation as a mechanism in directed networks. We 
found that users tend to often create a reciprocal link in response to an incoming 
link, explaining the high levels of symmetry observed in social networks with 
directed links. 
• We also found that nodes tend to create and receive links in proportion to the 
outdegree and indegree, which is consistent with preferential attachment (or 
preferential creation and preferential reception in directed networks). 
• However, we found that the BA model alone did not accurately predict the 
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proximity bias among nodes connected by new links in any of the empirical 
data sets. All networks showed a stronger bias towards proximity between new 
sources and destinations than would have been predicted by the BA model. 
• Upon closer examination of the newly created links links, we found than no sin-
gle proximity model we examined appears to accurately predict this proximity 
across all networks. However, we did find that models that consider network 
proximity as a factor in link creation predict the empirical data better then 
preferential attachment. This suggests that further research into growth mech-
anisms is necessary. 
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Chapter 7 
Network Communities 
The concept of a community is central to online, as well as offline, social networks. A 
community is a subset of the users in a social network that is more tightly intercon-
nected than the overall network [118]. Communities are interesting for a variety of 
reasons. For example, users in a community tend to interact frequently, often share 
interests, and trust each other to some extent. Therefore, communities are useful, for 
instance, to guide information dissemination and acquisition, to recommend or intro-
duce people who would likely benefit from direct interaction, and to express access 
control policies. 
Prior works have proposed algorithms for automatically detecting communities in 
social networks [13,31,58,99,118,131,153]. However, the algorithms have never been 
tested on real online social networks at scale. In this chapter, we use fine-grained 
data from a university online social network to study the effectiveness of existing 
algorithms for detecting communities, and we propose a new algorithm to overcome 
the observed limitations of existing approaches. 
Specifically, we make three contributions. First, we collect detailed data about 
a large university social network and analyze the structure of communities in the 
network. Our data covers almost 4,000 students and alumni of Rice University taken 
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from the Facebook [49] social network. For each student, we gather attributes like 
major(s) of study, year of matriculation, and dormitory, to see if communities in the 
network align with these attributes. We find that users tend to form links to other 
users who share the same attributes, and that users who share certain attributes 
define strong communities in the social network. 
Second, we examine how well existing techniques can detect communities. We find 
that existing approaches often perform poorly on our data set, sometimes returning 
a large part of the network (or the whole network) as a community. We demonstrate 
that this poor performance is due to the use of community-rating metrics that are 
biased towards large communities. 
Third, we propose and evaluate a new algorithm that can accurately infer mem-
berships of multiple, potentially overlapping communities, when given information 
about a small subset of the community members. In practice, this means that if even 
as few as 20% of users provide community information to social networking sites, the 
remaining members of the community can be determined from the social network 
alone with high accuracy. 
In the following sections, we describe the data we use for our community analysis. 
We then examine the data set, looking at the correlation between attributes and 
the links and communities in the network. Finally, we evaluate previously proposed 
approaches and propose and evaluate new approach for detecting communities in the 
network 
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7.1 Data sets used 
In this chapter, we use the Facebook data set from Rice University, described in 
Section 4.5. We partition our data set into a two subsets representing different parts 
of the Rice University network, which have different properties. The first group we 
use is the current undergraduates. This subset contains 1,233 users connected with 
86,416 links, for an average degree of 70.1. The second group we use is the current 
graduate students. This subset contains 548 users connected with 6,512 links, for 
an average degree of 11.8. We examine these two parts of the network separately, 
since we have different attributes sets for the undergraduates and graduate students 
and they represent largely distinct parts of the network. In fact, only 1,455 links are 
present between undergraduates and graduate students. 
7.2 Attributes in the network 
We first make two observations about how the structure of the social network is 
correlated with the attributes of users. First, we note that users are significantly 
more likely to be friends with other users who share their attributes. In some cases, 
the likelihood is as high as 10-fold more than that would be expected if links were 
placed randomly. Second, we observe that this affinity for links between similar users 
leads to communities of users in the network that are centered around attributes. 
Each of these observations is described in detail below. 
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7.2.1 Friends with common attributes 
Our first observation is that users are statistically much more likely to be friends with 
other users who share their attributes. In order to show this, we calculated for each 
attribute a (such as college or matriculation year) 
Q _ \{(i,j) e £ : s.t. ai = aj}\ . . 
ba
~ ~\E\ (7'1J 
where a; represents the value of attribute a for user i, and E represents the set of 
all links. Sa therefore represents the fraction of links for which users share the same 
value of attribute a. Finally, we divided this by what would be expected in a graph 
with a similar distribution of attributes but with the links placed randomly between 
users. The resulting value, which we call affinity, ranges from 0 to oo and represents 
the ratio of the fraction of links between attribute-sharing users, relative to what 
would be expected in a random graph. Thus, an affinity greater than 1 indicates that 
links are positively correlated with user attributes. 
Table 7.1 shows the affinity of the various attributes for the undergraduates and 
graduate students at Rice. We observe that for all attributes, a significant affinity is 
observed, showing that links in the Rice network are correlated with attributes. It is 
interesting to note that certain attributes are stronger than others: for example, grad-
uate students have a much strong affinity for other students in the same department 
when compared to other students in the same matriculation year. In some cases, the 
affinity is as high as 10, implying that users connected by a link are 10 times more 
likely to share an attribute that would be expected in a random graph. In summary, 
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Users 
undergrads 
grads 
Attribute 
college 
major 
year 
department 
school 
year 
Affinity 
5.77 
2.37 
1.93 
9.98 
4.09 
1.81 
Table 7.1 : Affinity values for various attributes of students at Rice. Links are 
correlated with numerous user attributes. 
we have observed that links in the Rice network are strongly correlated with attribute 
values, suggesting that communities of users centered around common attributes may 
be present. 
7.2.2 Attribute-based communities 
Given that we have observed a correlation between user attributes and links, it is 
natural to see if the users who share a similar attribute form communities, or dense 
clusters, in the network. Note that the previous observation is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition for attribute-based communities to exist, since users with 
common attributes may be linked together but may not form a dense community. In 
order to investigate whether attribute communities are present in our network, we 
artificially divide the network into communities based on user attributes, and then 
quantify the strength of that division into communities using modularity [118]. 
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Undergraduate students 
Table 7.2 shows the modularity for the undergraduate population when partitioned 
according to residential college, major, and matriculation year. Also shown is the 
modularity of the partitionings that are obtained when multiple attributes are used. 
The results show a significant modularity for the communities defined by residen-
tial college and matriculation year - a relatively high Q of 0.385 is observed when 
partitioning by residential college, and a Q of 0.259 is seen when dividing by year. 
However, the modularity of the communities defined by major is almost 0, indicating 
that no community structure exists based on academic major. Overall, these results 
indicate that users who share the same college or matriculation year form tightly-knit 
communities in the social network. 
Attributes 
college, major, year 
college, major 
year, major 
major 
college, year 
year 
college 
Communities 
660 
488 
270 
163 
36 
4 
9 
Modularity 
0.021 
0.025 
0.039 
0.046 
0.249 
0.259 
0.385 
Table 7.2 : Modularity values for communities defined by various attributes of under-
graduates at Rice. College and matriculation year reveal strong community structure. 
With some knowledge of the actual social network at Rice, the above results are 
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not unexpected. Undergraduate students are randomly assigned to a residential col-
lege upon matriculation, and they remain members of that college for the duration 
of their undergraduate studies. Thus, it is natural that strong communities form 
around residential colleges. Additionally, the strong communities among undergrad-
uate students of the same matriculation year are not surprising. Incoming students 
attend an orientation week together, are mostly assigned to share dormitory rooms 
with students of their year, and tend to spend time in courses with students of their 
year. Thus, it is also natural that a community structure exists among undergradu-
ates of the same matriculation year. Finally, the lack of a strong community structure 
around majors can be explained by the fact that Rice undergraduates obtain liberal 
arts education (taking courses from many departments), and they often do not choose 
majors until the end of their sophomore year. 
Graduate students 
We now turn our focus to the graduate student population. Table 7.3 shows the 
modularity of the graduate student population when partitioned according to de-
partment, academic school, and matriculation year.1 The results show a significant 
modularity for the comnmnities based on department - in fact, a Q of 0.586 is ob-
served. A similar modularity is observed when partitioning according to school - this 
is because each department is a member of exactly one school, and the partitioning 
^ o t e that graduate students are not assigned to residential colleges, so that attribute is disre-
garded here. 
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according to school ends up being a coarser version of the communities defined by 
department. Similar to the undergrads, a Q of 0.187 is also seen for the communities 
defined by matriculation year. This indicates a very strong community structure for 
the graduate students based on department, and a weak community structure based 
on matriculation year. 
Attributes 
year 
department, school, year 
department, year 
school, year 
school 
department, school 
department 
Communities 
11 
139 
139 
45 
9 
36 
36 
Modularity 
0.187 
0.294 
0.294 
0.304 
0.583 
0.586 
0.586 
Table 7.3 : Modularity values for communities defined by various attributes for grad-
uate students at Rice. Departments form strong communities. 
The results for the graduate student population are also not unexpected. Graduate 
students are accepted into a specific department at the beginning of their studies, 
and usually spend their entire tenure in the same department. Thus, the very strong 
association with the department is not surprising. Moreover, the variable length of 
graduate programs and the greater tendency of graduate students to interact across 
seniority levels explains why the partitioning according to matriculation year has a 
weak community structure. 
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7.2.3 Summary 
In both the Rice undergraduate and graduate student populations, we observe that 
users with similar attributes tend to be friends in the social network. Moreover, 
we observe a significant community structure, indicated by a high modularity value, 
for the communities defined by users who share certain attributes. We also observe 
that multiple overlapping community structures exist. For the undergraduates, we 
observe significant modularity when partitioning according to residential college and 
matriculation year. For the graduate students, we observe significant modularity 
when partitioning according to department and a weaker modularity according to 
matriculation year. 
7.3 Detecting communities 
In the previous section, we observed that the undergraduate network, and to a lesser 
extent the graduate network, contained communities that were correlated with mul-
tiple attributes. For the undergraduates, the partitionings according to college and 
matriculation year both showed significant correlation with the communities in the 
network. For the graduates, partitionings according to department and year showed 
similar behavior. We now consider the use of automatic clustering algorithms to 
detect a specific community among the multiple communities that exist. 
To do so, we split the problem into two parts: first, if partial membership in-
formation about all communities in the network is known, we examine the problem 
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of detecting a specific community partitioning. Second, if partial membership infor-
mation about only one community is known, we look at the problem of detecting a 
specific community given a partial membership list. 
7.3.1 Global community detection 
We assume that some fraction of the user population provides information about 
which communities they belong to. For example, some users on Facebook list their 
college and matriculation year in their profile. This information can_ be used to aid 
the automatic clustering algorithms. 
To evaluate whether this information can aid in identifying multiple community 
structures, we modified the Clauset [32] algorithm to take in attributes of a subset of 
the users. Instead of starting with every user in their own cluster, the algorithm pre-
assigns users with the same attribute into the same cluster. We then run the algorithm 
as normal, effectively "seeding" it with the users who reveal their attributes. Finally, 
we calculate the modularity of the resulting partitioning, and then compare it to the 
partitioning based on the attributes of all users. 
To measure how similar these two community structures are, we use the normalized 
mutual information metric [53]. This metric is calculated as 
- 2 V . V . x i j / o ^ ( ^ ^ - ) 
T.i^iogm + Y:jx,iog{^) {- } 
where x is a square matrix whose dimension is the number of communities detected. 
Each element x -^ represents the number of nodes in attribute-defined community i 
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that appeared in the detected community j . x.j and x,, denotes sum over column 
i, and sum over row i respectively, and N is the number of nodes in the graph. At 
a. high level, the metric ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 representing no correlation 
between the two community structures, and 1 representing a perfect match. 
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Figure 7.1 : Normalized mutual information versus the fraction of users who reveal 
their community for Rice undergraduates. Revealing more information naturally leads 
to partitionings with higher correlations, especially for the college and year attributes. 
This result shows that different attributes can be accurately inferred with as few as 
20% of users revealing their attributes. 
Figure 7.1 plots the results of this experiment for the undergraduates, by showing 
the normalized mutual information for each attribute. Separate lines are plotted for 
each attribute, and the correlation value is with respect to the attribute that users are 
revealing. Two trends can be seen in this graph. First, we observe that both college 
and year quickly lead to community structures with significant correlation. In fact, 
when just 20% of users reveal their college or year, we can infer the attributes for the 
remaining users with over 80% accuracy. Second, this is not the case for major of 
study. However, this result is not surprising, as we observed in the previous section 
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that communities are not formed around users with common majors. Overall, this 
experiment shows that multiple attributes can be inferred globally when as few as 
20% of the users reveal their attribute information. 
1 | 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 r 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Fraction of Users Revealed 
Figure 7.2 : Normalized mutual information versus the fraction of users who reveal 
their community for Rice graduate students. 
Figure 7.2 plots the results of this experiment for the Rice graduate students. 
Similar to the undergrads, we observe that certain attributes correspond to commu-
nities that can be detected with high accuracy. For example, if as few as 5% of the 
students reveal their department or school, we can infer the department or school 
for the remaining students with approximately 60% accuracy. However, this is not 
the case for the matriculation year attribute. We observed in the previous section 
that matriculation years only correspond to weak communities, so this result is not 
unexpected. 
• ' 1 3 5 
7.3.2 Local community detection 
We now look at detecting communities on a local scale. This is different from the 
problem in the previous section, where we assumed that partial information about 
all users in the network is known. Instead, for example, we may know that a subset 
of five users all live in the same dormitory, and we wish to determine the other users 
(for which we do not have any information) who also live in that dormitory. To 
detect these communities, we extend the previously proposed approaches for local 
community detection to take a seed set of nodes. 
While exploring local community detection, we found that previous approaches 
performed well when detecting certain attributes, but did not perform well on others. 
For example, we found that the algorithm of Luo [99] could infer the members of a res-
idential college at Rice, but was not able to infer the members of larger communities, 
such as all students in the same matriculation year. Thus, we propose a new method 
for detecting a single community, based on the metric of normalized conductance. We 
first describe this new metric below, followed by a description of our algorithm, and 
finally evaluate the algorithms on our Rice data set. 
Normalized conductance 
We first define a metric that rates the quality of a single community (as opposed to 
modularity, which rates the community structure of a partitioning of a graph into 
a collection of communities). To provide a measure for the quality of a community, 
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we propose a metric based on the widely adopted metric conductance [71]. Let G = 
(V, E) denote a graph, let A C V be a subset of the vertices that forms a community, 
and let B = V \ A. Let us also define 6AB to be the number of edges between A 
and B and CAA as the number of edges within A. The conductance of A is then 
traditionally defined as CAB/ZAA- Therefore, a small value of conductance denotes 
a strong community, as the community would be tightly linked internally, with very 
few links to the rest of the graph. 
However, this definition of conductance is not a good measure for the "goodness" 
of a community, as it is biased towards large communities. For example, if we place 
all the vertices in the graph in a single community, the conductance would be 0, which 
does not provide any information about the community formed. 
Hence, we propose a new metric called normalized conductance. To derive nor-
malized conductance, we first define the value K of community A as 
K = CAA (7.3) 
&AA +&AB 
This value is similar to conductance, except that it ranges between 0 and 1. A 
measure close to zero indicates very poor community structure, and a measure close 
to 1 indicates very good community structure with many more links within A than 
to the outside. However, this metric is still not perfect, as very large communities 
are naturally biased towards having many more edges within the graph (high BAA)-
Thus, we define the normalized conductance C for a community A as K minus the 
expected value of K for a random graph with the same communities A and B. 
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To calculate the expected value of K for a random graph, we need to calculate the 
expected values of eAA and e^s for a graph with the same community division and 
degree distribution, but with the links placed without regard for the communities. 
We define e^ = SAA + CAB and CB = e,BB + eAB, with e^ denoting the number of edges 
that reach vertices within A, and eg giving the same quantity for B. In a random 
graph, we would expect that e^y = &X^Y- Thus, our normalized conductance metric 
C can be written as 
. . C=. BAA — 6A6A - (7.4) 
eAA + e-AB eAeA + eAeB 
The metric C ranges between -1 and 1. Similar to modularity, a value of 1 indicates a 
significant community structure in A, a value of 0 indicates no more community struc-
ture than a random graph, and a value of -1 indicates less community structure than 
a random graph. One particularly useful property of this definition of conductance 
is that it is comparable across communities of different sizes and densities. Previous 
definitions generally only use the ratio of intra-community links to inter-community 
links, which is naturally biased towards very large communities. 
Algorithm 
We now describe our algorithm for detecting a single community, using the normalized 
conductance metric C. We assume the algorithm is given as input a subset of users 
S in a community and the social network graph G = (V,E). The algorithm then 
returns the other members of the community. Similar to the approach that was taken 
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by Luo [99], we use a greedy approach to maximize the normalized conductance. We 
initially divide the graph into two components A and B, with A = S initially. At each 
step, we select a user v € V in B that upon adding v to A yields the highest increase 
in the normalized conductance C for A. We repeat this process, adding users to A, 
until no remaining user would produce an increase in the normalized conductance C 
for A. At this point, we stop and return the community A as the result. 
The primary difference between our method and the previous approaches is the 
use of a metric that is weighted against a random graph. We found that the metrics 
used by previous approaches are all biased towards large communities. For example, 
the metric used by Luo et al. [99] is based on the ratio between the number of 
intra-community links to the number of inter-community links. As a community 
grows larger, this value naturally increases; in fact, it becomes infinite if an entire 
connected component is viewed as a community. Thus, these approaches often have 
trouble detecting large communities in the network, as they often proceed to detect 
the entire graph as a community. By weighting our metric against a random graph, 
we can detect both the small-scale and large-scale communities that exist. 
Evaluation 
To see how well our algorithm and others perform, we evaluate the performance 
along two axes. Assume that each algorithm takes as input a subset S of users with 
attribute H, and the social network graph. The algorithm then returns a set of users 
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R, representing the other members it believes also have attribute H, based on the 
community structure in the network. We define the recall to be 
\H\S\ ( 7 ' 5 ) 
representing the fraction of the remaining community members that the algorithm 
returns. Similarly, we define the precision to be 
representing the fraction of the returned users who are actually in the community. 
Thus, an ideal algorithm would have a recall of 1 (returning all of the remaining users) 
as well as a precision of 1 (only returning users who are actually in the community). 
We now evaluate our algorithm on the Rice data set along with the algorithms of 
Luo [99], Bagrow [13], and Clauset [31]. First, we examine how well they perform on 
the undergraduate population by providing the algorithms with varying-size subsets of 
the students with common attributes such as college, matriculation year, and major. 
For each attribute (i.e., each college, each major), we select 20 random subsets of 
users of each size. We then evaluate how well the algorithms perform when given 
each of these random subsets as input. 
For fair comparison with the other algorithms, a few parameters and modifica-
tions were required. First, none of the other algorithms accept as input a set of seed 
nodes; we naturally extended them to start with a set of nodes rather than a single 
node. Second, the algorithm proposed by Clauset does not specify a stopping con-
dition; instead, it requires the user to specify the number of nodes to be added to 
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the community. Thus, we utilise the stopping condition proposed by Bagrow [13] for 
the Clauset algorithm, based on p-strong communities.2 We evaluate the algorithms 
of Clauset and Bagrow with values of p — {0.75,0.8,0.85,.., 1.0}, as suggested, and 
select the one with the lowest number of inter-community edges (representing the 
"best" community). Third, the algorithm of Lou et al. performs iterative adds and 
deletions, and could therefore remove the original seed nodes from the resulting com-
munity. In the case of a single seed node, the authors view the removal of the seed 
node from the returned community as a failure of the algorithm to detect a com-
munity. In order to handle this case for our extended version that accepts a set of 
seed nodes, we imposed the constraint that we only consider the algorithm of Luo to 
have found a community if 50% or more of the original seed nodes were present in 
the resulting community. If not, we do not consider the algorithm to have found a 
community. 
Detecting undergraduate communities 
We now present the results for inferring different attributes for the undergraduate 
students. For these results, we average over all possible values of each attribute (such 
as all colleges) into the recall and precision data presented in Figure 7.3. Thus, we 
feed each algorithm x% of every college and calculate the recall and precision of the 
2A community is p-strong when a fraction p of nodes within the community satisfy the criteria 
that they have more neighbors inside the community than outside 
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result. We repeat this experiment five times for each college and fraction revealed, 
and then average over all colleges to obtain the data in Figure 7.3 (a). 
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(a) College (b) Major (c) Year 
Figure 7.3 : Recall and precision of single community detection for Rice undergradu-
ates for multiple algorithms. Good performance is observed for our algorithm (Norm. 
Gond.) for college and year; detecting users with the same major performs poorly 
due to the low correlation with communities in the network. The algorithm of Luo 
performs well at inferring college but does not perform well for inferring matriculation 
year. 
As a detailed example, Figure 7.4 presents the recall and precision for each of the 
matriculation years as different number of users are revealed. A number of interesting 
observations can be made about the results. First, the performance varies across the 
different matriculation years; the freshmen and sophomores appear to be the easiest to 
detect, followed by the juniors and seniors. Second, detecting all of the matriculation 
years shows good performance once 20% to 30% of the users is revealed. Third, note 
that the precision naturally deteriorates once very high fractions of the users in each 
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year are revealed. This is because the precision is defined based on the number of 
unrevealed users, which becomes much smaller as significant fractions are revealed. 
We now turn back to Figure 7.3 and discuss each attribute in detail. 
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Figure 7.4 : Recall and precision for matriculation year community detection for Rice 
undergraduates for our algorithm. Individual lines are shown for each matriculation 
year. Certain values of user attributes are easier to detect than others. 
Colleges: The results show that colleges can be inferred with very high recall 
and precision by both our algorithm and the algorithm of Luo when as few as 10% 
of the students in the college are known. For example, when 20% of the members 
of a single college are provided to the algorithms, both our algorithm at that of Luo 
can infer over 80% of the remaining members of that college with over 95% accuracy. 
Figure 7.5 shows this in detail for our algorithm, focusing on the performance when 
Freshmen 
• Juniors 
'Sophomores 
Seniors* 
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between 1% and 16% of the college members are provided. The algorithms of Clauset 
and Bagrow both perform rather poorly at detecting colleges: they each often return 
a large part of the network as belonging to the college, resulting in a very low precision 
score. 
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Figure 7.5 : Detail on recall and precision for college inference for Rice undergraduates 
with our algorithm. 
Years: However, for inferring matriculation years, all algorithms have significant 
recall, but only our algorithm has good precision. In fact, the other algorithms tend 
to detect the entire graph as a community, which leads to the low precision. Again, 
we believe that this poor performance is a function of the metrics that the other 
algorithms use. Since they essentially try to maximize the ratio of intra-community 
links to inter-community links, they occasionally end up returning the whole graph. 
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Majors: Finally, we observe that none of the algorithms are able to infer major; 
all have extremely low precision. This result is expected, though, since we observed in 
the previous section that majors do not form significant communities in the network. 
Detecting graduate student communities 
We now turn to evaluate our approach on the graduate student network. Figure 7.6 
shows how the recall and precision vary as different fractions of the department, 
school, and matriculation year of graduate students are provided. Inferring the de-
partment and school of students shows good performance for all algorithms except for 
Bagrow's (as we observed with the undergraduates, the algorithm of Bagrow tended 
to return a large portion of the network as a community). We find that knowing 
20% of the user attributes is sufficient to infer most of the remaining users with high 
accuracy. However, inferring matriculation year does not perform as well for any 
algorithm, having low recall and precision. Again, the poor performance at detecting 
matriculation years can be explained by the data in Section 7.2, which shows that 
the matriculation years form weak communities in the social network. 
7.4 Summary 
We began this section by asking whether the multiple overlapping community struc-
tures that exist in online social networks can be detected. We demonstrated that 
existing techniques can be "seeded" with attributes provided by users to detect mul-
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Figure 7.6 : Recall and precision for single community detection for Rice graduate 
students. Good performance is observed for department and school; much weaker 
performance is seen for year. 
tiple partitionings according to different attributes. In fact, we found that with as 
few as 20% of users with known attributes, the remaining users can be classified 
with over 80% accuracy. Moreover, we proposed a new algorithm that can detect a 
community when given as input only a few users in the community. We found that 
this algorithm is able to detect communities in both the undergraduate and graduate 
student networks when given as few as 10% of the community. Thus, we found that 
with partial information about users, we are able to detect the multiple community 
structures that exist with high accuracy. 
Our work has a number of implications and uses. For example, many of the 
popular online social networks could directly apply our algorithm in order to detect 
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communities in the network. This would enhance the user experience on the sites, as 
communities are often used for guiding search results, for suggesting users who may 
benefit from interaction, and for grouping users. 
However, our findings also raise interesting questions about the nature of privacy 
in online social networks. In particular, almost all privacy mechanisms available to 
users today are based on access control: users can specify which other users are able 
to view the content or information they upload. Our results show, though, that even 
information that is not provided by users can be inferred from the user's location in 
the network. Thus, a user's privacy is not only a function of their actions, but also 
the actions of their friends and community members. 
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Chapter 8 
Ostra: Leveraging Relationships 
Internet-based communication systems such as email, instant messaging (IM), voice-
over-IP (VoIP), online social networks, and content-sharing sites allow communication 
at near zero marginal cost to users. Any user with an inexpensive Internet connection 
has the potential to reach millions of users by uploading content to a sharing site 
or by posting messages to an email list. This property has democratized content 
publication: anyone can publish content, and anyone interested in the content can 
obtain it. 
Unfortunately, the same property can be abused for the purpose of unsolicited 
marketing, propaganda, or disruption of legitimate communication. The problem 
manifests itself in different forms, such as spam messages in email; search engine 
spam in the Web; inappropriately labeled content on sharing sites such as YouTube; 
and unwanted invitations in IM, VoIP, and social networking systems. 
Unwanted communication wastes human attention, which is one of the most valu-
able resources in the information age. The noise and annoyance created by unwanted 
communication reduces the effectiveness of online communication media. Moreover, 
most current efforts to automatically suppress unwanted communication occasion-
ally discard relevant communication, reducing the reliability of the communication 
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medium. 
Existing approaches to thwarting unwanted communication fall into three broad 
categories. First, one can target the unwanted communication itself, by automati-
cally identifying such communication based on its content. Second, one can target 
the originators of unwanted communication, by identifying them and holding them 
accountable. Third, one can impose an upfront cost on senders for each communi-
cation, which may be refunded when the receiver accepts the item as wanted. Each 
of these approaches has certain advantages and disadvantages, which we discussed in 
Chapter 3.4. 
In this chapter, we describe a method that exploits the difficulty in establishing 
and maintaining relationships in social networks to impose a cost on the senders of un-
wanted communication in a way that avoids the limitations of existing solutions. Our 
system, Ostra, (i) relies on existing social networks to connect senders and receivers 
via chains of pairwise relationships; (ii) uses a pairwise, link-based credit scheme that 
imposes a cost on originators of unwanted communications without requiring sender 
authentication or global identities; and (iii) relies on feedback from receivers to clas-
sify unwanted communication. Ostra ensures that unwanted communication strains 
the originator's relationships, even if the sender has no direct relationship with the 
ultimate recipient of the communication. A user who continues to send unwanted 
communication risks isolation and the eventual inability to communicate. 
The relationships (or social links) that Ostra uses exist in many applications. The 
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links can be explicit, as in online social networking sites, or implicit, as in the links 
formed by a set of email, IM, or VoIP users who include each other in their contact 
lists. Ostra can use such existing social links as long as acquiring and maintaining 
a relationship requires some effort. For example, it takes some effort to be included 
in someone's IM contact list (making that person's acquaintance); and it may take 
more effort to maintain that status (occasionally producing wanted communication). 
With respect to Ostra, this property of a social network ensures that an attacker can-
not acquire and maintain arbitrarily many relationships or replace lost relationships 
arbitrarily quickly. 
Ostra is broadly applicable. Depending on how it is deployed, it can thwart 
unwanted email or instant messages; unwanted invitations in IM, VoIP, or online 
social networks; unwanted entries or comments in Hogging systems; or inappropriate 
and mislabeled contributions to content-sharing sites such as Flickr and YouTube. 
8.1 Ostra strawman 
In this section, we describe a strawman design of Ostra. The design is appropriate for 
trusted, centralized communication systems in which users have strong identities (i.e., 
each individual user has exactly one digital identity). We discuss the basic properties 
of this design in the context of two-party communication (e.g., email and IM), multi-
party communication (e.g., bulletin boards and mailing lists), and content-sharing 
sites (e.g., YouTube and Flickr). Section 8.2 describes a refined design that removes 
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the need for strong identities, because such identities are difficult to obtain in practice. 
8.1.1 Assumptions 
The strawman design is based on three assumptions. 
1. Each user of the communication system has exactly one unique digital identity. 
2. A trusted entity observes all user actions and associates them with the identity 
of the user performing the action. 
3. Users classify communication they receive as wanted (relevant) or unwanted 
(irrelevant). 
Assumption 1 would require a user background check (e.g., a credit check) as part of 
the account creation process, to ensure that a user cannot easily create multiple iden-
tities; this assumption will be relaxed in Section 8.2. Assumption 2 holds whenever 
a service is hosted by a trusted Web site or controlled by a trusted tracker compo-
nent; the trusted component requires users to log in and associates all actions with 
a user. We sketch a decentralized design that does not depend on this assumption in 
Section 8.5. 
Producing communication can mean sending a email or chat message; adding an 
entry or comment to a blog; sending an invitation in an IM, VoIP, or social networking 
system; or contributing content in a content-sharing site. Receiving communication 
can mean receiving a message or viewing a blog entry, comment, or search result. 
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Figure 8.1 : Diagram of (a) the original communication system S, and (b) the com-
munication system with Ostra. The three phases of Ostra — (1) authorization, (2) 
transmission, and (3) classification — are shown. 
Typically, a user considers communication unwanted if she feels the content was 
not worth the attention. A user considers a blog entry, comment, or content object 
as unwanted if she considers the object to be inappropriate for the venue (e.g., site, 
group, or blog space) it was placed in or to have inappropriate search tags, causing 
the object to appear in response to an unrelated search. 
8.1.2 System model 
Figure 8.1 shows how Ostra interacts with a given communication system S. Ostra 
is a separate module that runs alongside the existing communication system. With 
Ostra, communication consists of three phases. 
Authorization 
When a sender wishes to produce a communication, she first passes the communica-
tion to Ostra. Ostra then issues a token specific to the sender, recipient, and commu-
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nication. If the sender has previously sent too much unwanted communication, Ostra 
refuses to issue such a token and rejects the communication. 
Transmission 
Ostra attaches the token to the communication and transmits it using the existing 
communication mechanism. On the receiving side, Ostra accepts the communication 
if the token is valid. The communication is then provided to the recipient. Note that 
Ostra is not involved in the actual transmission of the communication. 
Classification 
The recipient classifies the communication as either wanted or unwanted, according 
to her personal preferences. This feedback is then provided to Ostra. Finally, Ostra 
makes this feedback available to the sender. 
Note that in message-based communication systems, Ostra would normally be 
needed only for communication among users who do not regularly communicate 
with each other. Therefore, as an optimization, it is assumed that users maintain 
a whitelist of other users from whom they are willing to accept communication with-
out endorsement from Ostra. For convenience, this whitelist could be automatically 
derived from the list of a user's direct friends in the social network. 
153 
8.1.3 User credit 
Ostra uses credits to determine whether a token can be issued. Each user is assigned 
a credit balance, B, with an initial value of 0. Ostra also maintains a per-user balance 
range [L, U], with L < 0 < U, which limits the range of the user's credit balance (i.e., 
L < B < U at all times). We denote the balance and balance range for a single user 
as B\. For example, if a user's state is 3I5, the user's current credit balance is 3, and 
it can range between -5 and 6. 
When a token is issued, Ostra requires the sender to reserve a credit and the 
receiver to reserve a place holder for this credit in their respective credit balances. 
To make these reservations, the sender's L is raised by one, and the receiver's U is 
lowered by one. If these adjustments would cause either the sender's or the receiver's 
credit balance to exceed the balance range, Ostra refuses to issue the token; otherwise, 
the token is issued. When the communication is classified by the receiver, the range 
adjustments are undone. If the communication is marked as unwanted, one credit is 
transferred from the sender to the receiver. 
Let us consider an example in which both the sender's and the receiver's initial 
balances are 0*3. When the token is issued, the sender's balance changes to Ol^ 
and the receiver's balance changes to OI3, representing the credit reservation. Let 
us assume that the communication is classified as unwanted. In this credit is 
transferred from the sender to the receiver; the receiver's balance becomes I+3, and 
the sender's becomes — ll*. 
154 
This algorithm has several desirable properties. It limits the amount of unwanted 
communication a sender can produce. At the same time, it allows an arbitrary amount 
of wanted communication. The algorithm limits the number of tokens a user can 
acquire before any of the associated communication is classified; thus, it limits the 
total amount of potentially unwanted communication a user can produce. Finally, 
the algorithm limits the number of tokens that can be issued for a specific recipient 
before that recipient classifies any of the associated communication; thus, an inactive 
or lazy user cannot cause senders to reserve a large number of credits, which would 
be bound until the communication were classified. 
8.1.4 Credit adjustments 
Several issues, however, remain with the algorithm described so far. When a user's 
credit balance reaches one of her credit bounds, she is, in effect, banned from produc-
ing (in the case of the lower bound) or receiving (in the case of the upper bound) any 
further communication. What can cause a legitimate user's credit balance to reach 
her bounds? Note that on the one hand, a user who receives unwanted communication 
earns credit. On the other hand, even a well-intentioned user may occasionally send 
communication to a recipient who considers it unwanted and therefore lose credit. 
Across all users, these effects balance out. However, unless a user, on average, re-
ceives precisely the same amount of unwanted communication as she generates, her 
credit balance will eventually reach one of her bounds. As a result, legitimate users 
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can find themselves unable to communicate. 
To address this problem, credit balances in Ostra decay towards 0 at a constant 
rate d with 0 < d < 1. For example, Ostra may be configured so that each day, any 
outstanding credit (whether positive or negative) decays by 10%. This decay allows 
an imbalance between the credit earned and the credit lost by a user. The choice of 
d must be high enough to cover the expected imbalance but low enough to prevent 
considerable amounts of intentional unwanted communication. As we show as part 
of Ostra's evaluation, a small value of d is sufficient to ensure that most legitimate 
users never exceed their credit range. 
With this refinement, Ostra ensures that each user can produce unwanted com-
munication at a rate of at most 
d*L + S (8.1) 
where S is the rate at which the user receives communication that she marks as 
unwanted. 
A denial of service attack is, however, still possible. Colluding malicious users 
can inundate a victim with large amounts of unwanted communication, causing the 
victim to acquire too much credit to receive any additional communication. For these 
users, the rate of decay may be too low to ensure that they do not exceed their credit 
balances. To prevent such attacks, we introduce a special account, C, that is not 
owned by any user and has no upper bound. Users with too much credit can transfer 
credit into C, thereby enabling them to receive further communication. Note that 
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Operation 
User joins system 
Wanted communication sent 
Unwanted communication sent 
Daily credit decay 
Net Change in System Credit 
0, as user's initial credit balance is 0 
0, as no credit is exchanged 
0, as credit is transferred between users 
0, as total credit was 0 before decay 
Table 8.1 : Operations in Ostra, and their effect on the total system credit. No 
operation alters the sum of credit balances. 
the credit transferred into C is subject to the usual credit decay, so the total amount 
of credit available to active user accounts does not diminish over time. Additionally, 
users can only deposit credit into C; no withdrawals are allowed. 
Finally, there is an issue with communication failures (e.g., dropped messages) 
and users who are offline for extended periods. Both may cause the sender to reserve 
a credit indefinitely, because the receiver does not classify the communication. The 
credit decay does not help in this situation, because the decay affects only the credit 
balance and not the credit bounds. Therefore, Ostra uses a timeout T, which is 
typically on the order of days. If a communication has not been classified by the 
receiver after T, the credit bounds are automatically reset as though the destination 
had classified the communication as wanted. This feature has the added benefit that 
it enables receivers to plausibly deny receipt of communication. A receiver can choose 
not to classify some communication, thus concealing its receipt. 
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Sending 
Classifying 
Abuse 
Action 
Send wanted comm. 
Send unwanted comm. 1 credit 
Classify as wanted 
Classify as unwanted 
Misclassify as wanted 
Cost Reward 
Sender likely to send more 
1 credit, throttle sender 
Encourage sending more 
Misclassify as unwanted Discourage sending more 1 credit 
Don't use token Ties up credit for T 
Don't classify Ties up credit for T 
Drop incoming comm. 1 credit 
Table 8.2 : Incentives for users of Ostra. Users are incentivized to send only wanted 
communication, to classify communication correctly, and to classify received commu-
nication promptly. Marking an incoming communication as unwanted has the effect 
of discouraging the sender from sending additional communication, as the sender is 
informed of this and loses credit. Alternatively, marking an incoming communication 
as wanted costs the sender nothing, allowing the sender to send future communication 
with increased confidence. 
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8.1.5 Properties 
Ostra's system of credit balances observes the following invariant: 
At all times, the sum, of all credit balances is 0 
The conservation of credit follows from the fact that (i) users have an initial zero 
balance when joining the system, (ii) all operations transfer credit among users, and 
(iii) credit decay affects positive and negative credit at the same rate. Table 8.1 
details how each operation leaves the overall credit balance unchanged. Thus, credit 
can be neither created nor destroyed. Malicious, colluding users can pass credits 
only between themselves; they cannot create additional credit or destroy credit. The 
amount of unwanted communication that such users can produce is the same as the 
sum of what they can produce individually. 
We have already shown that each user can produce unwanted communication at a 
rate of no more than d * L + S. We now characterize the amount of unwanted subset 
of the user population can produce. Let us examine a group of users F. Owing to 
the conservation of credit, users in this group cannot conspire to create credit; they 
can only push credit between themselves. Thus, the users in F can send unwanted 
communication to users not in F at a maximal rate of 
\F\*d*L + SF (8.2) 
where SF is that rate at which users in F (in aggregate) receive communication from 
users not in F that they mark as unwanted. 
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The implication of the above analysis is that we can characterize the total amount 
of unwanted communication that non-malicious users can receive. Let us partition 
the user population into two groups: group G are "good" users, who rarely send 
unwanted communication, and group M are "malicious" users, who frequently send 
unwanted communication. Now, the maximal rate at which G can receive unwanted 
communication from M is 
\M\*d*L + SM (8.3) 
which implies that, on average, each user in G can receive unwanted communication 
at a rate of 
M W\ ( } 
However, we expect 5A/ to be small as users in G rarely send unwanted communi-
cation. Thus, the rate of receiving unwanted communication is dominated by static 
system parameters and by the ratio between the number of good and malicious users. 
Moreover, this analysis holds regardless of the amount of good communication that 
the malicious users produce. 
Finally, Ostra has an incentive structure that discourages bad behavior and re-
wards good behavior. Table 8.2 shows a list of possible user actions and their costs 
and rewards. 
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8.1.6 Multi-party communication 
Next, we show how the design can be used to support moderated multi-party com-
munication, including mailing lists and content-sharing sites. The existing design 
generalizes naturally to small groups in which all members know each other. In this 
case, communication occurs as a series of pairwise events between the originator and 
each of the remaining group members. 
In moderated groups, which are usually larger, a moderator decides on behalf 
of the list members if communication submitted to the group is appropriate. In this 
case, Ostra works exactly as in the two-party case, except that the moderator receives 
and classifies the communication on behalf of all members of the group. 
Thus, only the moderator's attention is wasted by unwanted communication, and 
the cost of producing unwanted communication is the same as in the two-party case. 
However, an overloaded moderator may choose to increase the number of credits 
required to send to the group, to mitigate her load by discouraging inappropriate 
submissions. 
Large content-sharing sites usually have content-rating systems or other methods 
for flagging content as inappropriate. Ostra could be applied, for instance, to thwart 
the submission of mislabeled videos in YouTube, by taking advantage of the existing 
"flag as inappropriate" mechanism. When a user's video is flagged as inappropriate, 
it is reviewed by a YouTube employee; if it is found to be mislabeled, the submission 
is classified as unwanted for the purposes of Ostra. 
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Extending Ostra to work with unmoderated multi-party communication systems 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
8.2 Ostra design 
The strawman design described in the previous section requires strong user identities: 
that is, each individual user is guaranteed to have at most one unique digital identity. 
Such identities are not practical in many applications, as they require a background 
check as part of the account creation process. Such checks may not be accepted by 
users, and as far as we know, few services that require such a strong background check 
have been widely adopted on the Internet. 
In this section, we refine the design of Ostra so that it does not require strong user 
identities. It is assumed that the communication system ensures that each identity is 
unique, but an individual user may sign up multiple times and use the system under 
different identities at different times. Our refined design leverages relationships to 
preserve Ostra's properties despite the lack of strong user identities. We still assume 
that a trusted entity such as a Web site hosts the communication service and runs 
Ostra. Later, in Section 8.5, we sketch out how Ostra could be applied to decentralized 
services. 
The refined design of Ostra replaces the per-user credit balances with balances 
that are instead associated with the links among users in a trust network. We show 
that this mapping preserves the key properties of the strawman design, even though 
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Ostra no longer depends on strong identities. We begin by defining a trust network 
and then describe how Ostra works with weak identities. 
8.2.1 Trust networks 
A trust network is a graph G — (V,E), where V is the set of user identifiers and 
E represents undirected links between user identifiers who have a trust relationship. 
Examples of trust networks are the user graph of an email system (where V is the 
set of email addresses and E is the set of email contacts) and online social networks 
(where V is the set of accounts and E is the set of friends). For convenience, we shall 
refer to two users connected by an edge in the trust network as friends. 
For the purposes of Ostra, a trust network must have the property that there 
is a non-trivial cost for initiating and maintaining links in the network. As a re-
sult, users in the trust network cannot acquire new relationships arbitrarily fast and 
cannot maintain an arbitrarily large number of relationships. We do not make any 
assumptions about the nature or the degree of trust associated with a relationship. 
Finally, the trust network must be connected, meaning that there is a path of 
trust links between any two user identities in the network. Previous studies [26,105] 
have shown that the user graphs in existing social networks tend to be dominated by 
a single large component, implying that the networks are largely connected. 
Ostra assumes that the users of a communication system are connected by a trust 
network and that Ostra has a complete view of this network. 
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8.2.2 Link credit 
Because a user may have multiple identities, we can no longer associate a separate 
credit balance with each identity. Otherwise, a malicious user could gain additional 
credit and send arbitrary amounts of unwanted communication simply by creating 
more identities. Instead, Ostra leverages the cost of forming new links in trust net-
works to enforce a bound on each user. 
Specifically, each link in the trust network is assigned a link credit balance B, with 
an initial value of 0, and a link balance range [L, U], with L < 0 < U and L < B <U. 
These are analogous to the user credit balance and range in the original design. We 
X-*Y 
denote the balance and balance range for a link X <~* Y from X's perspective as B^ . 
X-^Y 
For example, if the link has the state 3±5, then X is currently owed 3 credits by Y, 
and the balance can range between -5 and 6. 
The link balance represents the credit state between the user identities connected 
by the link. Ostra uses this balance to decide whether to issue tokens. It is important 
to note that the credit balance is symmetric. For example, if the link balance on the 
x—Y 
X <-> Y link is 1^|, then X is owed one credit by Y, or, from Y's perspective, Y owes 
Y-+X 
X one credit (the latter can be denoted — l t | ) . 
We map the user credit balance in the strawman design to a set of link credit 
balances on the user's adjacent links in the trust network. For example, as shown 
in Figure 8.2, if a user has two links in the trust network, the user's original credit 
balance is replaced with two separate credit balances, one on each link. However, we 
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Figure 8.2 : Mapping from (a) per-user credits to (b) per-link credits. 
cannot compute a user balance by taking the sum of the link balances - in fact, the 
concept of a user balance is no longer useful because a user can create many identities 
and establish links between them. Instead, we introduce a new mechanism for credit 
transfer that uses link balances, rather than user balances, to bound the amount of 
unwanted communication that users can send. 
We now describe this mechanism for transferring credits. For simplicity, we first 
describe the case of communication between users who are friends in the trust network. 
We then generalize the credit transfer mechanism to the case in which two arbitrary 
users wish to communicate. 
Communication among friends 
As in the strawman design, a user who wishes to send communication needs to obtain 
a token during the authorization phase. For example, a user X may request to 
send communication to another user Y, a friend of X's. Ostra determines whether 
transferring this credit would violate the link balance range on the X <-> Y link, and 
if not, it issues a signed token. The token is then included in X's communication to 
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(a) ( X ) Oil ( 9 ) initial state 
(b) (X) 0 ! l ( Y ) after token issued 
(c) ( X V — - 1 ^ 3 ( Y ) if Ymarks unwanted 
(d) ( X ) o f | ( Y ) ofew/se 
Figure 8.3 : Link state when X sends communication to friend Y. The state of the 
link balance and range is shown (a) before the token is issued, .(b) after the token 
is issued, (c) if Y marks the communication as unwanted, and (d).if Y marks the 
communication as wanted or if the timeout occurs. 
user Y. 
As in the strawman design, Ostra allows users to have multiple outstanding to-
kens by reserving credits for each potential transfer. In the example in the previous 
paragraph, Ostra raises the lower bound for the X <-• Y link by one. This single 
adjustment has the effect of raising X's. lower bound and lowering F's upper bound, 
because the lower bound on the X *-* Y link can be viewed as the upper bound on 
the Y «-» X link. Figure 8.3 shows the state of the X <-> Y link during each stage 
of the transaction. By adjusting the balance this way for outstanding tokens, Ostra 
ensures that the link balance remains within its range regardless of how the pending 
communication events are classified. 
Later, in the classification stage, user Y provides Ostra with the token and the 
decision whether X's communication was wanted. The balance range adjustment that 
was performed in the authorization phase is then undone. Moreover, if Y reports that 
the communication was unwanted, Ostra adjusts the balance on the X <-> Y link by 
subtracting one, thereby transferring a credit from X to Y. Thus, if the previous 
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X-+Y X->Y 
state of the link was 0*f , the final state would be — II3, meaning X owes Y one 
credit. Finally, Ostra automatically cancels the token after a specified timeout T. 
Communication among non-friends 
So far, we have considered the case of sending communication between two friends in 
the trust network. In this section, we describe how Ostra can be used for communi-
cation between any pair of users. 
When a user X wishes to send communication to a non-friend Z, Ostra finds a 
path consisting of trust links between X and Z. For example, such a path might be 
X <-» Y <-> Z, where X and Y are friends in the trust network, and Y and Z are also 
friends. When this path is found, the range bounds are adjusted as before, but this 
occurs on every link in the path. For example, if X wishes to send communication to 
Z, Ostra would raise the lower bound of both the X <-*• Y and the Y <-> Z links by 
one. Figure 8.4 shows a diagram of this procedure. If this adjustment can be done 
without violating any link ranges, Ostra issues a token to X. 
Similar to the transfer between friends, the token is then attached to X's commu-
nication to Z. Later, in the classification stage, Z provides Ostra with the token and 
the decision whether the communication was wanted. Now, the range adjustments 
on all the links along the path are undone. If the communication was unwanted, the 
credit is transferred along every link of the path; Figure 8.4 (c) shows the result of 
this transfer. 
167 
(a) ( X ) — Otl—(Y)—0*1—(Z) initial state 
(b) ( X ) — 0 * 1 — ( Y ) — 0 ! | — ( z ) after token issued 
(c) ( x ) — 1 * 1 ( 9 ) 1 - 3 — ( ? ) if Z marks unwanted 
(d) ( X > — 0 ! | — ® — 0 * | — ( z ) ofterwfes 
Figure 8.4 : Link state when X sends communication to non-friend. Z is shown (a) 
before the token is issued, (b) after the token is issued, (c) if Z marks the communica-
tion as unwanted, and (d) if Z marks the communication as wanted or if the timeout 
occurs. 
It is worth noting that the intermediate users along the path are largely indifferent 
to the outcome of the transfer, as any credit transfer will leave them with no net 
change. For example, consider the scenarios shown in Figure 8.4 (c) and (d). In 
either case, the total amount of credit that intermediate user Y has with all her 
friends is the same regardless of the outcome. If Z marks the communication as 
unwanted, as shown in Figure 8.4(c), Y owes a credit to Z, but X now owes a credit 
to Y. Ostra allows users to transfer credits along trust paths such that intermediate 
users along the path are indifferent to the outcome. 
Generalization of Ostra strawman 
One can show that Ostra generalizes the strawman design from the previous section. 
Recall the account C that is owned by the trusted site. Now, we construct a trust 
network in which each user has a single link to C, with the link balance and balance 
range equal to their user balance and balance range in the strawman design. Ostra 
with such a trust network has the same properties as the strawman design. To see this, 
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note that sending communication from X to Y requires raising the lower bound on the 
X *-» C link and lowering the upper bound on the Y <-> C link, which is equivalent to 
adjusting X's and F's user balance ranges in the same manner. Figure 8.5 (b) shows 
an example of this generalization for the specific set of user accounts in Figure 8.5 (a). 
More importantly, Ostra preserves the conservation of credit that was present in 
the strawman system. This can be derived from the fact that credit is associated with 
links instead of users. Any credit in Ostra is naturally paired with a corresponding 
debt: for example, if the state of a link is — l j ^ , then X owes Y one credit, but Y 
is owed a credit by X. Thus, all outstanding credit is balanced by outstanding debt, 
implying that credit cannot be created or destroyed. 
The conservation of credit holds for each link independently, and is therefore in-
dependent of the trust network topology (Figure 8.5 (c) shows an example of a trust 
network with a different topology). As a result, the analysis of the strawman sys-
tem in Section 8.1.5 applies to the full version of Ostra. For example, malicious, 
colluding users cannot conspire to manufacture credit; the amount of unwanted com-
munication that such users can produce together is the sum of what they can produce 
independently. 
8.2.3 Security properties 
We now discuss the security properties of Ostra's refined design in detail. Ostra's 
threat model assumes that malicious users have two goals: sending large amounts 
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Figure 8.5 : Generalization of per-user credit accounting to per-link credit accounting. 
Ostra with per-user credit (shown in (a)) can be expressed as per-link credit over a 
star topology (shown in (b)), with the central site C as the hub. The addition of links 
(shown in (c)) does not change the properties. 
of unwanted communication, and preventing other users from being able to send 
communication successfully. Strategies for trying to send additional unwanted com-
munication include signing up for multiple accounts and creating links between these 
accounts, as well as conspiring with other malicious users. Strategies for trying to 
prevent other users from communicating include targeting a specific user by sending 
large amounts of unwanted communication and attempting to exhaust credit on spe-
cific links in the trust network. In this section, we describe how Ostra handles these 
threats. 
Multiple identities 
One concern is whether users who create multiple identities (known as Sybils [44]) 
can send additional unwanted communication. Ostra naturally prevents such users 
from gaining additional credit. 
To send unwanted communication to another user, a user must eventually use one 
of her "real" links to a different user, which has the same effect as if the user only 
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had a single identity. To see this, assume a user with a set of multiple identities 
M = {Mi, M2,..., Mn} is sending to a different user U. Now, regardless of how the 
links between the identities in M are allocated, any path between M; and U must 
contain a link Mj ••<-> V, where V £ M. If this property does not hold, then U € M, 
which is a contradiction. 
Thus, using per-link balances has the effect that the total credit available to a 
user no longer depends on the number of identities a user has. Instead, the credit 
available depends on the number of links the user has to other users. Figure 8.6 
shows a diagram of how Ostra prevents users with multiple identities from sending 
additional unwanted communication. 
Ostra allows users to create as many identities as they wish but ensures that 
they cannot send additional unwanted communication by doing so. Malicious users 
may attempt to use multiple Sybil identities to create multiple links to a single user. 
Although they may succeed occasionally, these links require effort to maintain and 
the malicious user, therefore, cannot create an unbounded number of them. 
-® .. 
Figure 8.6 : Diagram of how Ostra handles various attacks: (a) a normal user, (b) 
multiple identities, and (c) a network of Sybils. The total amount of credit available 
to the user is the same. 
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Targeting users 
Another concern is whether malicious users could collectively send a large amount of 
unwanted communication to a user, thus providing this victim with too much credit 
to receive any additional messages. This attack is possible when the attacking users 
collectively have more links to legitimate users than the victim, as exhausting the 
credit on one of the victim's links requires the malicious users exhaust the credit on 
one of their own links. 
However, the victim has a simple way out by forgiving some of the debt on one 
of her links. If a user finds that she has too much credit on all of her links, she can 
forgive a small amount of debt from one of her friends. This is the same mechanism 
as transferring credit to the overflow account (C) described in Section 8.1. To see this 
equivalence, consider the star-topology trust network constructed in Section 8.2.2. In 
that case, a user transferring credit to the overflow account is essentially forgiving 
debt on their only link (to C). This mechanism does not allow malicious users to 
send additional unwanted communication to the victim, as the victim only forgives 
debt to her direct friend (i.e., the victim's friend does not repeat the process). 
Targeting links 
One final concern is whether malicious users could prevent large numbers of innocent 
users from communicating with each other by exhausting the credit on certain links 
in the trust network. If successful, such an attack could prevent a group of users from 
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sending to the rest of the user population. 
To exhaust the credit on specific links, attacking users would need both knowledge 
of the trust network topology and some control over trust path selection. Because the 
path selection is performed by the trusted site, the attacking users have the choice of 
only the destination and not the path. Even if we assume a powerful attacker who 
has control over the path selection, the trust network would need to have a topology 
that is susceptible to such an attack. For example, a barbell topology would be 
susceptible, as the link connecting the two halves of the network could be exhausted. 
Analysis of current online social networks (which are typical trust networks) shows 
that these have a very dense core [105]. We show in Section 8.4 that the structure of 
these networks makes it unlikely that such an attack would succeed on a large scale. 
8.3 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss some issues associated with deploying Ostra. 
8.3.1 Joining Ostra 
Fundamentally, Ostra exploits the trust relationships in an existing social network of 
users to thwart unwanted communication. As a result, users are expected to acquire 
and maintain a certain number of social links to be able to communicate. 
To join Ostra, a new user must be introduced to the system by an existing Ostra 
user. Requiring this form of introduction ensures that the trust network among users 
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is connected and that each new user has at least one trust link. Thus, Ostra can be 
used only in conjunction with a "invitation-only" social network. 
Users with few links in the trust network are more susceptible to credit exhaus-
tion (whether accidental or malicious). Thus, there is an incentive for users to obtain 
and maintain a sufficient number of trust links. Establishing additional links can be 
done via the communication system after the user has joined Ostra. Link invitations 
are treated as normal messages, so users who attempt to send unwanted link invi-
tations are blocked in the same manner as users who send other forms of unwanted 
communication. 
8.3.2 Content classification 
Ostra requires that recipients classify incoming communication as either wanted or 
unwanted. Providing explicit feedback is a slight burden on the user, but it may 
be a small price to pay for a system that responds to each user's preferences and 
is free of the misclassifications that are common in current content-based filtering 
systems [5]. Moreover, the feedback can often be derived implicitly from a user's 
actions; for instance, deleting a message probably indicates that the message was 
unwanted, whereas archiving or replying to the message strongly indicates that it 
was wanted. 
As an optimization in message-based communication systems, a user could main-
tain a whitelist indicating users from whom communication'is immediately and un-
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conditionally classified as wanted. In this case, Ostra would need to operate only 
among users who are not on each other's whitelists. 
8.3.3 Parameter settings 
Ostra limits the amount of pending communication that a user can have, where a 
pending item of communication is one that was generated by the user but not yet 
classified by the receiver. In Section 8.4, we show that Ostra's design parameters (L, 
U, and d) can be chosen such that most legitimate users are not affected by the rate 
limit, while the amount of unwanted communication is still kept very low. 
The L parameter controls the number of unclassified items of communication a 
user can have at any one time. A large L allows many outstanding messages but also 
admits the possibility that a considerable amount of this outstanding communication 
would be unwanted. In contrast, an L close to 0 ensures that very little unwanted 
communication is received, at the cost of potentially rate-limiting legitimate senders. 
The d parameter represents the rate at which users who have sent unwanted commu-
nication in the past are "forgiven". Setting d too high allows additional unwanted 
communication, whereas setting it too low may unduly punish senders who have in-
advertently sent unwanted communication in the past. In the Section 8.4, we show 
that the conservative settings of L=-3 and d=10% per day provide a good trade-off 
in practice. 
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8.3.4 Compromised user accounts 
If a user's account password is compromised, the attacker can cause the user to run 
out of credit by sending unwanted communication. However, the amount of unwanted 
communication is still subject to the same limits that apply to any individual user. 
Moreover, a user would quickly detect that her account has been compromised, be-
cause she would find herself unable to generate communication. 
8.4 Evaluation 
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of our Ostra prototype. Using 
data from a real online social network and an email trace from our institute, we 
show how Ostra can effectively block users from sending large amounts of unwanted 
communication. 
8.4.1 Experimental trust network 
To evaluate Ostra, we used a large, measured subset [105] of the social network found 
in the video-sharing Web site YouTube [167]. We extracted the largest strongly 
connected component consisting of symmetric links from the YouTube graph, which 
resulted in a network with 446,181 users and 1,728,938 symmetric links. 
Strictly speaking, the YouTube social network does not meet Ostra's requirements, 
because there is no significant cost for creating and maintaining a link. Unfortunately, 
trust-based social networks that do meet Ostra's requirements cannot be easily ob-
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tained due to privacy restrictions. For instance, in the Linkedln [95] professional 
networking site, users "vouch" for each other; link formation requires the consent 
of both parties and users tend to refuse to accept invitations from people they do 
not know and trust. But, unlike YouTube, it is not possible to crawl the Linkedln 
network. 
However, we were able to obtain the degree distribution of users in the Linkedln 
network. We found that both YouTube and Linkedln degree distributions follow the 
power-law with similar coefficients. We used maximum-likelihood testing to calculate 
the coefficients of the YouTube and Linkedln graphs, and found them to be 1.66 and 
1.58 (the resultant Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness-of-fit metrics were 0.12 and 0.05, 
suggesting a good fit). This result, along with the previously observed similarity in 
online social networks' structure [105], leads us to expect that the overall structure 
of the YouTube network is similar to trust-based social networks like Linkedln. 
Despite their structural similarity, the YouTube social network differs from the 
Linkedln trust network in one important aspect: some users in YouTube collect many 
links (one user had a degree of over 20,000!). The maximum degree of users in actual 
trust-based social networks tends to be much smaller. Anthropological studies [47] 
have shown that the average number of relationships a human can actively maintain in 
the real world is about 150 to 200. Because the amount of unwanted communication 
a user can send in Ostra is proportional to her degree in the trust network, the results 
of our YouTube-based evaluation may understate the performance of Ostra on a real 
trust-based network. 
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8.4.2 Experimental traffic workload 
We were unable to obtain a communication trace of the same scale as the social net-
work we use. Therefore, we had to make some assumptions about the likely commu-
nication pattern within the social network. We expect that users communicate with 
nearby users much more often than they communicate with users who are far away in 
i 
the social network. To validate this hypothesis, we collected an email trace from the 
Max Planck Institutes for Informations and Software Systems, consisting of two aca-
demic research institutes with approximately 200 researchers. Our anonymized email 
trace contains all messages sent and received by the mail servers for 100 days, and 
the anonymized addresses in the trace are nagged as internal or external addresses. 
Similar to previous studies [28,143], we extracted a social network from the email 
data by examining the messages sent between internal users. Specifically, we created 
a symmetric link between users who sent at least three emails to each other. We 
filtered out accounts that were not owned by actual users (e.g., helpdesk tickets and 
mailing lists), resulting in a large strongly connected component containing 150 users 
and covering 13,978 emails. 
We then examined the social network distance between sender and receiver for all 
messages sent between these 150 users. Figure 8.7 compares the resulting distance 
distribution with one that would result had the senders selected random destinations. 
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Figure 8.7 : Cumulative distribution (CDF) of distance between sender and receiver 
for our email trace. The observed data show a strong bias toward proximity when 
compared to randomly selected destinations. 
We found that the selection of senders had a very strong proximity bias: over 93% 
of all messages were sent to either a friend or a friend of a friend, compared to the 
expected 14% if the senders were chosen randomly. Thus, we expect that in practice, 
most communication in Ostra is directed to nearby users, significantly reducing the 
average path lengths in the trust network. 
8.4.3 Setting parameters 
We also used the email trace to determine the appropriate settings for the Ostra 
parameters L and U. To do this, we examined the rate at which users sent and 
received messages. The trace contains 50,864 transmitted messages (an average of 
3.39 messages sent per user per day) and 1,003,819 received messages (an average of 
66.9 messages received per user per day). The system administrators estimated that 
the incoming messages in the email trace consisted of approximately 95% junk mail. 
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Clearly, most of these receptions would not occur in an actual Ostra deployment. 
However, we could not access the spam niter's per-message junk mail tags, so we 
randomly removed 95% of the incoming messages as junk. 
To determine how often a given setting of L and U would affect Ostra, we simulated 
how messages in the email trace would be delayed due to the credit bounds. We ran 
two experiments with different assumptions about the average delay between the time 
when a message arrives and the time when the receiving user classifies the message. 
We first simulated casual email users who classify messages after six hours, and we 
then simulated heavy email users who classify messages after two hours. 
Table 8.3 presents the results of these two experiments with L—-Z and U=3. We 
found that messages are rarely delayed (less than 1.5% of the time in all cases), and 
that the average delay is on the order of a few hours. We also found that the delays 
for receiving messages are more significant than the delays for sending messages. We 
believe this is an artifact of our methodology. Over 98% of the delayed messages were 
received by just 3 users. In practice, it is likely that these users (who receive a high 
volume of relevant email) check and classify their email very frequently. This effect 
would reduce the frequency and magnitude of delays, but our simulation does not 
account for it. 
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Sending 
Receiving 
Average classification 
delay (h) 
2 
6 
2 
6 
Fract ion 
delayed 
0.38% 
0.57% 
1.3% 
1.3% 
Avg. 
2.2 
6.1 
4.1 
16.6 
Delay (h) 
Med. Max. 
1.9 7.6 
5.3 23.6 
3.2 13.2 
14.7 48.6 
Table 8.3 : Message delays in sending and receiving with L=-3 and U=3. The delays 
are shown for heavy email users (2 hour average classification delay) and casual email 
users (6 hour average classification delay). 
8.4.4 Effectiveness of Ostra 
In this section, we simulate deployments of Ostra in a message-based system (such as 
the messaging service on Flickr) and in a content-sharing system (such as YouTube). 
We evaluate Ostra under three traffic workloads: Random, where users select destina-
tions randomly; Proximity, where users select destinations with the distribution that 
was observed in Section 8.4.2; and YouTube, where users send to a single YouTube 
account in the network. We show that in all cases, Ostra effectively bounds the rate at 
which malicious users can send unwanted communication while not impeding wanted 
communication. 
Expected performance 
Ostra limits the amount of unwanted communication that can be sent. A single user 
user can send unwanted communication at a rate of at most d * L * D + S , where D 
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is the degree of the user. Thus, the rate at which a malicious user can send unwanted 
communication is in direct proportion to her degree. As the d or L parameters are 
increased, we expect the rate of unwanted communication to increase accordingly. 
Additionally, as the proportion of malicious users in the network increases, we expect 
the overall rate of unwanted messages to increase. 
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Figure 8.8 : Amount of unwanted communication received by good users as the 
number of attackers is varied. As the number of attackers is increased, the number 
of unwanted messages delivered scales linearly. 
Preventing unwanted communication 
In this section we verify experimentally that Ostra performs as described in Sec-
tion 8.4.4. Unless otherwise noted, the experiments were run with 512 randomly 
chosen attackers (approximately 0.1% of the population), L=-3, £/=3, and d=10% 
per day. Each good user sent 2 messages and each attacker sent 500 messages. 
To evaluate Ostra in the context of a content-sharing site, we modeled Ostra 
working in conjunction with YouTube. For these experiments, we configured the 
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network so that uploading a video involves sending a message via Ostra to a single 
'YouTube' account in the network. An existing, well-connected user (1,376 links) in 
the core of the network was selected to represent this account. 
We first show that the rate at which users receive unwanted communication varies 
with the number of attacking users. In Figure 8.8, we present the results of experi-
ments in which we vary the number of attackers in the network between 1 and 4,096 
users (0.0002% to 1% of the network). We examine the rate at which unwanted mes-
sages were received by non-attacking users, along with the expected bound derived 
from the equations in Section 8.4.4. 
As can be seen in Figure 8.8, Ostra effectively bounds the number of unwanted 
messages in proportion to the fraction of users who send unwanted communication. 
Even with 1% of the network sending unwanted messages, each legitimate user receives 
only 0.22 unwanted messages per week, translating to approximately 12 unwanted 
messages per year. 
Next, we explore Ostra's sensitivity to system parameter settings and other con-
ditions. Important parameters in Ostra are the credit bounds L and U for each link. 
If these bounds are set too high, attackers can send many messages before being cut 
off. However, if these bounds are set too low, a legitimate user could be temporarily 
prevented from sending messages. Figure 8.9 shows how the rate of unwanted message 
delivery is affected by the maximal credit imbalance across a link. As the maximum 
allowed imbalance increases, the amount of unwanted communication received by 
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Figure 8.9 : Amount of unwanted communication received by good users as the 
maximum credit imbalance per link is varied. 
good users increases, as expected. 
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of Ostra to the false positive rate of legitimate 
users' message classification. In other words, if users incorrectly mark other good 
users' messages as unwanted, how often are users blocked from sending message? We 
show how this probability of false classification affects the proportion of messages 
that cannot be sent in Figure 8.10. As can be seen, even a high false positive rate 
of 30% results in only a few blocked messages. This resiliency results from the rich 
connectivity of the social network (i.e., if one link becomes blocked, the users can 
route through other friends), and the fact that the false positive rate affects all users 
equally. 
In the case of the content-sharing site, because all paths intersect, good users are 
blocked more quickly as the amount of content that is marked as unwanted increases. 
For example, when the false classification rate is 64%, about 40% of messages cannot 
184 
0.8 0) 
> 
•a 
(A 
& 0.6 
a 
v> (0 
v 
E 0.4 
c 
o 
* • 
i
 
i 
Random -
Proximity 
YouTube • 
• • ' ' " j 
— $ — 
. . © . . . 
i 
. " * • • * -^v-
.... 
..._ 
10 
False classification probability (%) 
100 
Figure 8.10 : Proportion of messages delivered versus false classification probability 
for wanted messages. 
be sent. However, it seems very unlikely that the moderator of a sharing site would 
misclassify content at such a high rate. 
Resilience to link attacks 
In a potential security attack discussed in Section 8.2, malicious users attempt to 
exhaust credit on a set of links inside the trust network, i.e., links other than the 
attackers' adjacent links. If successful, this attack could disrupt communication for 
innocent users. To evaluate whether a real-world social network is susceptible to this 
attack, we performed a min-cut analysis of the YouTube social network. 
Assuming uniform link weights of one, we calculated the min-cuts1 between 3,000 
randomly selected pairs of users. We then looked for cases in which the set of links 
1A min-cut is a minimal set of links that, if removed, partitions two users; note that several such 
cuts can occur between two users. 
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involved in a min-cut for a given pair of users differed from the set of links adjacent to 
either one of the two users. Such a min-cut could be the target of an attack, because 
the attackers could exhaust credit on this set of links before they exhaust the credit 
on their own links. 
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Figure 8.11 : Proportion of 3,000 random user pairs for which the min-cut was not 
adjacent to one of the users, as a function of the lower of the two users' degrees. 
The fraction decreases as the users become well-connected, suggesting that a trust 
network with well-connected users is not vulnerable to link attacks. 
Figure 8.11 plots the proportion of user pairs for which the min-cut was not 
adjacent to one of the users, as a function of the lower of the two users' degrees. 
The results suggest that vulnerable links inside the network occur rarely, and that 
their frequency decreases with the degree of user connectivity. Therefore, the better 
connected users are in the trust network, the more robust the network is to link 
attacks. Because users in Ostra already have an incentive to maintain a certain 
number of links for other reasons, one would expect that a real Ostra trust network 
would not be vulnerable to link attacks. 
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8.5 Decentralizing Ostra 
The design of Ostra we have described so far assumes the existence of a trusted, 
centralized component that maintains the trust network and credit state. This design 
is suitable for centralized communication systems, such as those hosted by a Web site. 
Peer-to-peer communication systems with a centralized "tracker" component can also 
use this design. However, completely decentralized systems like SMTP-based email 
cannot use it. In this section, we briefly sketch out a design of Ostra that works 
without any trusted, centralized components. 
8.5.1 Overview 
In the absence of a trusted, centralized entity, both the trust network and the credit 
state must be distributed. We assume that each participating user runs an Ostra 
software agent on her own computer. This Ostra agent stores the user's key material 
and maintains secure network connections to the Ostra agents of the user's trusted 
friends. The two Ostra agents adjacent to a trust link each store a copy of the link's 
balance and bounds. 
Ostra authorization requires a route computation in the trust network. Because 
user trust networks can be very large (many online social networks have hundreds of 
millions of users), the path computation must be scalable. Moreover, it is assumed 
that users wish to keep their trust relationships private. In a centralized design, such 
privacy can be ensured easily. In the decentralized design, this concern complicates 
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the distributed route computation, as no user has a global view of the trust network. 
In the sections below, we sketch out distributed designs for the route computation, 
for maintaining link balances and for ensuring that users follow the Ostra protocol. 
8.5.2 Routing 
Routing in large networks is a well-studied problem. We use a combination of existing 
techniques for distributed route discovery in large trust networks. 
We divide the problem into two cases. To find routes within the local neighborhood 
of a user (e.g., all users within three hops), we use an efficient bloom filter-based [21] 
mechanism. To discover longer paths, we use landmark routing [152] to route to the 
destination's neighborhood and then use bloom filters to reach the destination. Each 
user creates and publishes a bloom filter (representing her local neighborhood) and a 
landmark coordinate (representing her location in the global network). 
A user's bloom filter represents the set of users within the two-hop neighborhood of 
the user's trust network. Thus, given a destination's bloom filter, a user can determine 
whether any of her friends are within the destination's two-hop neighborhood. If 
so, the user has found the next hop toward the destination. The solution works 
on arbitrary connected graphs. However, the approach is most efficient in sparse 
graphs in which the three-hop neighborhood accounts for a small percentage of the 
total network. Many real-world trust networks, such as social networks, have this 
property [105]. 
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For long paths, we use landmark routing to reach the destination's neighborhood. 
A small subset of the user population is chosen as landmarks, and every user in the 
network determines her hop distance and the next hop to each of these landmarks. 
The landmarks are selected such that every user is within three hops of at least one 
landmark. Then, the resultant coordinate system can be used to route to within three 
hops of any destination user, and the bloom filters to reach the destination. Thus, 
given a destination user's coordinate, a user can first route to a landmark user who 
is "near" the destination, and this landmark user can then use bloom filter routing 
for the last few hops. 
We describe these in terms of an interval / , which is the frequency with which the 
bloom filters and coordinates are recomputed and updated. Typical values of / are 
on the order of a few days. 
8.5.3 Bloom filter routing 
Bloom filters are a space-efficient probabilistic data structure for representing set 
membership. When testing whether an element is in the set, bloom filters have no 
false negatives, but have a configurable false positive rate [21]. In Ostra, each user U 
makes available two separate bloom filters: a one-hop bloom filter F 1 and a two-hop 
bloom filter F2. The one-hop bloom filter contains all of the direct friends of U, and 
the two-hop bloom filter contains all of Vs friends-of-friends. 
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Construction 
If U is friends with A, B, and C, then F1 for U would be a bloom filter with the 
following contents: F(SA, SB, SC) where F(-) represents a bloom filter. However, 
U enters a friend X in the bloom filter not using X's public identity, but using an 
alias for X (which we denote Sx) that is only know to X's friends. This ensures the 
privacy of C/'s set of friends, since it is impossible to enumerate C/'s friends given only 
the bloom filter and the public identifiers of nodes. Specifically, a user M, given C/'s 
bloom filter, can determine if U is friends with another user only if M is also friends 
with the other user herself. Moreover, since each user chooses unique parameters, it 
is impossible to estimate, given two user's bloom filters, the size of the intersection 
among the users' friends. 
Users construct their two-hop bloom filters by requesting one-hop bloom filters 
with a specified set of parameters from all of their friends. To construct a two-hop 
bloom filter, a user then simply perform a bit-wise OR of all of their friends' responses. 
Additionally, whenever a user creates or removes links, the user resends its one-hop 
bloom filter to each of her friends, so that they can update their two-hop bloom filters. 
Use 
When a user A wishes to discover a path to user B, A obtains f?'s one-hop and 
two-hop bloom filters using the lookup mechanism of the underlying communication 
system. A first checks to see if any of her friends appear in £?'s one-hop bloom filter. 
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If so, this implies that these friends are direct friends with B. Thus, A has found a 
path to B. 
If none of A's friends appear in S's one-hop bloom filter, then A can be sure that 
no two-hop path exists between herself and B. A then checks for three-hop paths by 
testing to see if any of her friends appear in £?'s two-hop bloom filter. If so, then A 
knows that these friends are friends-of-friends of B. In this case, A has found the 
first hop on a three hop path to B. 
If none of A's friends appear in JB'S one-hop bloom filter or two-hop bloom filter, 
this implies that no path shorter than three hops exists between A and B. In this 
case, A uses the coordinates described next to find a path between herself and B. 
False positives in bloom filters have the effect of artificially inflating path lengths. 
A user may, due to a false positive, forward to another user who is no closer to the 
destination. As we demonstrate in the evaluation, this case is rare and does not affect 
the eventual success of the route computation. 
8.5.4 Landmark routing 
To find long paths, users advertise their coordinates, which indicate their location 
in the trust network. A coordinate is a vector of distances, in hops, from a set of 
landmark users in the trust network. A node t/'s coordinate might be {3M,7JV}, 
meaning U is 3 hops from M and 7 hops from N. We describe in Section 8.5.4 below 
how landmarks are selected. 
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Users determine their coordinate using their friend's coordinates. For each land-
mark user, the distance from that landmark is the minimum of all of their friends' 
hop distances plus 1. For example, if U is friends with A and B, and A's coordinate 
is {2M,4JV} and 5's coordinate is {4M, 7^}, then f/'s coordinate is {3M,5JV}. Addi-
tionally, U records her next-hop for each coordinate. (In the example, U would record 
that A is the next hop towards M, and either A or B are the next hop towards N). 
Friends periodically exchange their coordinates and repeat the same calculation. 
Given a stable set of landmarks, the calculation converges to a stable set of coordi-
nates. In order to reduce the overhead of coordinate updates, new coordinates are 
only published by users once per interval / . 
Routing 
When a user A computes a path to a user B, A obtains £?'s coordinate through the 
underlying communication system's lookup service. A then looks for landmarks that 
appear in both £Ts and A's coordinate, and are within three hops of B. If such a 
landmark L exists, then A has found a path to B. This is because A knows how to 
get to L (by routing via the next hop), and L is able to use £Ts bloom filter to find 
a path to B (since B is within 3 hops of L). Additionally, each user along the path 
can check to see if B can be reached using bloom filter routing, attempting to detect 
a shorter path. 
If A is unable to find a shared landmark that is within 3 hops of B, then A is 
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unable to route to B. This situation may arise if B is very weakly connected to 
the network and is not within three hops of any landmark. Thus, users who are not 
within three hops of a landmark are unreachable by other users via the coordinate 
mechanism. However, they can still originate communication to other reachable users, 
as well as receive communication from users within their three-hop radius. 
Landmark selection 
Next, we discuss how to select landmarks. Too few landmarks limits the reachability 
of users in the network. Too many landmarks impacts the efficiency of the system, as 
the sizes of the coordinates grow with each additional landmark. Ideally, one would 
like to pick the minimal set of users to be landmarks, such that every user in the 
network is within 3 hops of at least one landmark. 
We use a simple distributed landmark selection scheme. Each user periodically 
checks to see if she is within 3 hops of a landmark. If not, and the user is sufficiently 
well connected to the network (i.e., she has at least Lmin friends), the user becomes 
a landmark herself. This scheme guarantees that all sufficiently well connected users 
are reachable, but it does not guarantee a minimally-sized set of landmarks. 
8.5.5 Decentralized credit update 
When the path in the trust network between the sender and receiver has been deter-
mined, the credit balances and bounds are updated in a decentralized manner during 
authorization, classification, and token expiration. 
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During authorization, the sender sends a signed authorization request message 
along the path. This request includes a unique identifier, the public key of the desti-
nation, and the destination's bloom filter and coordinate. Each user along the path (i) 
forwards the message, (ii) updates the balances and bounds of the message's incoming 
and outgoing links according to the rules stated below, (iii) records the destination, 
request identifier, previous hop, next hop, and expiration time of the request, and 
(iv) sets a timer for the expiration time. When the destination receives the request, 
it issues a signed token and sends it directly to the sender. 
The link bounds are updated as follows. Each user along the path increments the 
lower bound L for the next hop, as was done in the centralized Ostra described in 
Section 8.2. Thus, the state of the network after a token is issued is exactly as shown 
in Figure 8.4 (b). 
During classification, the destination sends a signed classification message along 
the path in the reverse direction. Each user checks if she has a record of a matching 
authorization request. If so, the adjustments of the link bounds performed during 
the authorization are undone, and the link balances are adjusted as described below. 
The message is then forwarded, and the record is deleted. Otherwise, if no matching 
record exists, the message is ignored. 
The link balances are adjusted as was done in the centralized case. If the message 
was classified as wanted, the link balances are not changed, as shown in Figure 8.4 (d). 
However, if the message was classified as unwanted, each user raises the credit balance 
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Figure 8.12 : Diagram of how credit exchange occurs when X sends to W, with the 
penalty for dropping being one credit. The state of the link credits is shown (a) before 
the message is sent, (b) before the message is classified, and (c) after the timeout T 
if Z drops the message. 
of the next hop in the path (the user to whom the original request was forwarded) 
and lowers the credit balance of the previous hop (the user from whom the original 
request was received). In this case, the resultant state of the network is shown in 
Figure 8.4 (c). . 
When the timer associated with an authorization request expires, then the user 
undoes the adjustments made to the link states during the authorization phase and 
deletes the request record. 
Because authorization and classification messages are forwarded by the Ostra 
agents of users in the trust network, one concern is whether malicious users can 
simply drop such incoming messages. To protected against this, we provide users 
with an incentive to forward authorization requests and responses: users penalize the 
next hop along the path by lowering the next hop's credit if the message does not 
reach its destination. 
Each user along the path adjusts the next hop's upper bound U by a penalty 
amount during the authorization phase. When the message is classified by the des-
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tination, the bound is restored. Otherwise, if a user drops the message, each of the 
users penalizes the next hop after the timeout T. An example is shown in Figure 8.12: 
while the message is pending classification (b), both the upper bound U and the lower 
bound L are changed to account for all possible outcomes. In the case in which Z 
drops the message (c), X penalizes Y, and Y penalizes Z. Thus, Z is penalized for 
dropping the message, whereas Y, who properly forwarded the message, has a neutral 
outcome. 
8.5.6 Security and privacy 
One concern is whether malicious users can abuse the false positives in the bloom 
niters to attract request to be routed through them. In order to maintain an accept-
able false positive rate, users select the number of hash functions and the bloom filter 
length so that the number of bits set to 1 is less than a specified values Bmax. Any 
bloom filters with more than Bmax bits set is ignored. Otherwise, malicious users 
could simply create bloom filters consisting of all Is, implying that they would be a 
good choice when routing to any other user. Appropriate settings can be indepen-
dently determined based on the size of the their two hop neighborhood. 
In Ostra, it is not possible to explore the trust network beyond two hops, due 
to the use of private aliases. By requesting the bloom filters of many nodes, it is 
however possible to determine the identities of friends of a friend with high probability. 
However, many deployed social networks, such as FaceBook [49] and Linkedln [95] 
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do in fact already allow two-hop browsing, so there is no loss of privacy in many 
applications. 
8.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented Ostra, a system that leverages the difficulty in cre-
ating and maintaining links in social networks to prevent unwanted communication. 
Ostra ensures that unwanted communication strains the originator's trust relation-
ships, even if the sender has no direct relationship with the ultimate recipient of 
the communication. A user who continues to send unwanted communication risks 
isolation and the eventual inability to communicate. Finally, we demonstrated that 
Ostra can effectively prevent unwanted communication upon a social network from a 
real-world site. 
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Chapter 9 
PeerSpective: Leveraging Shared Interest 
Over the last decade, the World Wide Web and Web search engines have fundamen-
tally transformed the way people find and share information. Recently, a new form of 
publishing and locating information, known as online social networking, has become 
very popular. While numerous studies have focussed on the hyperlinked structure of 
the Web and have exploited it for searching content, few studies, if any, have examined 
the information exchange in online social networks. 
In the Web, explicit links called hyperlinks between content (typically pages) are 
the primary tool for structuring information. Hyperlinks are used by authors to 
embed a page in the Web of related information, by human users to manually browse 
the Web, and by search engines to crawl the Web to index content, as well as to rank 
or estimate the relevance of content for a search query. 
In contrast to the Web, no explicit links exist between the content (typically 
photos, videos, and blog postings) stored in social networks. Instead, explicit links 
between users, who generate or publish the content, serve as the primary structuring 
tool. For example, in social networking sites like MySpace [111], Orkut [121], and 
Flickr [52], a link from user A to user B usually indicates that A finds the information 
published by B interesting or relevant, or A implicitly endorses 5's content due to an 
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established social relationship. Such social links enable users to manually browse for 
information that is likely of interest to them, and could be used by search tools to 
index and locate information. 
In this chapter, we seek to understand whether the shared interest that these 
social links represent can be exploited by systems. To answer this question, we design, 
build, and deploy PeerSpective, a prototype system that leverages the shared interest 
between users in a social network to produce more relevant Web search results. 
Overall, we make three contributions. First, we compare the mechanisms for 
content publication and location in the Web and online social networks. We argue 
that search techniques could benefit from integrating the different mechanisms used 
to find relevant content in the Web and social networks. Second, we present the 
design of PeerSpective, a Web search system that leverages the shared interest from a 
social network to improve Web search. Third, we present results from a deployment 
of PeerSpective that support our contention that shared interest in social networks 
can be leveraged in systems. 
9.1 The Web versus social networks 
We begin with a comparison of the Web and social networking systems, with respect 
to their mechanisms for publishing and locating content.1 Publishing refers to the 
mechanism by which content creators make information available to other users; it 
'We ignore the mechanisms for distributing content between users as they are similar in both 
the Web and many current online social networks. In both systems, the content is transferred using 
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includes the way users relate their content to other content found in the system. 
Locating refers to the mechanism by which users find information relevant to them; 
it includes the ways users browse or search the content in the system. 
9.1.1 The Web 
In the Web, the content typically consists of Web pages written in HTML. 
Publishing 
Users publish content by placing documents on a Web server. An author places 
hyperlinks into her page that refer to related pages. She may also ask other authors 
to include links to her page in their pages. Often, such links are placed deliberately 
to ensure the page is indexed and ranked highly by search engines. 
Locating 
Today, the predominant way of locating information on the Web is via a search engine. 
Modern Web search engines employ sophisticated information retrieval techniques and 
impressive systems engineering to achieve high-quality search results at massive scale. 
The key idea behind search engines like Google is to exploit the hyperlink structure 
of the Web to determine both the corpus of information they index and the relevance 
of a Web page relative to a given query [122]. This approach has proven highly 
HTTP over TCP, and the users navigate the systems using their Web browser. 
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effective, because the incident links to a page are strong indicators of the importance 
or relevance of the page's content in the eyes of other users. 
However, hyperlink-based search has some well known limitations. First, while 
Web search is very effective for relatively static information, it may under-rate or 
miss recently published content. For a new page to be noticed and appropriately 
ranked by a search engine, (a) it must be discovered and indexed by the search 
engine, (b) hyperlinks to the new page must be included in subsequently published 
or edited pages, and (c) all such links must then be discovered by the search engine. 
Second, as search engines determine the relevance of a page by its incident hyper-
links, their rating reflects the interests and biases of the Web community at large. For 
instance, a search for "Michael Jackson" yields mostly pages with information about 
the pop star. Computer scientists, however, may find the Web page of a professor 
with the same name more relevant. Refining the search to find that page is possible 
but can be tricky, particularly if one does not recall the professor's current affiliation 
or field of specialization. 
Third, the hyperlink structure influences whether a page is included in a search 
engine's index. Unlinked pages and non-publicly accessible pages are not indexed. 
Many other pages are not indexed because the search engine deems them insufficiently 
relevant, due to their location in the hyperlink structure. As a result, obscure, special-
interest content is less likely to be accessible via Web search. 
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9.1.2 Social Networks 
Online social networking Web sites have recently exploded in popularity. Sites offer 
services for finding friends like MySpace [111], Orkut [121], and Friendster [55], for 
sharing photos like Flickr [52], for sharing videos like YouTube [167] and Google 
Video [62], and for writing blogs like LiveJournal [97] and BlogSpot [20]. These 
sites are extremely popular with users: MySpace claims to have over 246 million 
users, while Facebook and Orkut boast 124 million and 67 million users, respectively. 
MySpace recently has even been observed to receive more page hits than Google [112]. 
Examples of online social networking, though, have existed for much longer. For 
instance, the common practice of placing content on the Web and sending its URL 
to friends or colleagues is essentially an instance of social networking. Typically, the 
author has no intention of linking the content; thus, the content remains invisible to 
users other than the explicit recipients of the URL. The content is advertised not via 
hyperlinks, but via links between users. 
Publishing 
Users publish content by posting it on a social networking site. Content is associated 
with the user who introduced it, and with users who explicitly recommend the content. 
Explicit links do not generally exist between content instances, and the content can 
be of any type. Often, the content is temporal in nature (e.g., blog postings), non-
textual (e.g., photos and video clips), and may be of interest only to a small audience. 
202 
Independent of the content, users maintain links to other users, which indicate trust 
or shared interest. 
Locating 
The predominant method of finding information in online social networks is to nav-
igate through the social network, browsing content introduced or recommended by 
other users. Some sites also provide keyword-based search for textual or tagged con-
tent. Additionally, other sites have 'top-10' lists showing the most popular content, 
where the popularity is determined according to how often users have accessed the 
content or based on explicit recommendations provided by users. 
Moreover, social networks enable users to find timely, relevant and reliable infor-
mation. This is because users can browse adjacent regions of their social network, 
which likely consist of users with shared interests or mutual trust. Since the content 
can be non-textual, obscure, or short-lived, it may be hard to find by the way of Web 
search. For example, blog posts are generally of short-term interest, videos and pho-
tos are non-textual, and all three types of content tend to be of interest to a limited 
audience. 
Content in social networks can also be rated rapidly, based on implicit and explicit 
feedback of a large community of content consumers. In contrast, Web search relies 
on the slower process of discovering hyperlinks in the Web, which are created by a 
relatively smaller number of content authors. Since content rating in social networks 
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is performed by the content consumers, rather than the producers, content introduced 
into the network can by rated almost immediately. 
9.1.3 Leveraging shared interest in Web search 
Today, the information stored in different social networks and in the Web is mostly 
disjoint. Each system has its own method of searching information. While search 
companies have started to address this issue with specialized search tools for RSS-
based news feeds and for blogs, there is no unified search tool that locates information 
across different systems. Social network-based search methods are not generally used 
in the Web, though services like Google Scholar support search facilities tailored to a 
specific community. Given that end users access both the Web and the social networks 
from the same browsers, it seems natural to unify the methods to find information as 
well. 
In this chapter, we explore the idea of integrating Web search with search in 
social networks, with the goal of leveraging the shared interest that exists between 
users. We believe that such an approach could combine the strengths of both types 
of systems: simultaneously exploiting the information contained in hyperlinks, and 
information from implicit and explicit user feedback; leveraging the huge investment 
in conventional Web search, while also ranking search results relative to the interests 
of a social network; and locating timely, short-lived, non-textual or special-interest 
information alongside the vast amounts of long-lived and textual information on the 
Web. 
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9.2 PeerSpective 
Our discussion above suggests that (a) a growing body of Internet content cannot 
be retrieved by traditional Web search as it is not well-connected to the hyperlinked 
Web, and that (b) social network links can be leveraged to improve the quality of 
search results. To explore this potential, we designed, built, and deployed the Peer-
Spective system. In this section, we describe the design of PeerSpective and discuss 
our experimental results. 
9.2.1 Design 
PeerSpective is designed as a lightweight HTTP proxy. Thus, each PeerSpective user 
configures their Web browser to use PeerSpective as a HTTP proxy, which allows 
PeerSpective to observe the content of pages that the client browses to. PeerSpective 
decodes these pages, parses out the text for know document formats (currently HTML 
and PDF), and then indexes the documents with the enclosed text. 
When the user performs a Google search, the proxy transparently forwards the 
query to both Google, as normal, as well as the PeerSpective proxies of other users in 
the social network. Each proxy (including the user's local proxy) executes the query 
on the local index and returns the result to the sender. 
The results are then collated and presented alongside the Google results as shown 
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in Figure 9.1. To do so, PeerSpective modifies the returned HTML from Google in 
order to include the PeerSpective results. Thus, to use PeerSpective, the user does 
not have to do any work, beyond the initial setup of PeerSpective. The PeerSpective 
index is populated as the user browses the Web normally, and Web search results are 
automatically inserted into the Google results page. 
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Figure 9.1 : Screenshot of our PeerSpective search interface. Results from the dis-
tributed cache appear alongside the normal Google results. 
Our PeerSpective implementation is built using the Lucene [98] text search engine 
and the FreePastry [54] peer-to-peer overlay. We configured Lucene to follow Google's 
query language, so that search qualifiers such as '+ ' , '-', and quotes would be consis-
tent across both systems. We also configured Lucene to automatically remove pages 
older than 30 days in order to prevent the index from getting stale. 
We ranked the results obtained from PeerSpective by multiplying the Lucene score 
of a search result by the Google PageRank of that result and adding the scores from all 
users who previously viewed the result. Thus, PeerSpective's ranking takes advantage 
of both the hyperlinks of the Web (via Google's PageRank) and the social links of 
the user community. 
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9.2.2 Privacy 
One potential concern with the PeerSpective architecture is the privacy of the users. 
PeerSpective indexes browsed Web pages, which sometimes contain sensitive informa-
tion. In order to mitigate the privacy impact of PeerSpective on users, we configured 
PeerSpective to only serve HTTP, and specifically not HTTPS, traffic. As many 
privacy-sensitive services, such as online banking and email, use HTTPS, this pre-
vents such sites from being indexed by PeerSpective. We also configured PeerSpective 
to respect the "Cache-Control" header returned by servers by only indexing pages that 
were labeled "Cache-Control: public". 
When using PeerSpective, users only see aggregated results, and are not aware 
of which user returned which result. Thus, users in PeerSpective have fc-anonymity, 
where k is the size of the group running PeerSpective. Finally, we configured a simple 
control panel for PeerSpective that allowed users to browse their local index, and to 
remove any pages that they did not wish to be included. 
9.2.3 Experimental methodology 
We recruited a group of 10 graduate students and researchers the Max Planck Institute 
for Software Systems to run PeerSpective. We present measurements and experiences 
from a one month long experimental deployment. During this time, the 10 users issued 
439,384 HTTP requests covering 198,492 distinct URLs. Only 25.9% of the HTTP 
requests were of content type text /html or application/pdf, meaning they could 
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be indexed by our proxy. The remaining requests consisted of images, javascript, and 
other miscellaneous types. 
Given that our user base is small, includes the authors, and represents a single 
community with highly specialized interests, we cannot claim that our results would 
be representative of a deployment with a larger, diverse user base. However, we 
believe our results indicate the potential of social network-based Web search. 
9.2.4 Limits of hyperlink-based search 
Even the best Web search engines do not index content that is not well linked to 
the general Web or content that is not publicly available. So, our first goal is to 
understand and quantify the Internet content that is viewed by users, but is not 
captured by the search engines. We would also like to know how much of this content 
is already indexed by another user in PeerSpective. 
To estimate the limits of hyperlink-based search, we check what fraction of the 
URLs actually visited by the users are not indexed by Google. There are a number 
of reasons why a page may not be indexed by Google: (a) the page could be too new, 
such a as blog posting or news article; (b) the page could be in the deep web and not 
well-connected enough for Google to choose to crawl it; or (c) the page could be in 
the dark web, where it is not publicly available or is not referred to by any other page. 
For each HTTP request, we checked whether Google's index contains the URL, 
and if some peer in PeerSpective has previously viewed the URL. Since search engines 
208 
only index static HTML content, we considered only URLs of indexable content types 
that did not have any GET or POST parameters and ended in either . html or . htm. 
Further, we discarded URLs with an auto-refresh feature (such as the scoreboard sites 
for sports), as they would artificially bias the results against Google. This left us with 
6,679 requests for 3,987 URLs. 
Our analysis shows that Google's index covers only 62.5%' of the requests, repre-
senting 68.1% of the distinct URLs. This implies that about one third of all URLs 
requested by our users cannot be retrieved by searching Google! Our analysis also 
showed that the union of the PeerSpective peer indexes covers about 30.4% of the 
requested URLs. While PeerSpective achieves only half of the coverage of Google's 
index, it does this with a much smaller size: at the end of the experiment, the Peer-
Spective indexes contained 51,410 URLs, compared to Google's index of over 8 billion 
URLs. 
Additionally, we found that 13.3% of the URLs viewed were contained in Peer-
Spective but not in Google's index. These documents were not available via Google's 
search engine but had been requested before by someone in the peer network. This 
increase in coverage amounts to a 19.5% improvement by PeerSpective compared to 
normal Google search. It is worth noting that, for our small social network of com-
puter science researchers, this improvement in coverage was possible by adding just 
a few thousand URLs to a Google index containing billions or URLs. 
Our results naturally raise the question, what are these documents that are of a of 
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U R L 
jwz.livejournal.com/413222.html 
www.mpi-sws.mpg.de/ ... /pres0031.html 
sandiego.craigslist.org/w4m/179184549.html 
edition.cnn.com/ ... /italy.nesta/index.html 
72 163/status.asp 
www.itv.com/news/ ... a8e4b6ea.html 
www.stat.rice.edu/~riedi/ ... /target21.html 
amarok.kde.org/forum/index.php/board,9.20.html 
Too new 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Deep web Dark web 
/ 
/ 
/ 
• 
/ 
/ 
Table 9.1 : Sample URLs that were not indexed by Google. We manually inspected 
the URLS to determine the likely reason for not being in Google's index, as discussed 
in Section 9.2.4: 
interest to our users, but are not indexed by Google? We manually analyzed a number 
of such URLs and show a random sample of them in Table 9.1. We additionally list 
the likely reasons why each URL does not appear in Google's index. 
9.2.5 Benefits of social network-based search 
Another challenge facing search engines is ranking all the indexed documents in the 
order of their relevance to a user's query. Ranking is crucial for search, as most users 
rarely go beyond the first few query results [146]. Our goal here is to study how often 
users click on query results from PeerSpective as opposed to Google. As shown in 
Figure 9.1, our users are presented with results from both Google and PeerSpective 
for every Google query. 
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During the course of the month, we observed 1,730 Google searches. While 
Google's first result page contained an average of 9.45 results, our smaller PeerSpec-
tive index resulted in an average of 5.17 results on the first page. Of the 1,730 queries, 
1,079 (62.3%) resulted in clicks on one or more search result links, 307 (17.7%) were 
followed by a refined query, and after the remaining 344 (19.8%), the user gave up. 
We found that 933 (86.5%) of the clicked results were returned only by Google, 83 
(7.7%) of the clicked results were returned only by PeerSpective, and 63 (5.7%) of the 
clicked results were returned by both. This amounts to a 9% improvement in search 
result clicks over Google alone, as 83 of the search result clicks would not have been 
possible without PeerSpective. 
It should be kept in mind that this 9% improvement over Google, considered 
by many to be the gold standard for Web search engineering, was achieved by a 
simple, very small, social network-based system quickly put together by three systems 
researchers over a period of a few days. Based on our early experience, we feel that 
these results suggest inherent advantages of using social links for search, which could 
be exploited better with more careful engineering. 
9.3 Discussion 
To better understand the cases when PeerSpective search results outperform Google 
results, we manually analyzed the corresponding queries and result clicks. We show 
a random sample of the data we analyzed in Table 9.2. We observed that the reasons 
211 
for clicks on PeerSpective results fall into three categories, described below. 
9.3.1 Disambiguation 
Some search terms have multiple meanings depending on the context. Search engines 
generally assume the most popular term definition. Social networks can take advan-
tage of the fact that communities tend to share definitions or interpretation of such 
terms. An example for disambiguation is shown in Table 9.2, where a user's query 
for "bus" yielded the local bus schedule, as it is the page with this keyword that is 
most visited by local users in the network. 
Query 
bus 
Stefan 
pe te r 
Serbian currency 
coolstreaming 
moose 
nuinchen 
Page clicked on 
Saarbriicken bus schedule 
FIFA World Cup site 
Peter Druschel's home page 
XE.com exchange rates 
CoolStreaming INFOCOM paper 
Northwest Airlines' contract of carriage 
Peter Druschel's homepage 
D 
/ 
/ 
R 
/ 
/ 
/ 
S 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Table 9.2 : Sample search queries for which PeerSpective returned results not in 
Google. The results are categorized into the three different scenarios of disambigua-
tion (D), ranking (R), and serendipity (S) discussed in Section 9.3. 
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9.3.2 Ranking 
Search engines rank all relevant documents and return the top of the resulting list. 
Social networks can inform and bias the ranking algorithm, since nearby users in the 
network often find similar sets of pages relevant. An example we observed is a search 
with the term "coolstreaming". A Google search ranks most highly popular sites (such 
as Wikipedia) discussing the CoolStreaming technique for P2P streaming of multi-
media content. PeerSpective ranked the INFOCOM paper describing CoolStreaming 
at the top, as it is most relevant to our researchers. 
9.3.3 Serendipity 
While browsing the Web, users often discover interesting information by accident, 
clicking on links that they had not intended to query for. This process, termed 
serendipity, is an integral part of the Web browsing experience. Search results from 
PeerSpective provide ample opportunity for such discoveries. For example, while 
looking for information about "Miinchen" (Munich), one of our users discovered that 
a fellow researcher attended school in Miinchen, thus finding a convenient source of 
information about the city. 
9.4 Summary 
Online social networking enables new forms of information exchange in the Inter-
net. First, end users can very easily and conveniently publish information, without 
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necessarily linking it to the wider Web. Second, social networks make it possible to 
locate and access information that was previously exchanged by "word of mouth", 
that is, by explicit communication between individuals. Third, unlike Web search 
engines, which organize the world of information according to popular opinion, social 
networks can organize the world of information according to the shared interest of 
smaller groups of individuals. 
In this chapter, we explored the potential of the integration of the Web and social 
network search technologies. In a small-scale experiment, we found that a significant 
fraction of URLs requested by our users cannot be retrieved by today's most popular 
search engine, as the URLs are too new, of interest to only a small population, or not 
publicly available. However, we found that by including pages browsed to by friends 
in a social network, the index coverage could be increased significantly. Moreover, we 
found that by including these pages in search results, a noticeable improvement in 
click-rate was observed, underscoring the potential for leveraging the shared interest 
in social networks. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
Originally conceived to solve computational problems in science, defense, and busi-
ness, computer systems now augment many human activities, including communica-
tion and social interaction. Today, millions of people use information technology to 
work, play, read, learn, socialize, connect, and express themselves. This broad range 
of new applications inspired the work in this thesis, where we have measured and 
analyzed the properties of online social networks, and designed, deployed, and eval-
uated new information systems that exploit the properties of these networks. In the 
following sections, we describe the high-level contributions of this thesis and discuss 
potential future research directions. 
10.1 Summary 
Recently, online social networks have exploded in popularity. MySpace (over 246 
million users) and Facebook (over 124 million users) are examples of wildly popular 
networks that are used to find and organize contacts; numerous other sites are used 
to share photos, videos, blogs, and news items. Despite the massive popularity of 
online social networks, surprisingly little is known about how people are using them 
to connect and share content. To better understand the structure of online social 
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networks, we conducted a large-scale measurement study that collected data on the 
social networks of four popular sites, covering over 11 million users and 328 million 
links. Surprisingly, the results showed that the social network graphs contained in 
different sites shared a number of graph-theoretic properties, even though the sites 
have very different goals, mechanisms, and policies. These results have a number of 
implications for system designers. For example, all the networks contain a dense core 
of popular users that holds the network together; any information flowing through 
the network must traverse this core, implying that these users will naturally have 
significant influence on the spread of information. This was the first study to collect 
data at large scale and the first study to collect data on multiple social networks. 
Moreover, we were the first to make the collected data available to the research 
community; the data is currently in use by more than 100 research groups. 
The static graph structure present in online social networks reflects the process 
by which users create links; to understand this process, it is necessary to observe how 
the networks change and grow over time. Thus, we conducted a second measure-
ment study that collected data from multiple online social networks by crawling the 
network daily for more than three months. This was the first study to collect net-
work growth data at significant scale and at fine temporal resolution. The analysis of 
this growth data provides intuitive explanations for a number of the observed struc-
tural properties. The results of our study can be used as the basis for constructing 
synthetic networks that reflect both global and local characteristics of online social 
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networks, leading to better structural and growth models. We also made the data 
in this study available to the research community and it is currently in use by more 
than 25 research groups. 
We have also examined the community structure of online social networks. We 
found that individual users are often members of multiple overlapping communities, 
but that existing algorithms for detecting communities do not perform well on real 
data from an online social network. We addressed this limitation by devising a new 
algorithm that can accurately detect multiple overlapping communities when given 
information about a small subset of the community members. In practice, even if only 
10% of users provide community information to social networking sites, the remaining 
community members can be determined by this algorithm with high accuracy. We 
demonstrated that this approach can identify communities at a range of scales on a 
university network: small communities such as sports teams, larger communities such 
as dormitories, and even very large communities such as every student matriculating 
in the same year. 
While valuable, the measurement studies described above are not an end per 
se, rather, they are a first-order concern when trying to build better systems. For 
example, links between users in online social networks can represent trust (e.g., users 
who know each other in the offline world) and shared interest (e.g., users who belong 
to the same community). We have built two new information systems that exploit 
each of these properties to solve open problems - these are briefly described below. 
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First, we demonstrated how to use social networks to address the problem of un-
wanted communication. Internet-based communication systems such as email, IM, 
VoIP, online social networks, and content-sharing sites allow communication at near 
zero marginal cost to users. Unfortunately, this property can be abused for the pur-
pose of spam, unsolicited marketing, propaganda, or disruption of legitimate commu-
nication. 
Using insights on trust in online social networks, we presented Ostra, a novel 
mechanism that exploits trust relationships among users to block unwanted commu-
nication. Ostra uses an existing network, such as a social network, to connect senders 
and receivers via chains of pairwise relationships, keeping a credit score associated 
with each link in the network. A user's links are penalized when she sends unwanted 
communication, and users whose links have all run out of credit must wait to send 
messages. Ostra is novel in that it is the first system that can. without assuming 
strong user identities, effectively ensure that having multiple identities does not ben-
efit the attacker. Ostra is sufficiently general that it can be used not only on social 
networks, but on any network in which links require some effort to form and maintain. 
Second, we showed how social networks can be used to mitigate the privacy and 
access challenges that arise when the amount of shared content is growing at an ex-
ponential rate. In particular, the growing amount of shared content on online social 
networks is leading to two pressing challenges. First, since users are sharing increas-
ingly personal information, the issue of privacy and access control is becoming more 
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important. Second, since the volume of shared content is growing at an exponential 
rate, finding relevant information is becoming more difficult. 
Using insights from our measurement studies, we proposed using communities 
to address these growing dilemmas. Communities can aid in both access control 
(since they represent a natural middle ground between a user's immediate friends 
and the rest of the world) and in information retrieval (since they often represent 
sets of users with shared interests). To demonstrate this approach in a deployed 
system, we presented the design, implementation, and deployment of PeerSpective, 
a system that uses a social network to provide better search results than socially-
oblivious search engines like Google. A preliminary version of PeerSpective showed 
a 7% improvement in click-rate over existing Web search technologies, underscoring 
the potential of leveraging communities in social networks. 
10.2 Future work 
So far, we have studied how users interact on today's online social networks and ob-
served how the trust and shared interest that links represent can be used to solve 
systems problems. The recent explosion in popularity of online social networks un-
derscores the continuing integration of computing in our daily lives, a trend that 
provides a number of interesting research challenges. In the following paragraphs, we 
outline a few of these challenges. 
In this thesis, we have focused exclusively on the user graph of social networking 
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sites; many of these sites allow users to host content, which in turn can be linked 
to other users and content. Establishing the structure and dynamics of the content 
graph is an open problem, the solution to which will enable us to understand how 
content is introduced in these systems, how data gains popularity, how users interact 
with popular versus personal data, and whether these trends can be hardened to 
prevent deliberate manipulation. Similarly, the data we collected on the growth of 
online social networks can be used to test previously proposed growth models to see 
how well they match the observations, as well as to guide the development of new 
models based on empirical data. 
Users often share very personal information on today's online social networks, 
with little regard for who will be allowed to view the content. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this often results in unintended consequences, ranging from public em-
barrassment to job loss. The underlying problem is, essentially, ensuring privacy for 
users while allowing them to share information and knowledge freely. This problem 
has aspects that span the areas of security, systems, and interface design. Thus, one 
challenge is to design mechanisms that enable the wide-spread sharing that users de-
sire while ensuring that users understand who else is able to access their content. One 
potential first step to solving this problem is to use communities as an abstraction 
for expressing privacy policies, allowing users to share content with more than just 
their friends but not necessarily with the entire world. 
Another problem concerns ensuring the relevance of information obtained. In prior 
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information sharing networks, ranking systems have proved invaluable for finding rel-
evant information - the most well-known example is PageRank for Web documents. 
However, the content shared in emerging systems like online social networks is dif-
ferent from previous systems: the content items rarely have links to other content 
items; rather, the links connect the users themselves. Thus, a new approach to find-
ing relevant information is needed that can compute the reliability of a given piece of 
information based on the combined reputation of the users who created or endorsed 
it. Whereas a Web page linked to by nytimes. com is likely important (because many 
important pages link to nytimes.com), it is unclear whether this same transitive im-
portance will apply to links between users. Additionally, since this computation is 
based on a social network of users, the links between whom may represent shared 
interest, it may be possible to easily compute customized rankings for each user's 
interests. The PeerSpective system represents a first step in this direction, however, 
the general problem of finding relevant content remains an open challenge. 
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